Bird v. Saenz
51 P.3d 324, 28 Cal. 4th 910, 2002 Daily Journal DAR 9137 (2002)
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Rule of Law:
For a bystander to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress in a medical malpractice context, the plaintiff must have a contemporaneous, understanding awareness of the negligent conduct itself as it is causing the injury, not merely an awareness of the injurious consequences of the conduct.
Facts:
- Nita Bird was diagnosed with metastatic ovarian cancer and required chemotherapy.
- On November 30, 1994, Nita's daughter, Janice Bird, brought her to the hospital for the outpatient surgical insertion of a Port-A-Cath to facilitate treatment.
- During the procedure, which took place outside of Janice's presence, one of the defendant physicians transected Nita's artery, causing severe internal bleeding.
- After a long wait, a physician told Janice they had encountered trouble and that Nita might have had a mild stroke.
- Shortly thereafter, Janice saw her mother, who was "bright blue," being rushed down a hallway by a team of doctors and nurses.
- A doctor informed Janice that they believed they had nicked an artery or vein and were trying to keep Nita alive.
- Nita's other daughter, Dayle Edgmon, then arrived, and both daughters witnessed Nita, still blue and in distress, being rushed to emergency surgery, believing she was bleeding to death.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiffs, the daughters of Nita Bird, sued the defendant physicians in superior court for wrongful death and negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED).
- Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the NIED claim.
- The superior court (trial court) granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
- Plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeal.
- The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's decision, finding there was a triable issue of fact.
- The Supreme Court of California granted review, limited to the issue of whether summary judgment was properly granted on the NIED claim.
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Issue:
Does a plaintiff who observes the injurious consequences of alleged medical malpractice, but not the underlying negligent act itself, satisfy the requirement of being contemporaneously aware of the injury-producing event for a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress?
Opinions:
Majority - Werdegar, J.
No. A plaintiff cannot recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress as a bystander to medical malpractice without perceiving the injury-producing event itself and understanding that it is causing injury. The court reaffirmed the strict, three-part test from Thing v. La Chusa, which requires that a plaintiff: (1) be closely related to the victim, (2) be present at the scene of the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and be then aware that it is causing injury, and (3) suffer serious emotional distress. Here, the plaintiffs did not meet the second requirement. The injury-producing event was the transection of the artery, which occurred in the operating room, unobserved by the plaintiffs. They only witnessed the later consequences of that event—their mother's physical distress and the frantic medical response. The court rejected the argument that the 'injury-producing event' could be redefined as the doctors' failure to diagnose and treat the severed artery, reasoning that such a medical determination is beyond the understanding awareness of a layperson. Citing Golstein v. Superior Court, the court held that recovery is barred where the plaintiff observes the victim's suffering but does not meaningfully comprehend the actual injury-causing event. Allowing recovery based on observing the injurious results, rather than the event itself, would eviscerate the Thing requirements and impose near-strict liability on healthcare providers for NIED.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrows the scope of bystander liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress in the context of medical malpractice. By strictly adhering to the Thing test's contemporaneous awareness requirement, the court establishes a high bar for plaintiffs, effectively precluding claims based on observing the aftermath of a medical error that was not itself perceptible to a layperson. The ruling insulates healthcare providers from NIED claims by family members who witness a patient's decline unless the malpractice is so overt and obvious that a bystander could understand the negligent act as it occurred. This clarification prevents the dilution of the Thing standard and avoids expanding liability into what the court sees as an unmanageable realm.
