Bedor v. Johnson
2013 WL 226912, 292 P.3d 924, 2013 CO 4 (2013)
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Rule of Law:
The sudden emergency jury instruction is abolished in negligence cases because its potential to mislead the jury greatly outweighs its minimal utility as it is duplicative of the general 'reasonable person under the circumstances' standard.
Facts:
- On January 16, 2004, Michael E. Johnson was driving westbound outside Telluride, Colorado.
- An ice patch regularly formed during the winter in the portion of the road where Johnson was driving.
- Johnson drove that stretch of road regularly and was aware of the possibility that ice might be present on the road that morning.
- Johnson's vehicle hit an icy patch of snow on the road.
- Upon hitting the ice, Johnson lost control of his vehicle, which spun and slid sideways across the center line.
- Johnson's vehicle then collided with an eastbound vehicle driven by Richard Bedor.
- Both Johnson and Bedor were injured in the collision.
- There was conflicting evidence presented at trial as to whether Johnson was speeding or intoxicated prior to losing control of his vehicle.
Procedural Posture:
- Richard Bedor filed a negligence action against Michael E. Johnson in a Colorado trial court.
- At the conclusion of a jury trial, the trial court gave a jury instruction on the sudden emergency doctrine over Bedor's objection.
- The jury returned a verdict in favor of Johnson, finding he was not negligent.
- Bedor, as appellant, appealed the judgment to the Colorado Court of Appeals.
- The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- Bedor, as petitioner, petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court for certiorari review, which was granted.
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Issue:
In a negligence action, should trial courts continue to provide a separate jury instruction on the sudden emergency doctrine?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Rice
No. A separate jury instruction concerning sudden emergencies should no longer be given in any negligence case. First, the trial court abused its discretion in giving the instruction in this specific case because the evidence did not support it; Johnson was aware of the potential for ice, and a mere loss of control is not a deliberate response to an emergency. Second, and more broadly, the court abolished the doctrine entirely, overruling its precedent in Young v. Clark. The court reasoned that the instruction has minimal utility because it was developed to soften the old rule of contributory negligence, which has been replaced by comparative negligence. Furthermore, it is duplicative, as the standard 'reasonable care under the circumstances' instruction already accounts for any emergency situation. The doctrine's potential to mislead the jury is significant because it can imply a lower standard of care, suggest the court has already found an emergency existed, and unduly focus the jury's attention on the moment of the emergency rather than the defendant's conduct leading up to it.
Dissenting - Justice Eid
Yes. The sudden emergency instruction should be retained because it simply repeats the standard negligence formulation that a jury should evaluate a defendant's conduct based on the circumstances, including a sudden emergency. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving the instruction, as Johnson's general awareness of possible ice does not preclude a sudden emergency, distinguishing this case from Kendrick. The instruction itself requires the jury to find the defendant was 'through no fault of his or her own' placed in the emergency, which properly directs the jury to consider the defendant's pre-emergency conduct, making it unlikely they would be misled.
Dissenting - Justice Boatright
Yes. The sudden emergency doctrine should be retained under the principle of stare decisis. The court's precedent in Young v. Clark already considered and rejected the same arguments about the instruction's utility and potential for confusion that the majority now adopts, and no conditions have changed to justify abandoning that precedent. Furthermore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion, as there was competent evidence—including expert testimony that Johnson attempted to correct his course—to support the conclusion that Johnson faced a sudden, unexpected circumstance not of his own making, making the instruction a rationally available choice for the trial court.
Analysis:
This decision marks a significant change in Colorado negligence law by explicitly abolishing the long-standing sudden emergency doctrine and overruling prior precedent that had affirmed it. The ruling aligns Colorado with a growing number of jurisdictions that have found the instruction to be more confusing than helpful. In future negligence cases involving unexpected events, litigants will no longer be able to request a specific 'sudden emergency' instruction. Instead, they must frame their arguments within the general standard of 'reasonable care under the circumstances,' treating the emergency as one of the circumstances for the jury to consider, which simplifies jury instructions but removes a specific defense tool.
