Bennemon ex rel. Williams v. Sullivan
1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 17284, 914 F.2d 987 (1990)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
For an illegitimate child to qualify for Social Security survivor benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(C)(ii), the deceased father's contributions to the mother's support during pregnancy must be more than trivial and sporadic. Contributions made prior to the pregnancy, such as a one-time act of lending one's name to obtain utilities, do not satisfy the statutory requirement of 'contributing to the support' of the unborn child.
Facts:
- George Williams and Betty Bennemon began a sexual relationship and lived apart.
- Williams, who had a better credit record, subscribed to electricity and telephone services for Bennemon in his name before she became pregnant.
- Williams paid a couple of Bennemon's utility bills at some point during their relationship.
- Bennemon became pregnant with Williams' child.
- Williams told friends he was the father and was reportedly thrilled by the prospect.
- During Bennemon's pregnancy, her telephone service was cut off.
- Two months into Bennemon's pregnancy, George Williams was stabbed to death.
- Williams had not made a written acknowledgment of paternity or been subject to a court order of paternity before his death.
Procedural Posture:
- Betty Bennemon, on behalf of her son Tarelle M. Williams, applied to the Social Security Administration for child's survivor benefits based on the earnings of the deceased George Williams.
- The Social Security Administration denied the application.
- An administrative law judge (ALJ) for the Social Security Administration held a hearing and upheld the denial.
- Bennemon appealed the ALJ's decision to the U.S. District Court.
- The U.S. District Court affirmed the decision of the administrative law judge.
- Bennemon, as the appellant, appealed the district court's judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a deceased wage earner's sporadic payment of a couple of utility bills and lending his name to obtain utility services for the mother prior to her pregnancy constitute 'contributing to the support' of an unborn child, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(C)(ii) for the child to receive social security survivor benefits?
Opinions:
Majority - Posner, Circuit Judge
No. A deceased wage earner's sporadic payment of utility bills and the one-time act of lending his name to obtain utility services for the mother before she became pregnant do not constitute 'contributing to the support' of the unborn child as required by the Social Security Act. The purpose of survivor benefits is to replace support that the child would have received had the father lived. While in-kind support can qualify, the contributions here were trivial, sporadic, and not demonstrably tied to the pregnancy. The act of lending his name to obtain utilities occurred during the 'courtship' period, not as a form of fresh support during the pregnancy. Furthermore, the fact that Bennemon's phone service was disconnected during her pregnancy is evidence against a finding of ongoing support. The statute requires some actual support, regardless of the father's financial capability or good intentions, and Williams' actions did not meet this threshold.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces a strict interpretation of the 'contributing to support' requirement for illegitimate children under the Social Security Act within the Seventh Circuit. It establishes that courts will scrutinize the timing and nature of support, distinguishing between acts of courtship and acts of paternal support during pregnancy. The ruling makes it more difficult for children of very poor, unmarried fathers to qualify for benefits based on non-traditional or minimal in-kind contributions. It highlights the statutory disparity where illegitimate children must prove dependency while legitimate children are presumed to be dependent, regardless of the father's actual support.
