Benninghoff v. Superior Court
38 Cal. Rptr. 3d 759, 2006 Daily Journal DAR 1218, 136 Cal. App. 4th 61 (2006)
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Rule of Law:
An attorney who has resigned from the State Bar with disciplinary charges pending is absolutely prohibited from practicing law in California, including representing parties in state administrative hearings, because such representation constitutes the practice of law; however, state courts cannot assume jurisdiction over that individual's practice before federal agencies due to federal preemption.
Facts:
- In 1999, Charles Benninghoff pleaded guilty to federal felonies, including conspiracy to defraud the United States and making false statements.
- Benninghoff subsequently resigned from the State Bar of California while disciplinary charges were pending, acknowledging his ineligibility to practice law.
- Benninghoff began representing professional licensees in state administrative hearings and federal prisoners in prison transfer applications.
- Benninghoff advertised his services as a 'professional advocate' through direct mail solicitations and websites.
- The Medical Board of California requested clarification from the State Bar regarding Benninghoff's eligibility to represent parties in its disciplinary hearings.
- Two administrative law judges ruled that Benninghoff was practicing law by representing parties in Medical Board hearings.
Procedural Posture:
- The State Bar of California filed an application with the trial court (Superior Court) seeking to assume jurisdiction over Charles Benninghoff's practice under Business and Professions Code section 6180.
- The trial court granted the State Bar's application and issued an order assuming jurisdiction over Benninghoff's practice.
- Charles Benninghoff then filed a petition for an extraordinary writ with the California Court of Appeal, seeking to reverse the trial court's order.
- While the writ petition was pending, Benninghoff filed a motion for a partial stay, requesting permission to continue representing federal prisoners.
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Issue:
Does a California superior court have the authority to assume jurisdiction over the entire practice of a former attorney who resigned with disciplinary charges pending, encompassing his representation of clients in both state administrative hearings and before federal agencies?
Opinions:
Majority - Ikola, J.
No, a California court cannot assume jurisdiction over a former attorney's practice before federal agencies, but yes, it can assume jurisdiction over representation in state administrative hearings. The court affirmed that representing parties in state administrative hearings constitutes the practice of law, as it requires the application of legal knowledge and technique, including advising clients, preparing legal documents, and examining witnesses. While some statutes or rules may allow true laypersons to practice law in specific administrative settings as an exception, this does not change the nature of the activity as 'practicing law.' Business and Professions Code section 6126, subdivision (b), explicitly and without exception prohibits 'defrocked' lawyers (those who resigned with charges pending, are disbarred, or suspended) from practicing law at all, distinguishing them from laypersons who might be 'otherwise authorized pursuant to statute or court rule' under section 6126, subdivision (a). The court found Benninghoff's activities clearly fell within the common law definition of practicing law. Furthermore, the court held that Benninghoff's attempts to disclaim a lawyer-client relationship in his contracts were ineffective, as the substance of the services provided created such a relationship. Public policy also supports preventing individuals convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude from practicing law. However, the court concluded that state law cannot restrict the right of federal courts and agencies to control who practices before them. Citing Sperry v. State of Florida, the court found that federal regulations allowing non-lawyers to practice before federal agencies preempt state laws prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law. Therefore, the court erred by assuming jurisdiction over Benninghoff’s federal practice.
Concurring - O’Leary, Acting P. J., and Moore, J.
Justices O’Leary and Moore concurred in the majority opinion.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the scope of the 'practice of law' in California, specifically affirming that representation in state administrative hearings falls within this definition. Crucially, it establishes a clear distinction between true laypersons, who might be statutorily authorized to perform certain legal-adjacent services, and former attorneys who have been disbarred or resigned with charges, who are absolutely prohibited from practicing law under Business and Professions Code section 6126, subdivision (b). The case also firmly reiterates the principle of federal preemption, limiting state courts' ability to regulate practice before federal agencies, thus safeguarding the federal government's authority to set its own standards for representation.
