No, the government does not have to give everyone a personal hearing for a general rule change. It would be impossible for the government to get anything done if it had to listen to every single person every time it made a broad rule that affects many people. When a rule singles out a few people for a special reason (like making just a few houses on one street pay for new pavement), then those people get a hearing. But when a rule applies to everyone in a large group, like a whole city, people's power comes from electing the officials who make those rules, not from individual meetings.

No, not everyone gets to argue when the decision affects a large group in the same way. The Constitution doesn't say the government has to hold a big meeting and let everyone speak before making these kinds of decisions. Laws can sometimes greatly affect people without giving them a chance to argue because people protect their rights by electing those who make the laws. If the government decided to double taxes, we wouldn't say everyone's rights were violated unless they got to argue against it first. There has to be a limit, or the government wouldn't get anything done. The process of making laws is all that's required when the rules apply to many people equally. In a previous case where a small group was affected differently based on their specific situation, the court said they had a right to be heard. But that's very different from a general decision about how property is valued across a whole county.

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> <opinion type="majority"> <author id="b489-9"> Mr. Justice Holmes </author> delivered the opinion of the court. This is a suit to enjoin the State Board of Equalization and the Colorado Tax Commission from putting in force, and the defendant Pitcher as assessor of Denver from obeying, an order of the boards increasing the valuation of all taxable property in Denver forty per cent. The order *444 was sustained and the suit directed to be dismissed by the Süpreme Court of the State. 56 Colorado, 512. See 56 Colorado, 343. The plaintiff is the owner of real estate in Denver and brings the case here on the ground that it was given no opportunity to be heard and that therefore its property will be taken-without due process of law, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. That is the only question with which we have to deal. There are suggestions on the one side that the construction of the state constitution and laws was, an unwarranted surprise and on the other that the decision might have been placed, although it was not, on the ground that there was an adequate remedy at law. With these suggestions we have nothing to do. They are matters purely of state law. The answer to the former needs no amplification; that to the latter is that the allowance of equitable relief is a, question of state policy and &gt; that as the Supreme Court of the State treated the merits as legitimately before it, we are not to speculate whether it might or might not have thrown out the suit upon the preliminary ground. For . the purposes of decisiort we assume that the constitutional question is presented in the baldest way— that neither the plaintiff nor the assessor of Denver, who, presents a brief on the plaintiff’s side, nor any representative of the city and county, was given an opportunity to be heard, other than such as they may have had by reason of the fact that the time of meeting of the boards is fixed by law. On this assumption it is obvious that injustice may be suffered if some property in the county already has been valued at its full worth. But if certain property has been valued at a rate different from that generally prevailing in the county' the owner has had his opportunity to protest and appeal as usual in our system of taxation, Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U. S. 701, 709, 710, so that it must be assumed that the property *445 owners in the county all stand alike. The question then is whether all individuals have a constitutional right to be heard before a matter can be decided in which all are equally concerned — here, for instance, before a superior board decides that the local taxing officers have adopted a system of undervaluation throughout a county, as notoriously often has been the case. The answer of this court in the State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575, at least as to any further notice, was that it was hard to believe that the proposition was seriously made. Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people it is impracticable that every one should have a direct voice in its adoption. The Constitution does not require all public acts to be done in town meeting or an assembly of the whole. General statutes within the state power are passed that affect the person or property of individuals, sometimes to the point of ruin, without giving them a chance to be heard. Their rights are protected in the only way that they can be in a complex society, by their power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule. If the result in this case had been reached as it might have been by the State’s doubling the rate of taxation, no one would suggest that the Fourteenth Amendment was violated unless every person affected had been allowed an opportunity to raise his voice against it before the body entrusted by the state constitution with the power. In considering this case in this court we must assume that the proper state machinery has been used, and the question is whether, if the state constitution had declared that Denver had been undervalued as compared with the rest of the State and had decreed that for the current year the valuation should be forty per cent, higher, the objection now urged could prevail. It appears to us that to put the question is to answer it. There must be á limit to individual argument in such matters if government is to go on. In Londoner v. Denver, 210 U. S. 373, *446 385, a local board had to determine 'whether, in what amount,, and upon whom’ a tax for paving a street should be levied for special benefits. A relatively small number of persons was concerned, who were exceptionally affected, in each case upon individual grounds, and it was held that they had a right to a hearing. But that decision is far from reaching a general determination dealing only with the principle upon which all the assessments in a county had been laid. Judgment affirmed. </opinion>

Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people, it is impracticable that every one should have a direct voice in its adoption.

Their rights are protected in the only way that they can be in a complex society, by their power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule.

Defendants are correct that agency rules of broad applicability normally do not implicate the same due-process concerns typical of agency adjudications involving individual rights.

As stated by the Supreme Court, "the legislative determination provides all the process that is due."

S Ct 708; 52 L Ed 1103 [1908]) saying that in the earlier case a relatively small number of persons "were exceptionally affected, in each case upon individual grounds."

"General statutes within the state power are passed that affect the person or property of individuals, sometimes to the point of ruin, without giving them a chance to be heard. Their rights are protected in the only way they can be in a complex society, by their power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule."

—even though an individual's property rights may be affected by legislative action, "[w] here a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people, it is impracticable that everyone should have a voice in its adoption

And unthinking reliance on general country conditions without linking those conditions to the applicant for asylum would undermine the individualized nature of the inquiry.

As respondents point out, appellants rely on a handful of cases as supporting the expansion of due process protection where a legislative act "exceptionally affected" a small number of people

In Bi-Metallic the Colorado Tax Commission and the State Board of Equalization had ordered a 40% increase in the valuation of all taxable property in Denver.

No, the Due Process Clause does not require individual hearings for general, legislative-type determinations. The court reasoned that it is impracticable for everyone to have a direct voice in the adoption of a rule that applies to more than a few people. The court distinguished this situation from its prior decision in Londoner v. Denver, where a hearing was required for a tax assessment for special benefits that affected a small number of persons on individual grounds. Here, the action was legislative in nature, affecting a large class of people equally. In such cases, the people's rights are protected not by individual hearings, but by their power, 'immediate or remote, over those who make the rule,' meaning the political process. The court analogized the board's order to a state legislature doubling the tax rate, an act for which no one would suggest an individual hearing is constitutionally required.

No. The Constitution does not require that all public acts must be done in town meeting or an assembly of the whole. General statutes within the state power can affect individuals without giving them a chance to be heard because their rights are protected by their power over those who make the rule. If the state had doubled the rate of taxation, no one would suggest a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment unless every person affected had been allowed to speak against it before the body with the power. There must be a limit to individual argument in such matters if government is to go on. The legislative determination provides all the process that is due, and broad rules that apply to more than a few people do not typically raise the same due process concerns as individual adjudications. Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people, it is impracticable that every one should have a direct voice in its adoption. In Londoner v. Denver, a local board had to determine 'whether, in what amount, and upon whom' a tax for paving a street should be levied for special benefits. A relatively small number of persons was concerned, who were exceptionally affected, in each case upon individual grounds, and it was held that they had a right to a hearing. But that decision is far from reaching a general determination dealing only with the principle upon which all the assessments in a county had been laid.

Bi-Metallic Investment Company v. State Board of Equalization

Case Podcast

Rule of Law:

The Legal Principle

Facts:

Procedural Posture:

How It Got Here

Issue:

Legal Question at Stake

Opinions:

Majority, Concurrences & Dissents

Analysis:

Why This Case Matters

Gunnerbot