Begay v. United States
128 S. Ct. 1581 (2008)
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Rule of Law:
A crime qualifies as a "violent felony" under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act only if it is similar in kind—specifically, involving purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct—to the enumerated examples of burglary, arson, and extortion, not merely similar in the degree of risk it poses. Crimes of strict liability, negligence, or recklessness, such as driving under the influence, do not meet this standard.
Facts:
- Larry Begay had twelve prior convictions for driving under the influence (DUI) in New Mexico.
- Under New Mexico law, a fourth or subsequent DUI conviction is classified as a felony, punishable by more than one year in prison.
- In September 2004, Begay threatened his sister and aunt with a rifle.
- Police subsequently arrested Begay for this conduct.
- Due to his prior felony convictions, federal law prohibited Begay from possessing a firearm.
Procedural Posture:
- Larry Begay pleaded guilty in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico to being a felon in possession of a firearm.
- The district court judge found that Begay's prior felony DUI convictions qualified as "violent felonies" under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).
- The district court sentenced Begay, as an armed career criminal, to the mandatory minimum of 15 years in prison.
- Begay appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, arguing his DUI convictions were not violent felonies.
- The Tenth Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, affirmed the district court's sentence.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted Begay's petition for a writ of certiorari to decide the issue.
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Issue:
Does a state felony conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) qualify as a "violent felony" under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Breyer
No. A state felony conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol does not qualify as a "violent felony" under the Armed Career Criminal Act's residual clause. The Act's listed examples—burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes involving explosives—limit the scope of the residual clause to crimes that are similar not only in the degree of risk they pose but also in kind. These enumerated offenses all typically involve purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct, which suggests that an offender who commits them is more likely to deliberately use a gun in the future. In contrast, DUI is more akin to a strict liability or negligent offense and does not exhibit the same kind of purposeful criminal mindset that the Act was designed to target.
Concurring - Justice Scalia
No. A state felony conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol does not qualify as a "violent felony" under the Armed Career Criminal Act's residual clause. The majority's 'purposeful, violent, and aggressive' test is not faithful to the statutory text. The proper approach is to determine if the crime in question poses a risk of physical injury at least as great as the least risky of the enumerated offenses, which is burglary. The government failed to provide sufficient statistical evidence to prove that a single act of drunk driving is as risky as burglary. Given this ambiguity, the rule of lenity requires interpreting the statute in favor of the defendant.
Dissenting - Justice Alito
Yes. A state felony conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol qualifies as a "violent felony" under the Armed Career Criminal Act's residual clause. The statutory text requires only that the conduct present a "serious potential risk of physical injury," and the staggering number of deaths and injuries caused by drunk driving annually demonstrates that it unequivocally meets this standard. The majority's interpretation improperly adds new elements to the statute—that the conduct must be 'purposeful,' 'violent,' and 'aggressive'—which do not appear in its text. A plain reading of the statute compels the conclusion that felony DUI is a violent felony.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrowed the scope of the ACCA's residual clause by introducing a qualitative, purpose-based analysis rather than a purely risk-based one. It requires lower courts to look beyond a crime's statistical risk and consider whether its typical commission involves purposeful and aggressive conduct similar to the enumerated offenses. This new framework created considerable uncertainty and inconsistent applications in the lower courts, contributing to the Supreme Court's later decision in Johnson v. United States (2015) to declare the residual clause unconstitutionally vague.
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