Bernal v. Fainter

Supreme Court of United States
467 U.S. 216 (1984)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

A state law that denies resident aliens the opportunity to become notaries public violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the position is not within the 'political function' exception that would justify discrimination on the basis of alienage.

Facts:

Efrem Bernal, a native of Mexico, is a legally admitted resident alien who has lived in the United States since 1961.
Bernal works as a paralegal for Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc., assisting migrant farmworkers.
To administer oaths and notarize statements for his clients, Bernal applied to become a notary public in Texas in 1978.
The Texas Secretary of State denied Bernal's application.
The sole reason for the denial was that Bernal was not a United States citizen, as required by Texas Revised Civil Statutes, Article 5949(2).

Procedural Posture:

Bernal sued the Texas Secretary of State in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, claiming the citizenship requirement violated the U.S. Constitution.
The District Court, a court of first instance, ruled in favor of Bernal, finding the statute unconstitutional.
The Secretary of State, as the defendant-appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
A divided panel of the Fifth Circuit, an intermediate appellate court, reversed the district court's decision, holding that the statute was constitutional under rational basis review.
Bernal, as the petitioner, successfully petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.

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Issue:

Does a Texas statute that requires a notary public to be a United States citizen violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Opinions:

Majority - Justice Marshall

Yes. A state law that discriminates on the basis of alienage is subject to strict judicial scrutiny unless it falls within the narrow 'political function' exception. This exception applies to positions intimately related to the process of democratic self-government. The Court applies a two-part test from Cabell v. Chavez-Salido to determine if a position qualifies for this exception. While the Texas statute is not overinclusive (the first prong), it fails the second prong because the duties of a notary public do not 'go to the heart of representative government.' The Court found a notary's duties to be essentially clerical and ministerial, lacking the policymaking responsibility or broad discretionary authority characteristic of positions like police officers or public school teachers. Because the political function exception does not apply, the statute is evaluated under strict scrutiny. The state's asserted interests in ensuring a notary's familiarity with the law and their future availability to testify were not compelling, nor was the citizenship requirement a narrowly tailored means to achieve them. Thus, the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause.

Dissenting - Justice Rehnquist

No. The Texas statute does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Justice Rehnquist dissented based on his reasoning in Sugarman v. Dougall, where he argued that the Equal Protection Clause should not be interpreted to make alienage a suspect classification. He believes states have a rational basis for reserving governmental positions, including that of a notary, for citizens, and such laws should be upheld under a rational basis review.

Analysis:

This decision significantly narrows the scope of the 'political function' exception, which allows states to discriminate against non-citizens for certain public positions. The Court established that the exception's application depends on the actual functions of a position, not its official title or designation as a 'public officer.' By categorizing the role of a notary as ministerial rather than one involving core governmental discretion, the ruling protects the economic opportunities of resident aliens. It reinforces that strict scrutiny is the default standard for alienage classifications, making it much more difficult for states to exclude non-citizens from public employment unless the job truly involves the formulation or execution of public policy.

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