Yes, this law is unconstitutional. The law gives police way too much power to listen in on anyone and everyone for a long time. The Fourth Amendment was created to stop 'general warrants,' which let authorities search wherever they wanted for whatever they wanted. This law is like a general warrant for conversations. To be fair, a warrant to eavesdrop must be very specific: it needs to name the exact crime, describe the conversation to be recorded, and be for a very short, limited time. This law didn't require any of that, so it's a violation of privacy.

Yes, the law is bad. Secretly recording people's conversations is one of the biggest invasions of privacy imaginable. It's like putting a government agent in your bedroom, your office, and everywhere else. I believe any kind of 'bugging' to collect evidence is unconstitutional, no matter how specific the warrant is, because it forces a person to be a witness against themselves without their knowledge.

Yes, Berger's conviction should be thrown out, but not because the whole law is bad. The law itself might be okay. The problem here was that the police didn't give the judge enough good evidence to justify bugging Steinman's office for 60 days. For such a huge invasion of privacy, you need really strong proof, and the police didn't provide it in this specific case.

No, the law is perfectly fine. The Fourth Amendment protects physical things like your 'house' and 'papers,' not your spoken words. The Court is making up a new 'right to privacy' that isn't in the Constitution. Besides, the New York law actually had more rules and protections than the Constitution requires. The majority is making it impossible for police to use a perfectly good tool to catch criminals.

No, the law is okay. The Court shouldn't have thrown out the entire law. It should have just looked at whether the bugging in this one case was reasonable. The New York courts had already said the law required 'probable cause,' just like the Constitution. The Court is stepping on the state's toes and making it harder to fight crime.

No, the law and the search were both constitutional. The police gave the judge a good reason to bug the office and were specific enough. The Court is inventing new, impossible rules just because it doesn't like eavesdropping. This is a very important tool for police to fight organized crime and corrupt politicians, and the Court is wrong to take it away.

The Court said New York's law is not okay because it lets the police secretly listen to too many conversations without being specific enough about what they're looking for. The law doesn't follow the Constitution's rules that protect people's privacy. The Court said the police need to have very good reasons to believe a crime is happening and they have to be clear about what exact conversations they want to record.

Justice Black disagreed and said the Court's decision means states can't have any laws that allow secret listening by police. He said the Court is being unfair to New York's law, which has rules to prevent the police from going too far. He thinks the Court is changing the meaning of the Constitution.

Justice Harlan also disagreed. He said the Court should have looked more carefully at how the law was used in this specific case instead of saying the whole law is unconstitutional. He thinks the police had good reasons for the second secret recording, but maybe not the first one. But he still thinks Berger's conviction should stand.

Justice White disagreed too. He said New York's law is constitutional and the police followed it properly in this case. He said the Court is making up new rules not actually in the Constitution. He argued secret recording is necessary to fight organized crime and the Court is making it too hard for police to use this tool legally.

Justice Douglas agreed with the Court's decision but thinks all secret recording by police is unconstitutional, no matter what. He believes it invades privacy too much and goes against the spirit of the Constitution's protections against unreasonable searches.

Justice Stewart said the New York law itself is okay but the police didn't give enough evidence to the judge to justify the secret recordings in this particular case. For something that invades privacy so much, he thinks the police need to have extra strong proof a crime is happening.

We say New York's law is not okay because it lets the police secretly listen to too many conversations without being specific enough about what they're looking for. The law doesn't follow the Constitution's rules that protect people's privacy. We say the police need to have very good reasons to believe a crime is happening and they have to be clear about what exact conversations they want to record.

I disagree and say the Court's decision means states can't have any laws that allow secret listening by police. The Court is being unfair to New York's law, which has rules to prevent the police from going too far. The Court is changing the meaning of the Constitution.

I also disagree. The Court should have looked more carefully at how the law was used in this specific case instead of saying the whole law is unconstitutional. The police had good reasons for the second secret recording, but maybe not the first one. But I still think Berger's conviction should stand.

I disagree too. New York's law is constitutional and the police followed it properly in this case. The Court is making up new rules not actually in the Constitution. Secret recording is necessary to fight organized crime and the Court is making it too hard for police to use this tool legally.

I agree with the Court's decision but think all secret recording by police is unconstitutional, no matter what. It invades privacy too much and goes against the spirit of the Constitution's protections against unreasonable searches.

Although I agree with overturning Berger's conviction, I believe the New York law itself is okay, but the police didn't give enough evidence to the judge to justify the secret recordings in this particular case. For something that invades privacy so much, the police need to have extra strong proof a crime is happening.

—the Supreme Court invalidated a New York eavesdropping statute as unconstitutional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

—responded, "we cannot forgive the requirements of the Fourth Amendment in the name of law enforcement. This is no formality that we require today but a fundamental rule that has long been recognized as basic to the privacy of every home in America. While `(t) he requirements of the Fourth Amendment are not inflexible, or obtusely unyielding to the legitimate needs of …

I would observe, however, that the United States Supreme Court has, in numerous Fourth Amendment cases, characterized places as "constitutionally protected areas."

The Fourth Amendment commands that a warrant issue not only upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, but also `particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.'[The scrutinized] statute lacks this particularization

For the Court's holding there were that a " `conversation'was within the Fourth Amendment's protections, and... the use of electronic devices to capture it was a `search'within the meaning of the Amendment. "

In invalidating a New York eavesdropping statute under the Fourth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court stated that statutory "authorization of eavesdropping for a two-month period is the equivalent of a series of intrusions, searches, and seizures pursuant to a single showing of probable cause."

"Probable cause under the Fourth Amendment exists where the facts and circumstances within the affiant's knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient unto themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed."

Warrants for electronic surveillance routinely set out "minimization" requirements—procedures for how and under what conditions the electronic surveillance may be conducted—in order to "afford [] similar protections to those that are present in the use of conventional warrants authorizing the seizure of tangible evidence."

Condemned as a nuisance at common law (4 Blackstone, Commentaries 168) and long recognized as highly intrusive

The Fourth Amendment typically requires "a neutral and detached authority be interposed between the police and the public," and it is offended by "general warrants" and laws that allow searches to be conducted "indiscriminately and without regard to their connection with [a] crime under investigation."

Yes, the New York eavesdropping statute violates the Fourth Amendment. The statute is unconstitutional because it authorizes a general search by electronic surveillance without the particularity and safeguards required for a valid warrant. The Fourth Amendment demands that a warrant particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized, but this statute fails on several fronts. First, it does not require a belief that a particular offense has been or is being committed, nor does it demand a specific description of the conversations to be seized, effectively giving officers a 'roving commission.' Second, authorizing eavesdropping for a two-month period allows for a prolonged series of intrusions on a single showing of probable cause, capturing all conversations indiscriminately. Third, the statute lacks a provision for terminating the eavesdrop once the sought-after conversation is seized and does not require a return on the warrant. This lack of 'precise and discriminate' procedures makes the statute's authorization of trespassory intrusions a form of the general warrant forbidden by the Constitution.

Yes, the statute is unconstitutional. This decision correctly overrules Olmstead v. United States and brings electronic surveillance under the protection of the Fourth Amendment. However, any electronic surveillance constitutes a search for 'mere evidence,' which inherently violates the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, regardless of how precisely a warrant is drawn. Placing a 'bug' is equivalent to placing an invisible policeman in a person's most private spaces, creating a dragnet that sweeps in all conversations, innocent or not, which is a greater invasion of privacy than the general warrants the Fourth Amendment was designed to prohibit.

Yes, the conviction should be reversed, but not because the statute is unconstitutional on its face. The New York statute itself is constitutional. The problem lies in its application in this specific case. The affidavits submitted to obtain the eavesdropping order for Steinman's office were constitutionally insufficient to establish the high degree of probable cause required to justify such a significant and prolonged invasion of privacy. The standard of justification must match the degree of the intrusion, and the bare, conclusory allegations in the affidavits failed to meet that rigorous standard.

No, the statute does not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures of tangible items—'persons, houses, papers, and effects'—not spoken words, and it does not establish a general 'right to privacy.' The Court is improperly rewriting the Constitution to ban eavesdropping, a necessary tool for law enforcement. Furthermore, the New York statute contains more safeguards than the Fourth Amendment itself requires, such as judicial authorization and time limits. The majority invalidates the statute by inventing new, impossible-to-meet requirements, like prior notice for a secret surveillance, effectively banning all eavesdropping.

No, the statute is constitutional and should not have been struck down on its face. The Court should have deferred to the New York courts' interpretation that the statute's 'reasonable grounds' standard is equivalent to 'probable cause.' Electronic eavesdropping is not inherently unreasonable, and the warrant in this case was sufficiently particular when read with its supporting affidavits. The proper analysis is whether the search was reasonable on a case-by-case basis. The Court's facial invalidation is an overreach that will thwart legitimate state law enforcement efforts.

No, the statute does not violate the Fourth Amendment, and its application in this case was constitutional. The Court should not invalidate the entire statute 'on its face' but should determine whether this particular search was reasonable. The affidavits supporting the Steinman eavesdrop order satisfied the Fourth Amendment's requirements of probable cause and particularity. The Court is creating new, impossibly high constitutional standards for eavesdrop warrants that are not found in the Fourth Amendment, thereby frustrating a vital law enforcement tool necessary to combat organized crime and corruption.

The Court held that New York's eavesdropping statute is too broad, resulting in a trespassory intrusion into a constitutionally protected area and violating the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments because it authorizes general searches and does not require particularity in describing the conversations to be seized. The statute's language permits a trespassory invasion of the home or office by general warrant, contrary to the Fourth Amendment's command. The Amendment requires particularity in the warrant as to what specific crime has been or is being committed, the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. The statute lays down no such requirements. The Court emphasized that probable cause under the Fourth Amendment exists where the facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe an offense has been or is being committed. The Court also noted that electronic surveillance must be accompanied by 'minimization' requirements to afford protections similar to conventional warrants.

Justice Black dissented, arguing that the Court's decision makes it impossible for states to have valid eavesdropping statutes. He criticized the majority's hostility to eavesdropping and reliance on the idea that advancing technology makes it more effective. Black argued that the Fourth Amendment does not ban all searches and seizures, only unreasonable ones, and that the New York statute has many safeguards. He accused the Court of rewriting the Fourth Amendment to impose requirements not found in the text. Black would have held the statute and its application in this case constitutional.

Justice Harlan dissented, arguing that the Court should not have facially invalidated the New York statute and instead examined whether it was constitutionally applied in this case. He analyzed the supporting affidavits and concluded that while the Steinman eavesdrop order itself was based on probable cause, the Neyer order was not. However, Harlan would still affirm the conviction, finding the use of the Neyer evidence to obtain the Steinman order permissible since the Neyer order was issued in a proceeding untainted by fraud. Overall, Harlan believed the statute contained adequate safeguards and that the Court improperly struck it down.

Justice White dissented, arguing that the New York statute is constitutional on its face and as applied in this case. He found no Fourth Amendment violation as to Berger since the Steinman eavesdrop, the only one Berger had standing to challenge, was supported by probable cause and sufficient particularity. White criticized the majority for facially invalidating the statute based on requirements not found in the Fourth Amendment's text. He pointed to the need for eavesdropping to combat organized crime and argued the Court was thwarting legislative efforts to allow law enforcement to use this essential investigative tool with proper safeguards.

Justice Douglas concurred in the judgment, agreeing that the New York statute is unconstitutional, but on the broader ground that any wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping is an impermissible general search for mere evidence. Douglas believed such surveillance inherently intrudes on privacy far more than physical searches. He rejected limitations, arguing it is impossible to show what overheard information was used as leads. Douglas saw electronic surveillance as inconsistent with the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.

Justice Stewart concurred in the result, finding the New York statute itself constitutional but concluding the affidavits supporting the eavesdrop orders in this case did not establish probable cause. Given the broad invasion of privacy, Stewart believed only the most precise and rigorous showing of probable cause could justify this electronic surveillance. The affidavits here contained only bare allegations. While this might be enough for a conventional search, Stewart found it insufficient for the extended eavesdropping authorized here.

I dissent, arguing that the Court's decision makes it impossible for states to have valid eavesdropping statutes. The majority's hostility to eavesdropping and reliance on the idea that advancing technology makes it more effective is unwarranted. The Fourth Amendment does not ban all searches and seizures, only unreasonable ones, and the New York statute has many safeguards. The Court is rewriting the Fourth Amendment to impose requirements not found in the text. The statute and its application in this case are constitutional.

I dissent, arguing that the Court should not have facially invalidated the New York statute and instead should have examined whether it was constitutionally applied in this case. Analyzing the supporting affidavits, I conclude that while the Steinman eavesdrop order itself was based on probable cause, the Neyer order was not. However, affirming the conviction is appropriate, finding the use of the Neyer evidence to obtain the Steinman order permissible since the Neyer order was issued in a proceeding untainted by fraud. Overall, the statute contains adequate safeguards, and the Court improperly struck it down.

I dissent, arguing that the New York statute is constitutional on its face and as applied in this case. There is no Fourth Amendment violation as to Berger since the Steinman eavesdrop, the only one Berger has standing to challenge, was supported by probable cause and sufficient particularity. The majority's decision to facially invalidate the statute based on requirements not found in the Fourth Amendment's text is misguided. The need for eavesdropping to combat organized crime is significant, and the Court is thwarting legislative efforts to allow law enforcement to use this essential investigative tool with proper safeguards.

I concur in the judgment, agreeing that the New York statute is unconstitutional but on the broader ground that any wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping is an impermissible general search for mere evidence. Such surveillance inherently intrudes on privacy far more than physical searches. Limitations are ineffective, as it is impossible to show what overheard information was used as leads. Electronic surveillance is inconsistent with the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.

I concur in the result, finding the New York statute itself constitutional but concluding that the affidavits supporting the eavesdrop orders in this case did not establish probable cause. Given the broad invasion of privacy, only the most precise and rigorous showing of probable cause can justify this electronic surveillance. The affidavits here contained only bare allegations. While this might be enough for a conventional search, it is insufficient for the extended eavesdropping authorized here.

Berger v. New York

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