Berry v. Borough of Sugar Notch
43 A. 240, 1899 Pa. LEXIS 823, 191 Pa. 345 (1899)
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Rule of Law:
A plaintiff's violation of a statute, such as a speed ordinance, does not constitute legally sufficient contributory negligence if the violation is not the proximate cause of the injury.
Facts:
- The plaintiff was a motorman operating a trolley car in the borough of Sugar Notch.
- A borough ordinance restricted the speed of trolley cars to a maximum of eight miles per hour.
- A large chestnut tree stood along the trolley line within the borough.
- During a violent wind-storm, the plaintiff was operating his car at a speed significantly exceeding the eight-mile-per-hour limit.
- As the trolley car passed underneath the chestnut tree, the wind blew the tree down.
- The falling tree crushed the roof of the car, injuring the plaintiff.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiff, a motorman, sued the borough of Sugar Notch in a trial court for injuries he sustained.
- A jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
- The borough of Sugar Notch, as the appellant, appealed the judgment to the appellate court.
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Issue:
Does a plaintiff's violation of a speed ordinance bar recovery for injuries when the violation only determined the plaintiff's presence at the location of the accident at the exact moment it occurred, rather than directly causing the harm?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Fell
No. A plaintiff's violation of a speed ordinance does not bar recovery where it is not the proximate cause of the injury. The court reasoned that the plaintiff's speed was not the legal cause of the accident because it did not contribute to the tree falling. The argument that the specific speed brought the car to the precise location of the accident at the moment the tree fell is dismissed as 'sophistical.' The court found this timing to be a 'merest chance' that foresight could not have predicted, as a slower speed could have resulted in the same outcome, and a faster speed might have avoided it altogether. Therefore, the violation of the ordinance was merely a coincidence of time and place, not a legally cognizable cause of the injury.
Analysis:
This case provides a classic example of the distinction between factual cause ('but-for' cause) and proximate (or legal) cause in tort law. While the plaintiff's speeding was a but-for cause of the injury—he would not have been at that exact spot at that exact time otherwise—the court held it was not the proximate cause. The decision establishes that for a plaintiff's negligence to be contributory, it must increase the risk of the specific type of harm that occurred. Speeding increases the risk of collision, not the risk of a tree falling on the vehicle at a particular moment, making the causal connection too attenuated and coincidental to be legally significant.
