Bell v. Maryland
1964 U.S. LEXIS 824, 84 S. Ct. 1814, 378 U.S. 226 (1964)
Rule of Law:
When a significant change in state law, such as the repeal of a criminal statute, occurs after a conviction but before the judgment becomes final on direct review, the U.S. Supreme Court will vacate the judgment and remand the case to the state's highest court for reconsideration in light of the supervening change in state law.
Facts:
- In 1960, 12 Negro students, including petitioners, went to Hooper's restaurant in Baltimore, Maryland, to engage in a “sit-in protest” because the restaurant would not serve Negroes.
- The restaurant hostess, following orders from Mr. Hooper, the corporate president, informed the students that they would not be served "solely on the basis of their color."
- The students did not leave when requested by the hostess and manager; instead, they proceeded to tables, took seats, and refused to depart, insisting on being served.
- Mr. Hooper called the police, who advised that an arrest warrant would be necessary.
- Mr. Hooper then went to the police station and swore out warrants, leading to the petitioners' arrest for criminal trespass.
Procedural Posture:
- The 12 Negro students (petitioners) were convicted in a Maryland state court for criminal trespass under Md. Code, Art. 27, § 577.
- The convictions were affirmed by the Maryland Court of Appeals (227 Md. 302, 176 A.2d 771 (1962)).
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari (374 U.S. 805) to review the case.
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Issue:
Does a supervening change in state law that abolishes the crime of which petitioners were convicted require a state appellate court, upon remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, to reverse the convictions and dismiss the indictments, notwithstanding a general state saving clause?
Opinions:
Majority - William J. Brennan Jr.
Yes, a supervening change in state law that abolishes the crime of which petitioners were convicted requires vacating the judgment and remanding the case to the state court for reconsideration. The Maryland Court of Appeals would likely reverse the convictions and dismiss the indictments because Maryland common law dictates that when a criminal statute is repealed or conduct is no longer deemed criminal by subsequent legislative action before final disposition, all pending criminal proceedings for such conduct must be dismissed. Although Maryland has a general saving clause designed to preserve convictions despite statutory changes, the newly enacted public accommodations laws do not explicitly 'repeal' or 'amend' the trespass law in a way that the saving clause would typically apply. These new laws, instead, create an affirmative right to service, effectively vindicating the petitioners' conduct. Furthermore, cogent state policy considerations suggest the legislature would not intend the saving clause to apply, especially given the new laws making discriminatory denial of service unlawful. The Court's consistent practice is to vacate and remand cases when a supervening event raises a question of state law that might control the outcome, allowing state courts to address their own law and avoiding unnecessary federal constitutional questions.
Concurring - William O. Douglas
No, the Court should not avoid the fundamental constitutional question by remanding on a state law issue; it should directly hold that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits racial discrimination in public accommodations and reverse the convictions outright. The Court's deferral to state law is a "pretense" to avoid a critical issue of national importance. Refusals of service by corporate restaurants are typically driven by commercial interests, not personal prejudices, and the state's enforcement of trespass laws in such cases constitutes "state action" that violates the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. This discrimination is a "relic of slavery" and creates an impermissible "second-class citizenship." Property dedicated to public use, like a restaurant, does not carry the same privacy rights as a private home. The precedent of Shelley v. Kraemer, where judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants was deemed state action, is applicable here because state judicial enforcement of trespass laws against Negroes demanding constitutionally protected rights is also state action.
Concurring - Arthur Goldberg
No, the Court should reverse the convictions outright, because the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees to all Americans the right to equal treatment in public accommodations. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments were intended to establish freedom and equality for all, eliminating a caste system. Historical evidence and congressional debates surrounding these amendments, as well as the common law tradition of innkeepers and common carriers serving all, demonstrate an understanding that access to public accommodations was a fundamental "civil right." The Civil Rights Cases (1883) assumed that states would affirmatively protect this right; when a state, like Maryland, applies its laws (common or statutory) to deny rather than protect access, it constitutes prohibited "state action." The proprietor's interest in discriminating in a business open to the public is slight compared to the Negro's constitutional right to equal public accommodations. The constitutional principle must adapt to modern life, just as Brown v. Board of Education did for schools, and extend to contemporary public establishments like restaurants.
Dissenting - Hugo Black
No, the Fourteenth Amendment does not, of itself, prohibit a State from enforcing its neutral trespass laws to convict persons who refuse to leave a privately owned restaurant after being denied service due to race; therefore, the convictions should be affirmed. The Court's refusal to decide this crucial constitutional question is an unjustified abdication of duty. The Maryland trespass statute is not vague, and freedom of expression does not grant a right to trespass on private property to protest. The Fourteenth Amendment's Section 1 prohibits "state action" only, not private discrimination. A state's enforcement of its general, impartial trespass laws to protect a property owner's right to control their private business, even if the owner is prejudiced, does not constitute forbidden state action. Shelley v. Kraemer is distinguishable because it involved state action that denied federally guaranteed property rights (to buy/sell property), whereas this case involves an owner's right to refuse service. There is no evidence of Maryland coercing or encouraging Hooper's discriminatory policy. Historical evidence does not support the claim that the Fourteenth Amendment, without congressional legislation, guaranteed access to privately owned public accommodations; rather, calls for legislation at the time suggest the opposite. The Court's role is to interpret the Constitution as written, not to rewrite it based on current societal views.
Analysis:
This case illustrates the Supreme Court's practice of judicial restraint, prioritizing avoidance of constitutional questions when a non-federal state ground might resolve the case. While the majority avoided the merits of racial discrimination in public accommodations, the concurring and dissenting opinions starkly outline the central debate of the era: the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment's 'state action' doctrine and whether it directly prohibited private racial discrimination enforced by state trespass laws. The procedural outcome of this case ultimately did little to resolve the substantive constitutional questions, which were eventually addressed by civil rights legislation and subsequent Supreme Court cases like Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States and Katzenbach v. McClung.
