BEHRENS v. PELLETIER
516 U.S. 299 (1996)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A defendant is not deprived of the right to immediately appeal a district court's denial of a qualified immunity claim at the summary judgment stage simply because the defendant had previously appealed a denial of the same defense at the motion to dismiss stage.
Facts:
- The Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) approved South Coast Savings and Loan for insurance on the condition that any new managing officer be approved by FHLBB.
- Pioneer Savings and Loan, South Coast's successor, named respondent Pelletier as its managing officer and sought FHLBB's approval.
- Pelletier had previously been a senior executive at Beverly Hills Savings and Loan, which FHLBB had recently declared insolvent amid an investigation into misconduct by its management.
- Petitioner Behrens, an FHLBB supervisory agent, wrote a letter to Pioneer withholding approval for Pelletier's hiring and advising that he be replaced.
- Upon receiving Behrens' letter, Pioneer asked Pelletier to resign and subsequently fired him when he refused.
- Pelletier alleged that Behrens' letter and other continuing efforts to harm his reputation prevented him from securing other employment within the savings and loan industry.
Procedural Posture:
- Pelletier sued Behrens and others in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, asserting Bivens claims for constitutional violations.
- Behrens filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity.
- The District Court dismissed some claims but implicitly denied qualified immunity on the remaining claim regarding Pelletier's inability to secure subsequent employment.
- Behrens, as appellant, filed an immediate appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where Pelletier was the appellee.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's denial but stated in dictum that a defendant is entitled to only one such interlocutory appeal.
- On remand and after discovery, Behrens again moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.
- The District Court denied the motion, stating that material issues of fact remained.
- Behrens filed a second notice of appeal to the Ninth Circuit.
- The Ninth Circuit dismissed the second appeal for lack of jurisdiction, relying on its 'one-appeal' rule.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Ninth Circuit's dismissal.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a defendant's immediate appeal of a district court's denial of qualified immunity on a motion to dismiss deprive the court of appeals of jurisdiction over a second immediate appeal from a denial of qualified immunity on a subsequent motion for summary judgment?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Scalia
No. A defendant's immediate appeal of an unfavorable qualified-immunity ruling on a motion to dismiss does not deprive the court of appeals of jurisdiction over a second appeal, also based on qualified immunity, following a denial of summary judgment. The Supreme Court's decision in Mitchell v. Forsyth established that a denial of qualified immunity is an immediately appealable 'final decision' because the immunity is an entitlement not just to avoid trial, but also the burdens of pretrial litigation like discovery. The legal analysis at the motion to dismiss stage, which scrutinizes the conduct as alleged in the complaint, is distinct from the analysis at the summary judgment stage, which examines the evidence gathered during discovery. Because the legal questions are different, a denial of summary judgment is no less 'final' or appealable than a denial of a motion to dismiss, and an unsuccessful appeal from the first does not preclude an appeal from the second.
Dissenting - Justice Breyer
Yes. While one interlocutory appeal on qualified immunity is justified, a second appeal is not. The 'collateral order' doctrine, which permits immediate appeals of certain non-final orders, is a narrow exception that should not be expanded. A second appeal on the same general issue of immunity does not meet the 'separability' requirement in spirit, as it risks duplication and waste of appellate resources. Furthermore, the primary interest protected by the first appeal is the right to avoid trial, which is sufficiently important. The interest protected by a second pretrial appeal is largely the right to avoid further discovery, which is not an interest 'sufficiently important to overcome the policies militating against interlocutory appeals.' Allowing multiple interlocutory appeals creates opportunities for delay, threatens to 'ossify civil rights litigation,' and adds to the burden on already overloaded appellate courts.
Analysis:
This decision significantly strengthens the procedural power of the qualified immunity defense for government officials. By clarifying that defendants can immediately appeal denials of immunity at both the motion to dismiss and summary judgment stages, the Court provides two distinct opportunities to halt trial court proceedings and seek appellate review. This solidifies qualified immunity as not merely a defense from liability, but a right to avoid the entire litigation process. The ruling impacts civil rights litigation by potentially increasing delays and costs for plaintiffs, who may have to overcome two separate interlocutory appeals before ever reaching a trial on the merits.
