Berry v. G. D. Searle & Co.
56 Ill. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974)
Rule of Law:
An action for personal injuries resulting from a breach of an implied warranty is governed by the four-year statute of limitations provided in the Uniform Commercial Code (§ 2-725), not the general two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.
Facts:
- On or before May 29, 1965, the Planned Parenthood Association of Chicago (Association) prescribed and sold a birth-control pill known as Enovid to Martha Berry.
- The Enovid pill was manufactured by G. D. Searle & Co. (Searle).
- On or about May 30, 1965, after ingesting the drug, Berry suffered a cerebral vascular accident (stroke) and became partially paralyzed.
- Berry allegedly did not learn that Enovid was the cause of her injury until June 1, 1967.
Procedural Posture:
- Martha Berry filed a second amended complaint in the circuit court of Cook County against G. D. Searle & Co. and the Planned Parenthood Association of Chicago.
- The complaint included a count for breach of implied warranty (Count I) and a count for strict liability in tort (Count II).
- The defendants moved to dismiss both counts, arguing they were filed after the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions had expired.
- The circuit court (trial court) granted the defendants' motion and dismissed both counts.
- Berry, as the appellant, appealed the dismissal directly to the Supreme Court of Illinois.
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Issue:
Does the four-year statute of limitations in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) § 2-725, rather than the general two-year statute of limitations for personal injury, govern an action for personal injuries arising from a breach of implied warranty?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Kluczynski
Yes. The four-year statute of limitations set forth in UCC § 2-725 governs personal injury actions based on a breach of implied warranty. The UCC's plain language demonstrates a legislative intent to create a distinct statutory cause of action for breach of warranty that can result in personal injury, as evidenced by sections allowing for consequential damages for injury to a person (§ 2-715) and treating limitations on such damages as prima facie unconscionable (§ 2-719). This remedy is separate from strict tort liability. Therefore, the UCC's specific four-year limitation period applies to claims brought under its provisions. The court also held that privity of contract is not required between a consumer and a remote manufacturer in a personal injury action based on breach of implied warranty. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the strict liability claim, finding it was barred by the two-year personal injury statute because the cause of action for a 'sudden traumatic event' like a stroke accrues at the time of injury, not when the plaintiff discovers its cause.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the landscape of products liability litigation in Illinois by establishing that plaintiffs may pursue personal injury claims under two distinct theories with different statutes of limitations. By applying the UCC's four-year statute of limitations to warranty claims, the court provides a longer period for plaintiffs to file suit than the traditional two-year tort statute, potentially saving claims that would otherwise be time-barred. The decision also reinforces the erosion of the privity doctrine in product liability cases, extending its abolition to UCC warranty claims against remote manufacturers for personal injury. This ruling enhances consumer protection by providing an alternative and sometimes more favorable avenue for recovery against manufacturers of defective goods.
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