No for the roadside questions, but Yes for the police station questions. The Miranda rule applies to any crime, big or small, once you're officially in police custody. It would be too confusing for police if the rule changed depending on the crime. Because McCarty was under arrest at the station, his statements there can't be used against him. But, a normal traffic stop isn't like being arrested. It's short, happens in public, and isn't as intimidating as being in an interrogation room. So, the questions asked on the side of the road, before the arrest, are okay to use as evidence.

I agree with the final decision but think the court did too much. The only question we really needed to answer was whether Miranda rights apply to minor traffic crimes after an arrest. The court shouldn't have gone on to decide the extra issue about roadside questioning because it wasn't necessary to solve this case. Courts should stick to only answering the questions they absolutely have to.

The Court said Miranda applies to misdemeanors too. But a routine traffic stop is different from a formal arrest and doesn't restrict a person's freedom enough to require Miranda warnings. Police can ask some questions during a stop to figure out who the driver is and confirm or dispel suspicions. What matters is how a reasonable person in the driver's position would feel about the situation. Since the driver wasn't informed of his rights after being arrested, his statements at the station can't be used as evidence. But the questions asked during the traffic stop were allowed because that wasn't an interrogation requiring Miranda warnings.

Justice Stevens agreed that Miranda warnings are needed for questioning after an arrest, even for minor traffic crimes. But he didn't think the Court needed to discuss the statements made before the formal arrest, since that wasn't necessary to decide the case. He said the Court should be careful about deciding issues that aren't required to resolve the specific case before them.

Yes. We hold that Miranda applies to misdemeanors too. But a routine traffic stop is different from a formal arrest and does not restrict a person's freedom enough to require Miranda warnings. We note that officers can ask some questions during a stop to figure out who the driver is and confirm or dispel suspicions. What matters is how a reasonable person in the driver's position would feel about the situation. Because the driver was not informed of his rights after being arrested, the statements at the station cannot be used as evidence. But the questions asked during the traffic stop were allowed because that was not an interrogation requiring Miranda warnings.

I concur that Miranda warnings are needed for questioning after an arrest, even for minor traffic crimes. But I do not believe it was necessary to discuss the statements made before the formal arrest, since that was not required to decide this case. The Court should be careful about deciding issues that are not needed to resolve the specific case before us.

"[T] he only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation."

A suspect is in custody for Miranda purposes when his or her "freedom of action is curtailed to a `degree associated with formal arrest.'"

—holding that persons temporarily detained pursuant to traffic stop are not "in custody" for purposes of Miranda

—stating that an "officer may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicions

—the Court "held that a person detained as a result of a traffic stop is not in Miranda custody because such detention does not `sufficiently impair [the detained person's] free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional rights.'"

A routine traffic stop, on the other hand, is a relatively brief encounter and "is more analogous to a so-called `Terry stop'... than to a formal arrest. "

"But cases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was `compelled'despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare. "

The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing

After a traffic violation, a driver can generally expect "to spend a short period of time answering questions and waiting while the officer checks his license and registration, that he may then be given a citation, but that in the end he most likely will be allowed to continue on his way."

No, for the roadside questioning, and Yes, for the post-arrest interrogation. A person subjected to custodial interrogation is entitled to Miranda warnings regardless of the offense's severity, but a routine traffic stop is not custodial. First, creating a misdemeanor exception to Miranda would undermine the rule's clarity, forcing police to guess the severity of an offense at the time of arrest and creating complex litigation. The purposes of Miranda—to counteract the coercive pressures of a custodial setting—apply equally to all custodial interrogations. Therefore, McCarty's statements made at the jail while in custody were inadmissible. Second, routine traffic stops are not 'custodial' because they are presumptively brief and temporary, and they occur in public view, which mitigates the police-dominated atmosphere present in stationhouse interrogations. Such stops are more analogous to a non-coercive 'Terry stop' than a formal arrest. Thus, McCarty’s pre-arrest statements made during the roadside stop were admissible.

The judgment should be affirmed based solely on the answer to the question presented for certiorari. I concur in the judgment and the Court's holding that Miranda warnings are required for custodial interrogations involving misdemeanor traffic offenses. However, I do not join Part III of the opinion, which addresses the admissibility of statements made during the pre-arrest roadside stop. This issue was not passed upon by the Court of Appeals and was not necessary to decide the case, and the Court should have exercised judicial restraint by declining to rule on a constitutional question that was not essential to the disposition.

The Court held that the Miranda decision applies to misdemeanors. However, persons temporarily detained pursuant to traffic stops are not 'in custody' for purposes of Miranda. The Court clarified that a routine traffic stop is more analogous to a 'Terry stop' than to a formal arrest and does not sufficiently impair a person's free exercise of their privilege against self-incrimination to require Miranda warnings. An officer may ask a moderate number of questions to determine the detainee's identity and to confirm or dispel suspicions. The Court emphasized that the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have understood their situation. Because the respondent was not informed of his rights after being taken into custody, his post-arrest statements should not have been admitted. However, the roadside questioning did not constitute custodial interrogation, so pre-arrest statements were admissible.

Justice Stevens concurred in part and in the judgment. He agreed that Miranda warnings are required when a suspect is subjected to custodial interrogation, even for a misdemeanor traffic offense. However, he did not join Part III of the Court's opinion, which discussed the admissibility of statements made prior to formal arrest, because it was unnecessary to decide the case and answer the question presented. Justice Stevens emphasized the importance of judicial restraint and only deciding issues that are compelled by the litigation before the Court.

We hold that the Miranda decision applies to misdemeanors. However, persons temporarily detained pursuant to traffic stops are not 'in custody' for purposes of Miranda. We clarify that a routine traffic stop is more analogous to a 'Terry stop' than to a formal arrest and does not sufficiently impair a person's free exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination so as to require Miranda warnings. An officer may ask a moderate number of questions to determine the detainee's identity and to confirm or dispel suspicions. We emphasize that the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have understood their situation. Because respondent was not informed of his rights after being taken into custody, his post-arrest statements should not have been admitted. However, the roadside questioning did not constitute custodial interrogation, so pre-arrest statements were admissible.

I concur in part and in the judgment. I agree that Miranda warnings are required when a suspect is subjected to custodial interrogation, even for a misdemeanor traffic offense. However, I do not join Part III of the opinion, which discussed the admissibility of statements made prior to formal arrest, because it was unnecessary to decide the case and answer the question presented. I emphasize the importance of judicial restraint and only deciding issues that are compelled by the litigation before us.

Berkemer v. McCarty

Case Podcast

Rule of Law:

The Legal Principle

Facts:

Procedural Posture:

How It Got Here

Issue:

Legal Question at Stake

Opinions:

Majority, Concurrences & Dissents

Analysis:

Why This Case Matters

Gunnerbot