Berga v. Archway Kitchen & Bath, Inc.
1996 WL 330886, 926 S.W.2d 476, 1996 Mo. App. LEXIS 1065 (1996)
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Rule of Law:
An employer's duty to control an off-duty employee to prevent harm to third parties under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317 does not arise when an employee's incapacitation is caused by inhaling chemical fumes at work. The intangible fumes remaining in an employee's body after leaving the workplace do not constitute a tangible "chattel" entrusted by the employer, which is required to trigger such a duty off-premises.
Facts:
- Chris Dowling was an employee of Archway Kitchen and Bath, Inc. (Archway), a business that required workers to use chemicals which produced fumes.
- On September 26, 1994, during his workday, Dowling was allegedly overexposed to dangerous chemical fumes, in part due to a ventilation malfunction at the plant.
- After clocking out of work, Dowling began driving home in his personal vehicle.
- While driving on the highway, Dowling lost consciousness as a result of the fume exposure.
- Dowling's vehicle crossed the median of the divided highway and struck a vehicle driven by Mark Berga head-on.
- Mark Berga died from the injuries he sustained in the collision.
Procedural Posture:
- Mike and Madalyn Berga sued Chris Dowling, Archway Kitchen and Bath, Inc., and an unknown chemical manufacturer in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis.
- The case was transferred to the Circuit Court of St. Louis County.
- The Bergas filed an amended petition alleging negligence against Dowling, negligence and vicarious liability against Archway, and negligence against the manufacturer.
- The Bergas settled their claim against Dowling and did not obtain service on the manufacturer.
- Archway filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment on the claims against it.
- The Bergas conceded in writing that Dowling was acting outside the scope of his employment, effectively removing the vicarious liability claim.
- The trial court granted Archway's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
- The Bergas, as plaintiffs-appellants, appealed the dismissal to the Missouri Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does an employer have a legal duty to a member of the public for injuries caused by an employee who, after being overexposed to chemical fumes at work, loses consciousness while driving his own vehicle home from work?
Opinions:
Majority - Simon, J.
No. An employer does not have a legal duty to a member of the public for injuries caused under these circumstances. To establish negligence, a plaintiff must first show the existence of a duty. The general rule is there is no duty to control the conduct of a third person unless a special relationship exists, as stated in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315. The employer-employee relationship is a special relationship, but the corresponding duty under § 317 is limited. An employer's duty to control an employee acting outside the scope of employment exists only if the employee is on the employer's premises or is using a chattel of the employer. Since the accident occurred off Archway's premises, liability could only attach if Dowling was 'using a chattel' of Archway. The court concluded that the chemical fumes Dowling inhaled, which remained in his system, do not qualify as a chattel entrusted to him by his employer. The chattel envisioned by § 317 is a tangible item like a vehicle or a firearm, not intangible fumes that become part of the employee's physiological state. Therefore, Archway owed no duty to Mark Berga.
Analysis:
This decision narrowly construes an employer's duty to control off-duty employees, reinforcing the general principle of non-liability for conduct outside the scope of employment. By defining 'chattel' under Restatement § 317 as tangible property, the court limits the ability to hold employers responsible for harms caused by employees who are incapacitated by their work environment but are no longer on the premises or using company equipment. This precedent makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to establish employer liability in cases involving employee fatigue, intoxication, or illness originating from the workplace unless there is an affirmative act by the employer creating the risk, as seen in other jurisdictions. It solidifies the distinction between an employee's condition caused by the workplace and the employer's control over instruments of harm.
