Berghuis v. Smith
559 U.S. 314, 176 L. Ed. 2d 249, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 2925 (2010)
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Rule of Law:
To establish a prima facie violation of the Sixth Amendment's fair-cross-section requirement, a defendant must not only show that a distinctive group was underrepresented but must also present specific evidence demonstrating that a particular aspect of the jury-selection process was the cause of that underrepresentation.
Facts:
- In November 1991, Christopher Rumbley was shot and killed during a brawl in a Grand Rapids, Michigan bar where all patrons, including respondent Diapolis Smith, were African-American.
- Smith, an African-American, was charged with murder and set for trial in Kent County Circuit Court.
- At the time of Smith's 1993 trial, Kent County's jury-eligible population was 7.28% African-American, while the pool from which jurors were summoned was 6% African-American.
- Kent County's jury selection process first assigned potential jurors to fulfill the needs of 12 local district courts before assigning the remaining individuals to the county-wide Circuit Court where felony cases were tried.
- The vast majority of Kent County's African-American residents lived in Grand Rapids, the county's largest city.
- The venire panel for Smith's trial, consisting of 60 to 100 individuals, included at most three African-American members.
- Smith was ultimately tried and convicted of second-degree murder by an all-white jury.
- Shortly after Smith's trial, Kent County reversed its juror assignment policy to serve the Circuit Court first, based on an internal belief that the prior system 'swallowed up most of the minority jurors.'
Procedural Posture:
- Diapolis Smith was convicted of second-degree murder by a jury in the Kent County Circuit Court, a Michigan state trial court.
- On direct appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals (an intermediate appellate court) remanded the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on Smith's fair-cross-section claim.
- After the hearing, the trial court rejected Smith's claim.
- Smith appealed again to the Michigan Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court and ordered a new trial.
- The State, as the appellant, appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court (the state's highest court), which reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, thereby reinstating Smith's conviction.
- Smith then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan, which was dismissed.
- Smith, as the appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which reversed the District Court's decision and granted habeas relief.
- Berghuis, the warden, petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does a criminal defendant establish 'systematic exclusion' under the third prong of the Duren test for a Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section violation by identifying a jury-assignment procedure as the cause of underrepresentation without providing specific evidence to prove that causation?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Ginsburg
No. A defendant does not establish systematic exclusion under Duren v. Missouri merely by identifying a feature of the jury-selection process without presenting evidence that causally links that feature to the underrepresentation of the distinctive group. Smith failed to satisfy the third prong of the Duren test, which requires a showing that the underrepresentation was due to 'systematic exclusion.' Although Smith argued that the county's practice of assigning jurors to district courts first 'siphoned' away African-American jurors from the Circuit Court pool, he provided no evidence to prove this theory. He did not demonstrate the racial composition of the district court venires or show that the policy change after his trial led to a statistically significant improvement. A defendant's burden cannot be met by pointing to a 'laundry list' of factors that might contribute to underrepresentation; specific proof of causation is required. Because the Michigan Supreme Court's conclusion that Smith failed to prove causation was not an 'unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law' under AEDPA, the Sixth Circuit erred in granting habeas relief.
Concurring - Justice Thomas
Yes, I concur with the Court's judgment. While I have significant doubts about whether the Sixth Amendment's text and history support the 'fair cross section' requirement at all, seeing it as more of a judicial creation from Due Process and Equal Protection principles, the parties did not ask the Court to reconsider that precedent. Therefore, applying the Court's existing precedent as required under the AEDPA standard of review, the Michigan Supreme Court's decision was not unreasonable, and I join the majority's conclusion.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies and heightens the evidentiary burden for defendants raising Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section challenges. By requiring specific proof of causation for the 'systematic exclusion' prong of the Duren test, the Court makes it more difficult for defendants to succeed by merely pointing to statistical disparities and facially non-discriminatory, but potentially impactful, administrative procedures. The ruling underscores the high deference federal courts on habeas review must give to state court factual findings under AEDPA. Consequently, future claims will likely require more sophisticated statistical analysis to definitively link a specific part of the jury-selection process to the resulting underrepresentation.
