No, her trial was fair enough. The court said that for her lawyer to have had a 'conflict of interest,' he needed to be actively torn between helping her and helping himself. Here, the lawyer never even considered that he should be a witness, so he never faced that choice. The problem was only 'potential,' not 'actual.' Even if he had testified, it wouldn't have made a big difference because another witness already said similar things, and a much more believable witness (a chaplain) testified that Beets asked about insurance money right after her husband disappeared, which made her look guilty. The book deal was shady and unethical, but she couldn't prove it actually made her lawyer do a worse job.

No, but I disagree with some of the reasoning. I agree with the final outcome, but I think the court is using the wrong legal test. That test is for when a lawyer represents two different clients who have opposite goals. This case is about a conflict between the lawyer's own personal interests (making money from a book deal) and his client's interest (staying off death row). We should have used the normal 'bad lawyer' test instead of this special 'conflict of interest' test. If we had, I think the lawyer's failure to testify would have been seen as a big deal that hurt her defense.

No, Beets's constitutional rights were not violated by Andrews being her lawyer. Andrews did not have a real conflict of interest that negatively affected how he represented Beets. The media contract, while possibly unethical, did not create a real conflict or negatively impact Andrews's work. Andrews did a good enough job at trial and did not harm Beets's case. The prosecution did not secretly promise to go easy on Beets's children for testifying against her. However, Andrews's failure to look into Beets's personal history was noted, but not enough to prove he was an ineffective lawyer.

I agree with the decision to uphold Beets's conviction and death sentence, and that there was no actual conflict shown. But I disagree with the alternative view that her conviction could stand under the negative impact test from the Cuyler v. Sullivan case if it applied here. That test was made for conflicts involving lawyers representing multiple clients, and shouldn't be used here where the lawyer didn't have conflicting duties to multiple clients. Andrews not testifying should be looked at as a professional mistake under the Strickland v. Washington case, not as a conflict of interest under Cuyler.

—although counsel did not "conduct a thorough investigation of [the defendant's] medical, mental, and psychological history," which would have revealed that the defendant "was raised in abject poverty, experienced a debilitating hearing loss, was afflicted with learning disabilities, had received head injuries as a child, and suffers from battered woman syndrome," the …

To prevail, Garcia-Jasso must show that De la Garza "was required to make a choice advancing his own interests to the detriment of his client's interests."

The Fifth Circuit has held that where a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is based on an alleged conflict of interest, in order to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.

"When multiple representation exists, the source and consequences of the ethical problem are straightforward: `counsel represents two clients with competing interests and is torn between two duties.... He must fail one or do nothing and fail both.'"

—noting that an attorney's media-rights contract was "almost surely unethical," though the facts before the court were inadequate in and of themselves to create an actual conflict of interest or adversely affect the counsel's performance

—no duty to inquire into conflict of interest when trial court learned of defendant's agreement to assign literary rights to counsel's son three months after close of trial at hearing on motion to appoint counsel for appeal

The "constitutional predicate" for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based upon a conflict of interest is that defense counsel "actively represented conflicting interests."

The district court's conclusions regarding Faubion's claims that she received ineffective assistance of counsel are mixed questions of law and fact and, thus, also subject to de novo review

No. The attorney's potential role as a witness and the media rights contract did not create an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected his performance under the Sixth Amendment. To establish a violation, a defendant who did not object at trial must meet the two-prong test from Cuyler v. Sullivan: demonstrating an 'actual conflict of interest' that 'adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.' Beets failed to establish the first prong because the potential conflict never ripened into an actual one. Her attorney, Andrews, never realized he 'ought' to be a witness and was thus never forced to choose between his own interests and his client's. A mere theoretical or speculative conflict is insufficient. Beets also failed to show an adverse effect. Andrews's potential testimony about Beets's ignorance of benefits would have been largely cumulative to another witness's testimony and would have been significantly outweighed by the credible testimony of a chaplain, who stated Beets inquired about benefits just days after her husband's disappearance. While the media rights contract was an unethical breach, Beets failed to show it created an actual conflict that adversely affected Andrews's performance.

No, I concur in the judgment but for different reasons. While I join the opinion that no actual conflict was shown, I disagree with the majority's alternative holding that there was no adverse effect. Had an actual conflict existed, Andrews's failure to testify would have met the low threshold for adverse effect, as his testimony was unique and not merely cumulative. The larger issue is that the Cuyler v. Sullivan 'actual conflict plus adverse effect' test should be confined to cases involving multiple representation of clients with competing interests. For conflicts between an attorney's self-interest and a client's interests, like this one, the standard 'deficient performance plus prejudice' test from Strickland v. Washington is the more appropriate framework for analysis. Andrews's failure to act in his client's best interest should be treated as a matter of professional effectiveness under Strickland, not as a conflict of interest under Cuyler.

No. The representation of Beets by Andrews did not constitute a violation of the Sixth Amendment. Andrews did not have an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected his performance as Beets's counsel. The media rights contract, while potentially unethical, did not create an actual conflict or adversely affect Andrews's performance. Andrews's performance at trial was neither deficient nor prejudicial to Beets's case. The prosecution did not enter into hidden promises of leniency with Beets's children who testified against her. However, the failure to investigate Beets's personal history was noted, but not sufficient to establish ineffective assistance of counsel.

I concur in the judgment upholding Beets's conviction and sentence and agree that an actual conflict has not been shown. However, I do not agree with the alternative holding that the conviction could stand under the adverse effect test of Cuyler v. Sullivan if it were applicable. The Cuyler standard, developed for conflicts involving multiple representation, should not be applied to this case where counsel did not face conflicting demands of multiple clients. Andrews's failure to testify should be treated as a matter of professional effectiveness under Strickland v. Washington, not as a conflict of interest under Cuyler.

Beets v. Collins

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Issue:

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Majority, Concurrences & Dissents

Analysis:

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