Bierczynski v. Rogers

Supreme Court of Delaware
239 A.2d 218 (1968)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

A participant in a motor vehicle race on a public highway is liable for injuries to a non-participant resulting from the race, regardless of whether that participant's vehicle was directly involved in the collision.

Facts:

Robert C. Race and Ronald Bierczynski, co-workers, were driving their separate cars toward their place of employment.
Cecil B. Rogers, driving in the opposite direction, observed Race and Bierczynski driving down a steep hill on Lore Avenue.
Rogers testified that the two cars were driving side-by-side at approximately 55-60 mph in a 25 mph zone, with Race's front bumper near Bierczynski's back bumper.
Before reaching an intersection, Race swerved back into his lane behind Bierczynski.
After crossing the intersection, Race's car lost control, careened sideways, and struck the front of Rogers' car, which was stopped in the oncoming lane.
Bierczynski's vehicle did not make physical contact with Rogers' vehicle and came to a stop about 35 feet from the site of the collision.

Procedural Posture:

Cecil B. Rogers and Susan D. Rogers sued Robert C. Race and Ronald Bierczynski for negligence in a Delaware trial court.
A jury returned a special verdict, finding that both Race and Bierczynski were negligent and that the negligence of each was a proximate cause of the accident.
The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs against both defendants jointly.
Defendant Bierczynski appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court of Delaware.

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Issue:

Does participation in a motor vehicle race on a public highway make a driver liable for injuries caused by another racer, even if the first driver's vehicle does not physically contact the injured party's vehicle?

Opinions:

Majority - Herrmann, Justice

Yes. A participant in a motor vehicle race on a public highway is an act of concurrent negligence imposing liability on each participant for any injury to a non-participant resulting from the race. The court reasoned that all parties engaged in a race are wrongdoers acting in concert. Each participant is liable for harm to a third person arising from the tortious conduct of the other because they have induced and encouraged the tort. Therefore, even though Bierczynski's car did not physically strike the Rogers' vehicle, his participation in the speed competition was a proximate cause of the accident, making him jointly liable for the resulting damages.

Analysis:

This decision solidifies the application of the "concert of action" theory to torts involving street racing. It establishes a precedent that the act of participating in a race is sufficient to establish proximate cause for any resulting harm, relieving plaintiffs of the burden of proving that the non-colliding defendant's specific actions directly caused the other racer to crash. The ruling significantly expands liability for all participants in such dangerous activities, holding them jointly responsible as if they were a single entity. This lowers the evidentiary bar for victims and reinforces the public policy against racing on public roads.

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