Bell v. Campbell
434 S.W.2d 117, 12 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 86, 1968 Tex. LEXIS 269 (1968)
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Rule of Law:
An original negligent act is not a proximate cause of an injury when a new, independent, and unforeseeable force intervenes to become the direct and immediate cause of that injury. If the original negligence has run its course and merely creates a static condition, it is considered a remote cause, not a proximate one.
Facts:
- Thomas J. Marshall, driving an automobile pulling a trailer, and Addie Campbell, driving a pickup truck, were both proceeding in a westerly direction on U.S. Highway 67.
- At approximately 6:00 p.m., while it was dark and raining, Marshall's automobile struck the rear of Campbell's truck.
- The impact caused Marshall's trailer to become disengaged, overturn, and come to rest blocking the north traffic lane.
- William Payton, Jr., John Homer Bell, and Frank T. Bransford stopped to help remove the overturned trailer from the highway.
- While they were attempting to move the trailer, W. W. Fore, who had been drinking, drove his vehicle into the trailer.
- This second collision resulted in severe injuries to Bransford and the deaths of Payton and Bell.
Procedural Posture:
- The statutory beneficiaries of Payton and Bell, along with the injured Bransford, filed suit against Marshall, Campbell, and the Fores in a Texas trial court.
- Plaintiffs settled their claims against the Fores.
- The case proceeded to trial against Marshall and Campbell (respondents).
- Respondents filed a third-party action against the Fores for indemnity and contribution.
- The trial court rendered a take-nothing judgment in favor of respondents Marshall and Campbell.
- The plaintiffs (petitioners) appealed to the Texas Court of Civil Appeals.
- The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- The plaintiffs (petitioners) appealed to the Supreme Court of Texas.
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Issue:
Does the negligence of drivers in a first collision constitute a proximate cause of injuries sustained by individuals in a second, subsequent collision caused by an independent third party's negligent act?
Opinions:
Majority - Walker, Justice
No, the negligence of the drivers in the first collision does not constitute a proximate cause of the injuries sustained in the second collision. For a negligent act to be the proximate cause of an injury, the injury must be a natural and probable consequence that could have been reasonably foreseen. Here, the actions of W. W. Fore were a new and independent intervening cause that broke the chain of causation. The negligence of Marshall and Campbell had run its course and was complete; it simply created a condition that attracted the victims to the scene. All forces from the first collision had come to rest, and the original negligence did not actively contribute to the second collision. Therefore, the defendants' negligence was not a concurring cause but merely a remote cause, and they cannot be held liable for the unforeseeable actions of Fore.
Dissenting - Smith, Justice
This opinion notes a dissent without providing any reasoning.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the Texas common law distinction between a 'condition' and a 'cause' in proximate cause analysis. It reinforces the principle that foreseeability is the cornerstone of proximate cause and limits the scope of liability for an original tortfeasor. By holding that the original negligence was merely a condition, the court insulates defendants from liability for subsequent, unforesee-able superseding acts, even if the 'but-for' test is met. This case is crucial for understanding how courts analyze causation in multi-event tort scenarios and distinguishes between a superseding cause, which breaks the causal chain, and a concurring cause, which does not.
