Bice v. Petro-Hunt, L.L.C.

North Dakota Supreme Court
768 N.W.2d 496, 2009 ND 124, 177 Oil & Gas Rep. 285 (2009)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

In North Dakota, when an oil and gas lease requires royalty based on the 'market value at the well' for sour gas unmarketable at the wellhead, the 'at the well' rule applies, allowing lessees to deduct reasonable post-production processing costs using the work-back method; additionally, a 'free use' clause permits off-lease use of processed gas for essential operations benefiting all lessors; and specific contractual terms govern the reasonableness of risk-capital and depreciation deductions.


Facts:

  • Gulf Oil Corporation discovered the Little Knife Field in 1976 and built the Little Knife Gas Plant in the late 1970s to process sour casinghead gas.
  • The Little Knife Gas Plant removes hydrogen sulfide and liquid hydrocarbons, with residue gas and other products sold at or downstream of the plant tailgate.
  • A dispute between Gulf and royalty owners over gas valuation in the early 1980s led to a 1983 settlement agreement, which stated royalty would be determined by adding revenue from gas/products and subtracting processing costs.
  • Petro-Hunt, L.L.C., acquired the Little Knife Gas Plant and interests in the Little Knife Field in 1997, as successor to Chevron and the William Herbert Hunt Trust Estate.
  • Petro-Hunt paid royalty on casinghead gas on the same basis to all royalty owners, despite lease clauses calling for payments based on "market value of the gas at the well."
  • The gas from the Little Knife Field is sour and has no discernible market value at the well before it is processed to remove hydrogen sulfide and liquid hydrocarbons.
  • Petro-Hunt uses residue gas, after processing at the Little Knife Gas Plant, as fuel at three central tank batteries to heat, treat, and separate oil, gas, and water, which are essential functions typically performed at individual well sites.
  • The 1983 settlement agreement explicitly allowed a six percent risk-capital charge on undepreciated investment and specified a 13-year straight-line depreciation method, subject to annual review and adjustment for extended economic life.
  • Since acquiring the plant, Petro-Hunt made new capital investments totaling over $2 million and adjusted depreciation based on the extended economic life of the plant.
  • Petro-Hunt purchased the plant for $6,213,452 (net of salvage value) and has depreciated a total of $7,684,986 out of an $8,341,804 depreciable base (purchase price plus new capital additions).

Procedural Posture:

  • In 2001, royalty owners (Plaintiffs) brought suit against Petro-Hunt, L.L.C., in district court, asserting underpaid royalties due to post-wellhead cost deductions.
  • The royalty owners were certified as a Class in 2004.
  • In February 2007, Petro-Hunt moved for summary judgment, and the Class also requested partial summary judgment.
  • On April 30, 2007, the district court granted Petro-Hunt partial summary judgment, determining royalties should be calculated based on the work-back method, allowing deduction of commercially reasonable processing costs.
  • The district court refused to rule on the remaining issues at that time because discovery was not complete.
  • After discovery was completed, Petro-Hunt again moved for summary judgment.
  • In July 2008, the district court granted Petro-Hunt summary judgment on the remaining issues.
  • The Plaintiffs, proceeding as a class, appealed from the district court’s order granting Petro-Hunt summary judgment to the Supreme Court of North Dakota.

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Issue:

Does an oil and gas lessee, under a lease requiring royalty based on 'market value at the well,' have the right to deduct post-production processing costs from royalty payments when the gas produced is sour and unmarketable at the wellhead?


Opinions:

Majority - Crothers, Justice

Yes, an oil and gas lessee, under a lease requiring royalty based on 'market value at the well,' has the right to deduct post-production processing costs from royalty payments when the gas produced is sour and unmarketable at the wellhead. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that North Dakota joins the majority of states in adopting the 'at the well' rule and rejecting the 'first marketable product doctrine' for calculating oil and gas royalties. The court found the term 'market value at the well' is not ambiguous. Because the sour gas from the Little Knife Field has no discernible market value at the well before processing, the work-back method is appropriate to determine market value by deducting reasonable post-production costs (including transportation, gathering, compression, processing, treating, and marketing costs) from the downstream sales price. The court found persuasive the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of North Dakota law in Hurinenko v. Chevron, USA Inc., given similar facts involving unmarketable sour gas. The court also affirmed Petro-Hunt's right to use processed residue gas off the leased premises without paying royalty under the 'free use' clause. It interpreted the lease language ('on said land for its operation thereon' or 'from said land...for all its operations hereunder') to modify 'operations' rather than limiting the physical location of gas consumption, especially since consolidating facilities into central tank batteries was more efficient, minimized surface disturbance, allowed hydrocarbon recovery, and benefited both the lessee and lessors. A narrow interpretation would lead to absurd results, unfairly burdening a single lessor. Finally, the court affirmed Petro-Hunt's deductions for risk-capital and depreciation. It found the 6% risk-capital charge was explicitly allowed by the 1983 settlement agreement, and the Class failed to demonstrate it was excessive or no longer binding. Regarding depreciation, the court concluded the 1983 agreement and referenced tax agreement did not prohibit depreciation after July 22, 1990, but rather required annual review and adjustment based on the plant's economic life and new capital investments. The Class also failed to show Petro-Hunt depreciated the plant below its salvage value or that its fair market value exceeded its book value, as their calculations ignored the purchase price being net of salvage value and subsequent capital additions.



Analysis:

This case significantly clarifies North Dakota's stance on oil and gas royalty calculations, firmly aligning it with the 'at the well' rule and the use of the work-back method for unmarketable gas. The ruling provides crucial guidance for energy companies dealing with sour gas requiring substantial post-production processing, ensuring that reasonable costs incurred to make the gas marketable are deductible from royalty payments. Furthermore, the decision offers a practical interpretation of 'free use' clauses, allowing operational flexibility for lessees to consolidate facilities off-lease for efficiency, so long as these operations benefit all lessors. This reduces potential litigation over the geographic scope of such clauses and reinforces the importance of clear, comprehensive contractual agreements in managing royalty disputes and operational costs within the energy sector.

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