Betts v. Crawford
1998 WL 710628, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 153, 965 P.2d 680 (1998)
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Rule of Law:
Under a comparative negligence system, the doctrine of secondary assumption of risk merges with the concept of contributory negligence and is not a separate affirmative defense. A trial court properly instructs the jury by providing instructions on the general duty of care and comparative fault, rather than a specific, and potentially confusing, instruction on assumption of risk.
Facts:
- Bonnie Crawford worked as a housecleaner for Terry and Kay Betts on a weekly basis.
- As part of her duties, Crawford occasionally had to pick up items, such as those belonging to the Bettses' small children, that were left on the stairs leading to the basement laundry room.
- On July 22, 1994, Crawford was carrying bundled sheets to the basement to be laundered.
- While descending the stairs, Crawford tripped over items that had been left there, causing her to fall and suffer serious injuries.
Procedural Posture:
- On October 23, 1996, Bonnie Crawford sued Terry and Kay Betts in a state trial court for negligence.
- During pre-trial discovery, the Bettses deposed Crawford's expert medical witness, Dr. Peter Crane.
- At trial, the Bettses moved to strike Dr. Crane's testimony, arguing it was a prejudicial surprise that contradicted his deposition; the trial court denied the motion.
- The Bettses proposed a jury instruction regarding a servant's assumption of risk, which the trial court refused to give.
- The jury returned a verdict finding the Bettses 85% negligent and Crawford 15% negligent, and it awarded Crawford $178,000 in damages.
- The trial court entered judgment on the verdict, and the Bettses (appellants) filed a timely appeal to the Supreme Court of Wyoming against Crawford (appellee).
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Issue:
Does a trial court err by refusing to give a jury instruction on a servant's assumption of risk as a basis for apportioning fault in a negligence case governed by a comparative negligence statute?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Golden
No. A trial court does not err by refusing to give a specific jury instruction on assumption of risk in a negligence case, as the doctrine is subsumed within the broader framework of comparative negligence. The court found that the Bettses' proposed instruction on a servant's assumption of risk was an outdated and inaccurate statement of modern Wyoming law. Following the adoption of the comparative negligence statute, secondary assumption of risk (where a plaintiff knowingly encounters a risk created by a defendant's negligence) is no longer an absolute defense. Instead, it is treated as a form of contributory negligence and is factored into the apportionment of fault. The court determined that the general instructions given to the jury on the duty of reasonable care and comparative fault were sufficient, comprehensive, and accurately stated the governing law, effectively allowing the jury to consider Crawford's own negligence in encountering the open and obvious risk. The court also held that any error regarding the admission of surprise expert testimony was not preserved for appeal because the Bettses failed to request a continuance, which is the proper remedy, and in any event, the testimony did not cause substantial prejudice.
Analysis:
This case solidifies the modern view of assumption of risk in jurisdictions that have adopted comparative negligence, clarifying that secondary assumption of risk is not a distinct defense but is instead treated as a form of plaintiff's fault to be compared with the defendant's negligence. The decision effectively discourages the use of separate, potentially confusing 'assumption of risk' jury instructions in most negligence cases, guiding trial courts to rely on standard comparative fault and duty of care instructions. This approach simplifies jury deliberations by focusing them on a single, unified system for apportioning fault based on the specific facts, rather than on archaic common law doctrines. The ruling reinforces that an employer's duty to provide a safe workplace is not negated simply because an employee is aware of an obvious risk.
