Biden v. Texas
597 U. S. ____ (2022) (2022)
Rule of Law:
The statutory authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(C), which states the Secretary of Homeland Security "may" return certain aliens to a contiguous territory, is discretionary and does not become a mandatory duty even if the government lacks the resources to comply with the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b)(2)(A).
Facts:
- In December 2018, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under the Trump administration established the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), also known as the 'Remain in Mexico' policy.
- Under MPP, certain non-Mexican nationals arriving by land from Mexico were returned to Mexico to await their U.S. removal proceedings.
- The policy was implemented pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(C), which provides that the Secretary 'may' return such aliens to the contiguous territory.
- The Government of Mexico agreed to cooperate with the United States in administering the program.
- DHS has consistently lacked sufficient funding and capacity to detain every alien subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).
- On January 20, 2021, the incoming Biden administration announced it would suspend new enrollments in MPP.
- On June 1, 2021, DHS Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas issued a memorandum officially terminating the MPP program.
Procedural Posture:
- The States of Texas and Missouri sued the Biden administration in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, challenging the termination of MPP.
- The District Court entered judgment for the States, vacated the June 1 termination memorandum, and issued a nationwide injunction ordering the government to reimplement MPP in good faith.
- The government appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which denied the government's request to stay the injunction.
- The U.S. Supreme Court also denied the government's application for a stay.
- While the appeal was pending, the Secretary of Homeland Security issued a new memorandum on October 29, 2021, again terminating MPP with a more detailed explanation.
- The Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment, holding that the October 29 memorandum was not a new, final agency action and that terminating MPP violated the INA.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Fifth Circuit's decision.
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Issue:
Does the Immigration and Nationality Act compel the Secretary of Homeland Security to maintain the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP) when the government lacks sufficient capacity to detain all aliens subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Roberts
No. The Immigration and Nationality Act does not compel the Secretary to maintain the MPP. The text of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(C) uses the word 'may,' which unambiguously connotes discretionary authority, not a mandatory duty. The lower courts erred by inferring that this discretionary authority becomes mandatory when the government cannot comply with the separate mandatory detention requirement of § 1225(b)(2)(A). If Congress had intended such a result, it would have used explicit language rather than relying on an unspoken inference that contradicts the plain text. The historical context and significant foreign policy implications of mandating negotiations with Mexico further support that the authority is discretionary. Furthermore, the October 29 Memoranda, which provided a new and more thorough explanation for terminating MPP, constituted a new and valid final agency action because the agency chose to 'deal with the problem afresh' after the initial remand, which is a permissible option under administrative law.
Concurring - Justice Kavanaugh
No. When detention capacity is insufficient, the immigration statutes provide DHS with two legally permissible options: granting parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) or returning noncitizens to Mexico under § 1225(b)(2)(C). The Executive Branch has substantial discretion to choose between these options, and different administrations may exercise that discretion differently. While the exercise of that discretion must be reasonable and reasonably explained under the Administrative Procedure Act, the question of whether the administration's final termination memo meets that standard remains open for the lower courts to decide on remand. In conducting that review, courts must be deferential to the President’s foreign policy judgments.
Dissenting - Justice Alito
Yes. The government's rescission of MPP violates the Immigration and Nationality Act because the Act provides a clear and unequivocal mandate that aliens who are not clearly admissible 'shall be detained.' When the government cannot fulfill this mandatory duty due to capacity limits, it cannot simply release aliens into the country. Instead, it must utilize the other lawful alternatives Congress provided: returning aliens to a contiguous territory or granting parole on a true case-by-case basis. The majority's isolated focus on the word 'may' ignores the statute's overall structure, which creates a hydraulic relationship between the options. By refusing to use the contiguous-territory return authority, DHS is violating the statute's clear command.
Dissenting - Justice Barrett
This opinion does not answer the issue on the merits, but agrees with the majority's merits analysis. The Court should not have reached the merits of the case. Instead, it should have vacated the lower court's judgment and remanded for reconsideration of jurisdiction in light of the Court's recent decision in Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez. The majority rushes to decide a complex jurisdictional question under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1)—whether it limits subject-matter jurisdiction or only remedies—on a compressed timeline with inadequate briefing. This short-circuits the ordinary judicial process on an important issue that deserved more thorough consideration by the lower courts first.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms the significant discretion afforded to the Executive Branch in implementing immigration policy and conducting foreign affairs. By strictly interpreting the word 'may' as discretionary, the Court rejected an attempt to have the judiciary compel the use of a specific enforcement tool based on resource constraints in another area. This solidifies the principle that separate statutory mandates and discretionary authorities are read independently unless Congress explicitly links them. The ruling also provides important administrative law guidance, clarifying that an agency, after a judicial remand, can supersede its prior invalidated action with a new one, thereby resetting the terms of judicial review without being bound by its initial reasoning.
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