Berry v. Chaplin
1946 Cal. App. LEXIS 1013, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652, 169 P.2d 442 (1946)
Rule of Law:
In California, blood grouping tests are expert opinion evidence, not conclusive proof of paternity or non-paternity unless statutorily declared so, and a guardian ad litem cannot bind a minor to a stipulation that surrenders the minor’s right to trial or support without a judicial determination that the stipulation is in the minor's best interests.
Facts:
- Joan Berry claimed that Charles Chaplin was the father of her unborn child, conceived around December 20, 1942.
- A guardian ad litem, the plaintiff's grandmother, commenced a filiation proceeding on behalf of the unborn child against Charles Chaplin.
- The guardian ad litem, Joan Berry's attorneys, and Charles Chaplin and his attorneys signed a stipulation for blood tests.
- The stipulation provided that if two physicians determined Chaplin was not the father based on blood tests, the action would be dismissed with prejudice, and Chaplin would not be obligated for further payments.
- Charles Chaplin paid for Joan Berry's medical care, support during pregnancy and confinement, and attorneys' fees as agreed in the stipulation.
- After the child, Carol Ann Berry, was born, physicians conducted blood tests and unanimously reported that Charles Chaplin could not be the father.
- Joan Berry testified that she had sexual intercourse with Charles Chaplin on four occasions in December 1942.
- Defendant's butler corroborated Joan Berry's testimony that she stayed at Chaplin's home from December 23rd to 24th, 1942, occupying a room connected to his.
Procedural Posture:
- A guardian ad litem for the unborn child (plaintiff Carol Ann Berry) commenced a filiation proceeding in superior court against Charles Chaplin (defendant) to declare paternity and seek support.
- The guardian ad litem, Joan Berry's attorneys, and Charles Chaplin and his attorneys signed a stipulation for blood tests, which was approved by Superior Court Judge William S. Baird without a hearing or evidence on the minor's best interests.
- After the child's birth and the physicians' unanimous report of non-paternity based on the blood tests, the defendant moved for dismissal of the action based on the terms of the stipulation.
- Superior Court Judge Stanley Mosk denied the defendant's motion to dismiss on March 8, 1944.
- Defendant Charles Chaplin then filed an answer, denying the complaint's allegations and raising the stipulation and blood test results as an affirmative defense (plea in bar).
- Superior Court Judge Clarence L. Kincaid considered the defendant's special defense before trial and denied it, again without evidence on the minor's best interests.
- The case proceeded to trial before a jury, which rendered a verdict finding the defendant to be the father of the plaintiff.
- A judgment was entered in accordance with the verdict, decreeing paternity and ordering Charles Chaplin to pay $75 per week for support and $5,000 in attorneys' fees.
- Charles Chaplin (defendant) appealed from the whole of the judgment, except the portion requiring the payment of attorneys' fees, to the California Court of Appeal.
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Issue:
1) Does a guardian ad litem's stipulation to dismiss a paternity action based on non-conclusive blood test results, without a judicial finding that the stipulation is in the minor's best interest, validly bind the minor? 2) Are scientific blood tests conclusive evidence of non-paternity in California?
Opinions:
Majority - Wilson, J.
No, the court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss the action, as a guardian ad litem cannot validly bind a minor to a stipulation that waives the minor's fundamental rights without a judicial finding of best interest, and blood tests are not conclusive evidence of non-paternity in California. A guardian ad litem acts as an officer and agent of the court with limited powers; they cannot sacrifice the ward's property or waive material rights, such as the right to a trial, without a court determination that such actions are beneficial or at least not prejudicial to the minor. The stipulation in this case attempted to make an unverified physicians' report conclusive, thereby depriving the court of its jurisdiction to hear all evidence and making the blood tests conclusive, which is contrary to California law (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1837, 1978) and precedent (Arais v. Kalensnikoff). The initial judicial approval of the stipulation was invalid because no evidence was presented, and no finding was made regarding the minor's best interests. Furthermore, Joan Berry's testimony regarding sexual intercourse with Chaplin constituted sufficient prima facie evidence to sustain the jury's verdict, regardless of contradictory evidence or her relations with other men, as credibility is a matter for the jury. Blood tests are considered expert opinion, and their weight, like all other evidence, is for the jury to determine; they are not conclusive. The instruction informing the jury that blood tests are not conclusive or binding was a correct statement of the law. Allowing the jury to visually compare the defendant with the mother and child was also a permissible form of evidence.
Concurring - McComb, J.
Yes, the judgment must be affirmed, but the precedent regarding the non-conclusiveness of blood tests should be reconsidered by the Supreme Court. Justice McComb concurs in the judgment only because this court is bound by the Supreme Court's decision in Arais v. Kalensnikoff, which held blood tests are not conclusive. He believes the Arais decision was erroneous and has been widely criticized by legal scholars for leading to a 'striking miscarriage of justice.' He argues that modern scientific advances, including blood-grouping tests, provide accurate and unimpeachable methods for ascertaining factual truth, and that courts should utilize these tools rather than reject them in favor of older, less certain methods to improve the administration of justice. He cites Professor Wigmore on the universal negative truth of heredity as it applies to blood types.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the principle of judicial oversight over the actions of guardians ad litem, particularly when a minor's fundamental rights, such as the right to support or a full trial, are at stake. It clarifies that such stipulations are not automatically binding and require stringent judicial review to ensure they serve the minor's best interests. Furthermore, the decision firmly reiterates California's stance at the time that scientific blood grouping tests, while admissible as expert opinion, are not conclusive evidence of paternity or non-paternity without explicit legislative decree, leaving the ultimate determination of factual truth to the jury. This highlights the judiciary's cautious approach to adopting new scientific evidence as determinative and underscores the inherent tension between scientific certainty and traditional legal fact-finding, setting a precedent that prioritized the jury's role in weighing all evidence.
