Bennett v. Jeffreys
356 N.E.2d 277, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1976)
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Rule of Law:
A natural parent may be deprived of custody only upon a finding of extraordinary circumstances, such as surrender, abandonment, persistent neglect, unfitness, or a prolonged disruption of custody. Upon such a finding, the court may then proceed to determine custody based on the best interest of the child.
Facts:
- When she was an unwed 15-year-old, the petitioner, Bennett, gave birth to a daughter, Gina Marie.
- Under pressure from her own mother, Bennett reluctantly acquiesced to having the newborn infant cared for by Mrs. Jeffreys, a non-relative.
- For approximately the next eight years, the child remained in the custody of Mrs. Jeffreys, who never took formal steps to adopt.
- The mother maintained some disputed level of contact with the child during this period but never legally surrendered or abandoned her.
- At age 23, upon nearing college graduation and with the support of her parents, Bennett sought to regain custody of her daughter.
Procedural Posture:
- The natural mother, Bennett, initiated a custody proceeding in Family Court against the custodian, Jeffreys.
- The Family Court, as the court of first instance, ruled that although the mother was not unfit and had not abandoned the child, custody should remain with Jeffreys.
- The mother appealed to the Appellate Division, an intermediate appellate court.
- The Appellate Division reversed the Family Court's order and awarded custody to the mother.
- The custodian, Jeffreys, then appealed the Appellate Division's decision to the Court of Appeals, the state's highest court.
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Issue:
May a natural parent, who has not surrendered, abandoned, or been found unfit, be deprived of custody of their child due to a prolonged separation that constitutes an extraordinary circumstance, thereby triggering a 'best interest of the child' analysis?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Judge Breitel
Yes. A natural parent may be deprived of custody if extraordinary circumstances exist, and a prolonged separation from the child for most of its life constitutes such a circumstance. Where such extraordinary circumstances are found, the court's role is to make a disposition that is in the best interest of the child. The court established a two-part inquiry. First, a court must determine whether extraordinary circumstances exist to displace the parent's superior right to custody. These include surrender, abandonment, unfitness, persistent neglect, or an extended disruption of custody. Second, only after such a finding, the court may then analyze what is in the child's best interest. Here, the protracted separation of mother and child was an extraordinary circumstance. However, neither of the lower courts properly conducted the best interest analysis; the trial court failed to adequately examine the custodian's qualifications, while the appellate court failed to examine the mother's. Therefore, a new hearing is required to determine the best interest of the child by exploring the qualifications, background, and circumstances of both the mother and the custodian.
Concurring - Judge Fuchsberg
Yes. He agrees with the result but argues that the legal analysis should be different. Fuchsberg contends that the 'best interests of the child' should not be a discrete, secondary inquiry that follows a finding of 'extraordinary circumstances.' He argues that the two concepts are inherently intertwined and should be considered together from the outset. When a natural parent has allowed a long-term, stable relationship to form between the child and a third party who has become the 'psychological parent,' the presumption favoring the natural parent should disappear. The court's primary focus should be on the child's need for security and continuity, without giving the biological parent an evidentiary advantage.
Analysis:
This case establishes a significant two-part test in custody disputes between a natural parent and a non-parent. It moves away from a strict 'parental rights' doctrine, which only allowed termination for unfitness or abandonment, by adding 'extraordinary circumstances' like prolonged separation as a trigger for a best interest analysis. This precedent empowers courts to prioritize a child's psychological well-being and stability over a biological parent's rights when there has been a significant, albeit potentially blameless, disruption to the parent-child relationship. The decision balances the constitutional rights of parents with the state's parens patriae interest in protecting children, setting the stage for future cases to weigh the trauma of removal against the right of a fit parent to custody.
