Bassett v. Lamantia
2018 MT 119, 417 P.3d 299, 391 Mont. 309 (2018)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The public-duty doctrine, which generally shields law enforcement officers from negligence liability for failing to protect the public at large, does not apply to or exclude duties that arise from an officer's affirmative acts that directly injure an individual, for which the officer owes a duty to exercise the care of a reasonable officer with similar skill, training, and experience under the circumstances.
Facts:
- Officer Lamantia and his partner responded to a neighborhood disturbance around 12:30 a.m.
- Officer Lamantia observed a male suspect running into a driveway, jumping over a retaining wall, and proceeding into Robert Bassett's backyard.
- Lamantia identified himself as a police officer, ordered the suspect to stop, and pursued him on foot, jumping over the retaining wall and dropping his flashlight in the process.
- Robert Bassett came out of his house to investigate the commotion in his backyard.
- Lamantia, while searching for his flashlight, heard footsteps behind him, turned, saw Bassett approaching, and, fearing for his safety, tackled Bassett to the ground.
- Lamantia released Bassett as soon as he realized Bassett was not a threat, and Bassett then pointed Lamantia in the suspect's direction, allowing Lamantia to continue his pursuit.
- Bassett later reported that he was injured during the encounter with Lamantia and was subsequently diagnosed with a torn rotator cuff.
Procedural Posture:
- Robert Bassett sued Officer Paul Lamantia and the City of Billings in state court, alleging a state-law negligence claim against Lamantia and a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violation.
- Lamantia and the City removed the case to federal court, specifically the United States District Court.
- The United States District Court entered summary judgment in favor of Lamantia and the City on both claims, finding that the public-duty doctrine shielded Lamantia and the City from negligence liability because no special relationship existed.
- Bassett (appellant) appealed the District Court's decision regarding only the negligence claim to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
- The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals certified the public-duty doctrine question to the Montana Supreme Court.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Under Montana law, when a plaintiff claims he was injured directly by an officer's affirmative acts, does the public-duty doctrine exclude all duties that may arise pursuant to generally applicable principles of negligence?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Laurie McKinnon
No, the public-duty doctrine does not exclude all duties that may arise pursuant to generally applicable principles of negligence when a plaintiff is injured directly by an officer's affirmative acts. The public-duty doctrine applies specifically to an officer's general duty to protect and preserve the peace for the public at large, meaning an officer is typically not liable to an individual for failing to protect them from harm inflicted by third parties or other independent sources unless a 'special relationship' exists. However, this doctrine does not extend to situations where an officer's own affirmative actions directly cause injury to an individual. In such cases, the officer owes a legal duty under general negligence principles, supported by Montana statutes (§§ 27-1-701, 28-1-201, MCA) which establish that all persons are responsible for injuries caused by their want of ordinary care. The existence of this duty also hinges on foreseeability, meaning the officer could reasonably foresee that their conduct could result in injury to the plaintiff. For law enforcement officers, this standard of care requires exercising the same level of care that a reasonable officer with similar skill, training, and experience would use under the same or similar circumstances, acknowledging their professional role.
Concurring - Justice Beth Baker
I concur with the Court's opinion, but offer additional observations regarding the consideration of public policy. While the Court relied on general ordinary care statutes (27-1-701 and 28-1-201, MCA) to establish public policy, it did not separately examine the traditional public policy factors (moral blame, prevention of future harm, burden, consequences to the public, and availability/cost of insurance) typically used when imposing a new common-law duty. However, upon separate consideration, these traditional public policy factors strongly support the imposition of a duty in this case. The moral blame attached to causing serious injury, the compelling interest in preventing future harm, and the public's strong interest in the safety of both officers and citizens, as well as public trust, all weigh in favor of recognizing this duty. Although there is a burden on government entities and taxpayers for potential litigation and insurance costs, this is balanced by the Court's ruling that the duty is cabined by a professional standard of care, ensuring officers are only held to standards they are trained to meet.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the scope of the public-duty doctrine in Montana, limiting its application to an officer's failure to protect from third-party harm, rather than extending it to an officer's direct, affirmative actions. By establishing that officers are not shielded from negligence claims when their own conduct causes injury, the Montana Supreme Court ensures a pathway for individuals to seek redress. The ruling reinforces accountability for law enforcement while balancing the need for officer discretion by applying a professional standard of care, which recognizes the unique demands of police work. This distinction between omissions (failure to protect) and affirmative acts of negligence is critical for future cases involving governmental entities and individual officers.
