Beagle v. Vasold
65 Cal. 2d 166, 417 P.2d 673, 53 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1966)
Rule of Law:
In personal injury actions, counsel may state the total amount of general damages claimed and may suggest 'per diem' calculations for pain and suffering during argument to the jury, as these are permissible inferences from the evidence and aid the jury in quantifying subjective damages.
Facts:
- Plaintiff suffered personal injuries when a car driven by Kenneth Vasold went over an embankment while rounding a curve in the road.
- Kenneth Vasold died as a result of his injuries, and plaintiff, along with Elizabeth Vasold and another occupant, were injured.
- Plaintiff, a 39-year-old carpenter, was hospitalized for 12 days and sustained head and hand lacerations, a wood sliver under his eyelid, and a chipped front tooth.
- Following the accident, plaintiff's vision became impaired, requiring him to wear eyeglasses.
- Plaintiff developed severe back pains that radiated down his thighs to his knees, necessitating a back brace, and had been unable to work as a carpenter since the accident.
- A medical doctor testified that plaintiff's congenital back defect, spondylolisthesis, became symptomatic as a result of the accident.
- The medical doctor also testified that an operation costing $2,000 would be necessary to relieve plaintiff’s back condition.
- Plaintiff's complaint prayed for $61,025.18 in general damages, in addition to compensation for medical expenses and loss of earnings.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiff brought an action against Elizabeth Vasold and the administrator of Kenneth Vasold's estate for personal injuries.
- The trial court informed plaintiff’s attorney, both before opening statements and prior to summation, that he would not be permitted to mention to the jury 'the value of his action in dollars' in a lump sum or as to 'any per diem damages such as so many dollars per day, or so many dollars per month.'
- The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $1,719.48.
- Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial on the ground of inadequacy of the damages awarded.
- The trial court denied plaintiff's motion for a new trial.
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Issue:
Does a trial court err by prohibiting plaintiff's counsel from stating the amount of general damages claimed, either as a total sum or as a 'per diem' sum, in argument to the jury in a personal injury action?
Opinions:
Majority - Mosk, J.
Yes, a trial court errs by prohibiting plaintiff's counsel from stating the amount of general damages claimed, either as a total sum or as a 'per diem' sum, in argument to the jury in a personal injury action. The court reasoned that it is a well-established practice for attorneys to inform the jury of the total damages sought, and courts typically instruct juries on the maximum amount claimable. The court rejected the rationale of Botta v. Brunner, which held that 'per diem' arguments are not evidence and invade the jury's province. Instead, the court found that counsel's suggestion of a 'per diem' sum for pain and suffering is merely a reasonable inference from the evidence presented, rather than the introduction of new evidence, and therefore does not improperly invade the jury's role. While acknowledging concerns about potentially excessive verdicts, the court emphasized that the ultimate award must meet a test of reasonableness, and both trial and appellate courts retain the power and duty to reduce awards that are unreasonably large. Furthermore, safeguards exist, such as defense counsel's ability to counter-argue and the court's instruction that counsel's arguments are not evidence and that the jury is not bound by any particular calculation method. The court concluded that denying counsel the ability to make such arguments deprives them of an effective advocacy tool for quantifying subjective injuries, and found that the trial court's restriction in this case constituted prejudicial error, given the nature of plaintiff's injuries and the relatively low jury award.
Concurring - Traynor, C. J.
Yes, the trial court committed prejudicial error in refusing to allow plaintiff’s attorney to state a monetary estimate of an appropriate award for pain and suffering. However, Chief Justice Traynor argued that while counsel should be permitted to suggest a specific sum or range of sums for pain and suffering, arguments using a 'per diem' formula for such damages should never be allowed because they are inherently misleading. He reasoned that these formulas appear reasonable on their face but can yield wildly disparate and arbitrary total sums, with no basis in human experience for testing their reasonableness. Counsel, he asserted, could manipulate the unit of time or the amount surmised for that period to arrive at any desired total, making the argument 'sophistic' and not serving truth, even if challenged by counter-arguments.
Analysis:
This case significantly broadened the scope of permissible argument in personal injury cases in California, particularly concerning the quantification of non-economic damages like pain and suffering. By explicitly allowing 'per diem' arguments, the court provided attorneys with a more direct and arguably more persuasive method to illustrate the duration and intensity of a plaintiff's suffering to a jury, thereby aiding the difficult task of monetizing subjective harm. The decision reflects a confidence in the jury's ability to discern reasonable inferences while relying on judicial checks (remittitur and appellate review) and adversarial argument to prevent unwarranted or excessive awards. It empowers plaintiffs' counsel to more fully articulate the value of their clients' intangible losses, influencing the strategy for calculating and presenting damages in future personal injury litigation.
