Bauman v. Crawford
104 Wash.2d 241, 704 P.2d 1181 (1985)
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Rule of Law:
A minor's violation of a statute does not constitute negligence per se; instead, the violation may be introduced as evidence of negligence, but the minor's conduct must ultimately be judged by the special standard of care for a child of the same age, intelligence, maturity, training, and experience.
Facts:
- Donald Bauman, who was 14 years and 4 months old, was riding his bicycle at approximately 9:30 p.m., after dark.
- His bicycle was equipped with reflectors but lacked a headlight, which was required by both a Seattle Municipal Code ordinance and a state statute for bicycles operated after dark.
- Bauman was riding his bicycle down a steep hill.
- An automobile driven by respondent Crawford made a left turn in front of Bauman at the base of the hill.
- A collision occurred between Bauman's bicycle and Crawford's automobile, resulting in Bauman suffering a broken lower leg.
Procedural Posture:
- Donald Bauman, through his guardian ad litem, sued Crawford for damages in the trial court.
- Crawford asserted the affirmative defense of contributory negligence.
- The trial court instructed the jury on both negligence per se for the statutory violation and the special child's standard of care.
- The jury returned a verdict for Bauman but found him 95% contributorily negligent, significantly reducing his award.
- Bauman (as appellant) appealed to the Washington Court of Appeals, an intermediate appellate court.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- Bauman (as petitioner) sought and was granted review by the Supreme Court of Washington, the state's highest court.
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Issue:
Does a minor's violation of a statute constitute negligence per se, automatically establishing a breach of duty in a civil negligence action?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Pearson
No, a minor's violation of a statute does not constitute negligence per se. The public policy underlying the special standard of care for children, which accounts for their immaturity and lack of judgment, fundamentally conflicts with the rigid, adult-focused standard of the negligence per se doctrine. The court reasons that applying negligence per se to a child would unfairly abrogate the special child's standard of care and substitute a form of strict liability. The court overrules its prior decision in Everest v. Riecken and adopts the majority view that a statutory violation is merely evidence of a minor's negligence. The jury must still evaluate the child's conduct based on what a reasonably careful child of the same age, intelligence, maturity, and experience would have done under the circumstances.
Concurring - Justice Brachtenbach
I concur with the majority's holding and reasoning. However, the entire doctrine of negligence per se should be reexamined for all defendants, not just minors. The doctrine improperly removes the determination of negligence from the trier of fact and places it with the court. The numerous exceptions created by courts to avoid the harshness of the doctrine demonstrate its flaws. Instead of inferring legislative intent to create a standard for civil liability from a criminal statute, courts should return the question of negligence to the jury, allowing a statutory violation to serve only as evidence of negligence.
Analysis:
This decision aligns Washington with the majority of American jurisdictions by carving out an exception to the negligence per se doctrine for minors. It prioritizes the individualized assessment of a child's capacity over a rigid, one-size-fits-all rule based on statutory violation. The case establishes a clear precedent that in tort cases involving minors between ages 6 and 16, their immaturity and development are paramount considerations, even when a safety statute is at issue. The strong concurrence also signals a potential judicial willingness to reconsider the broader application of the negligence per se doctrine in future cases.
