No, Kentucky's method is constitutional. The inmates did not prove there was a 'substantial risk' of extreme pain. They only showed a slight possibility of something going wrong. Kentucky already has several safety checks in place. For a court to force a state to change its method, there must be a very high risk of pain and a proven, much better alternative. Courts should not act as science fair judges, picking the 'best' execution method.

No, the inmates didn't prove their case under the current rules. But, it's very disturbing that the state uses a paralysis drug that is banned for putting pets to sleep because it can hide pain. This whole issue makes me question if the death penalty itself is still a good idea. The reasons we used to have for it, like preventing crime and getting even, don't seem as strong anymore.

No, the method is fine because the 'risk of pain' is the wrong question. The Constitution only bans punishments that are *designed* to be torturous, like being burned alive. Since lethal injection is meant to be humane, it's constitutional, even if there's a small chance of an accident.

The court should not have approved this so quickly. The risk of agonizing pain is so horrifying that the state should be required to take simple, common-sense steps to prevent it. Other states check if the inmate is truly unconscious by calling their name or brushing their eyelashes. Kentucky skips these easy checks, creating an unnecessary and cruel risk of torture. The case should be sent back to see if these simple safeguards are needed.

No, Kentucky's method does not violate the Constitution. The Constitution doesn't say executions have to be totally pain-free. Baze and Bowling didn't prove there's a big risk of the drugs being given wrong. Kentucky has safety measures to give the drugs properly. The Supreme Court agrees with the lower courts that Kentucky's method is okay.

I agree with the main opinion but want to explain how it should work. An inmate challenging an execution method must show it has a big risk of severe pain that could be lowered a lot by a different method. Showing a slightly safer way isn't enough. Courts shouldn't get too involved in scientific debates they're not experts in.

I think this case will make people debate not just the three-drug method, but whether the death penalty should be allowed at all. The good opinions by the Chief Justice and Justice Ginsburg made me think the death penalty is used out of habit rather than careful thought. In my experience, the death penalty doesn't serve an important public purpose.

Justice Stevens' view that the death penalty is unconstitutional is not supported by the Constitution. The Constitution clearly allows the death penalty. Justice Stevens' reasons are not convincing. Whether to have the death penalty should be decided by the people and their representatives, not courts. Most Americans disagree with Justice Stevens.

I agree with the final decision only. The main opinion's rule is not supported by the original meaning of the Constitution or the Court's past cases. I believe an execution method violates the Constitution only if it's designed on purpose to cause pain. Kentucky's method is meant to avoid pain, not cause it, so it's constitutional.

I don't see enough evidence, in this case or other sources, to believe Kentucky's execution method has a big risk of causing unnecessary suffering. The death penalty itself has serious risks, which is partly why it's so controversial. But we're not deciding if the death penalty is constitutional here. The evidence raises concerns but doesn't prove Kentucky's method is cruel and unusual punishment.

Kentucky's execution process is missing basic steps used by other states to make sure the prisoner is unconscious before the second and third drugs are injected. I would send the case back to the lower courts to consider if leaving out these steps creates an easily avoidable risk of severe and unnecessary pain.

No, Kentucky's lethal injection protocol does not violate the Eighth Amendment. To succeed, petitioners must show that the state's method creates a 'substantial risk of serious harm,' not merely an 'unnecessary risk.' Petitioners failed to meet this high burden. Kentucky's protocol contains sufficient safeguards—such as requiring experienced personnel to set IV lines, using redundant IV sites, and conducting visual checks for unconsciousness—to protect against a substantial risk of maladministration. The proposed alternatives are not constitutionally required because they are either untested (the one-drug method) or not shown to be necessary to avoid a substantial risk (additional monitoring). Permitting challenges based on marginally safer alternatives would improperly transform courts into 'boards of inquiry charged with determining “best practices” for executions.'

No, under the Court's existing precedent, the petitioners failed to prove Kentucky's protocol is unconstitutional. However, the use of pancuronium bromide is deeply troubling because it serves no therapeutic purpose and masks any signs of suffering, a practice forbidden in animal euthanasia in Kentucky. This case prompts a broader reexamination of the death penalty itself, as its primary justifications—incapacitation, deterrence, and retribution—have been significantly eroded over time, suggesting that capital punishment is becoming a 'pointless and needless extinction of life' that may be unconstitutional.

No, the protocol is constitutional, but the plurality's 'substantial risk' test is incorrect. The original meaning of the Eighth Amendment prohibits only punishments that are 'deliberately designed to inflict pain,' such as torture, breaking on the wheel, or burning at the stake. A method of execution is not 'cruel and unusual' merely because it poses an accidental risk of pain. Because lethal injection is intended to be a humane method, not a torturous one, it does not violate the Eighth Amendment, and no risk-based analysis is required.

The case should be remanded for further consideration. The plurality's 'substantial risk' test sets too high a bar. The proper inquiry should balance the degree of risk, magnitude of pain, and availability of alternatives. Kentucky's protocol omits simple, costless, and readily available safeguards that other states use to confirm an inmate's unconsciousness before administering the painful second and third drugs, such as touching the inmate's eyelashes or calling their name. This failure creates an 'untoward, readily avoidable risk of inflicting severe and unnecessary pain' that should be scrutinized more closely.

No, Kentucky's lethal injection protocol does not violate the Eighth Amendment. The Amendment does not demand the avoidance of all risk of pain in carrying out executions. Petitioners failed to show that the risk of an inadequate dose of sodium thiopental is substantial. Kentucky's protocol includes several safeguards to ensure proper administration of the drugs. The judgment is affirmed because petitioners did not carry their burden of showing that the risk of pain from improper administration of the protocol and the failure to adopt untried and untested alternatives constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

I join the plurality opinion but write separately to explain how the holding should be implemented. An inmate challenging a method of execution must show that the method presents a substantial risk of severe pain that could be significantly reduced by adopting readily available alternative procedures. Proof of a slightly or marginally safer alternative is insufficient. The proffered alternative must effectively address a substantial risk of serious harm. Courts should not embroil themselves in ongoing scientific controversies beyond their expertise.

I am convinced that the case will generate debate not only about the constitutionality of the three-drug protocol, and specifically about the justification for the use of pancuronium bromide, but also about the justification for the death penalty itself. The thoughtful opinions by the Chief Justice and Justice Ginsburg have persuaded me that current decisions by state legislatures, Congress, and this Court to retain the death penalty are the product of habit and inattention rather than an acceptable deliberative process. I have relied on my own experience in reaching the conclusion that the imposition of the death penalty represents the pointless and needless extinction of life with only marginal contributions to any discernible social or public purposes.

Justice Stevens' conclusion that the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment is insupportable as an interpretation of the Constitution. The text of the document recognizes capital punishment as a permissible legislative choice. Justice Stevens' analysis fails on its own terms, as the evidence he cites is far from conclusive. The legitimacy of capital punishment is a question for the democratic process, not courts. Justice Stevens' views are not shared by the American people.

I concur only in the judgment. The plurality opinion's formulation of the governing standard finds no support in the original understanding of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause or in the Court's previous method-of-execution cases. In my view, a method of execution violates the Eighth Amendment only if it is deliberately designed to inflict pain. Because Kentucky's protocol is designed to eliminate pain rather than to inflict it, petitioners' challenge must fail.

I cannot find, either in the record or in the readily available literature, sufficient grounds to believe that Kentucky's method of lethal injection creates a significant risk of unnecessary suffering. The death penalty itself brings serious risks, which in part explain why it is so controversial. But the lawfulness of the death penalty is not before us. Petitioners' proof and evidence, while giving rise to legitimate concern, do not show that Kentucky's method of applying the death penalty amounts to cruel and unusual punishment.

Kentucky's protocol lacks basic safeguards used by other States to confirm that an inmate is unconscious before injection of the second and third drugs. I would vacate and remand with instructions to consider whether Kentucky's omission of these safeguards poses an untoward, readily avoidable risk of inflicting severe and unnecessary pain.

Baze v. Rees

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