Beverly Maeker v. William Ross (072185)
2014 N.J. LEXIS 910, 99 A.3d 795, 219 N.J. 565 (2014)
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Rule of Law:
A statutory amendment requiring a specific type of contract to be in writing does not apply retroactively to invalidate oral agreements that were validly formed before the amendment's effective date, unless the legislature expressly states its intent for retroactive application.
Facts:
- In 1998, Beverly Maeker and William Ross began a romantic relationship, and in 1999, Maeker moved into Ross's home.
- They lived together in a marital-like relationship until 2011, during which Ross financially supported Maeker and paid all her expenses.
- Throughout their relationship, Ross repeatedly promised that he would financially support Maeker for the rest of her life.
- In late 2001, Maeker, in reliance on Ross's promises of lifetime support, abandoned her twenty-year career in the architectural glass industry.
- In return for the support, Maeker performed homemaking duties, provided companionship, and cared for Ross when he was ill.
- In December 2010, Ross executed a will naming Maeker as executor and providing funds for her 'comfortable support and maintenance', and also gave her a written power of attorney.
- On July 1, 2011, Ross ended their relationship and terminated all financial support to Maeker.
Procedural Posture:
- Beverly Maeker filed a complaint against William Ross in the Chancery Division, Family Part, Somerset County (a trial court), seeking to enforce an oral palimony agreement.
- Ross filed a motion to dismiss the complaint under Rule 4:6-2(e), arguing the 2010 amendment to the Statute of Frauds barred the claim because the agreement was not in writing.
- The trial court denied Ross's motion to dismiss, concluding the amendment should be applied prospectively and did not invalidate pre-existing oral agreements.
- The Appellate Division (an intermediate appellate court) granted Ross's motion for leave to appeal.
- The Appellate Division reversed the trial court's decision and dismissed Maeker's complaint, holding that the amendment barred enforcement of any palimony agreement not in writing as of the date the lawsuit was filed.
- The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted Maeker's petition for certification to review the Appellate Division's decision.
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Issue:
Does the 2010 amendment to the New Jersey Statute of Frauds, N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h), which requires palimony agreements to be in writing and made with the advice of counsel, apply retroactively to invalidate oral palimony agreements formed before the amendment's effective date?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Albin
No. The 2010 amendment to the Statute of Frauds does not apply retroactively to invalidate oral palimony agreements formed before its enactment. The court reasoned that there is a strong presumption against the retroactive application of statutes, especially when retroactivity would impair substantive contract rights. The legislature is presumed to be aware of the long-standing judicial principle that changes to the Statute of Frauds are applied prospectively. The text and legislative history of the amendment give no clear indication that the legislature intended to depart from this tradition and extinguish previously lawful oral agreements. Therefore, individuals who entered into oral palimony agreements in reliance on established precedent, such as Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, retain their right to enforce those agreements. The correct focus for a retroactivity analysis is the date the contract was formed, not the date the cause of action for breach accrued.
Analysis:
This decision preserves the enforceability of countless oral palimony agreements made in reliance on over thirty years of New Jersey precedent. It reaffirms the strong judicial presumption against statutory retroactivity, particularly where it would impair vested contractual rights and lead to manifest injustice. The ruling establishes a clear temporal dividing line: oral agreements predating the January 18, 2010 amendment remain subject to the prior common law, while any agreements formed after that date must comply with the new statutory requirements of a writing and independent legal advice. This avoids constitutional questions about the impairment of contracts and protects the settled expectations of parties who structured their lives based on the law as it existed.
