Barton v. Bee Line, Inc.
238 App. Div. 501, 265 N.Y.S. 284 (1933)
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Rule of Law:
A female under the age of eighteen who knowingly consents to an act of sexual intercourse does not have a civil cause of action for damages against her partner, even though the act constitutes the crime of second-degree rape under the state's penal law.
Facts:
- Plaintiff was a fifteen-year-old female.
- Plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle operated by the defendant, a common carrier.
- An act of sexual intercourse occurred between the plaintiff and the defendant's chauffeur.
- The plaintiff alleged that she was forcibly raped by the chauffeur.
- The chauffeur testified that the plaintiff consented to their sexual relations.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiff sued the defendant common carrier in a state trial court.
- The trial court instructed the jury that the plaintiff could recover damages even if she had consented.
- A jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, awarding her $3,000.
- The trial court judge set aside the jury's verdict and ordered a new trial.
- The plaintiff (as appellant) appealed the trial court's order to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does a female under the age of eighteen, who consents to sexual intercourse while understanding the nature of the act, have a civil cause of action for damages against her partner whose conduct constitutes a criminal offense?
Opinions:
Majority - Lazansky, P. J.
No. A female under the age of eighteen has no cause of action against a male with whom she willingly consorts if she knows the nature and quality of her act. The court reasoned that the criminal statute defining statutory rape is intended to protect public virtue and society, not to provide a civil remedy that would financially reward a consenting minor for her 'indiscretion.' The court distinguished between criminal law, designed to punish offenders for the good of society, and civil law. It argued that allowing a civil suit would frustrate the purpose of the protective statute by turning it from a 'shield to save' into a 'sword to desecrate,' potentially enabling females to become 'seducers in their turn.' Therefore, if the chauffeur is not liable in civil damages because of the plaintiff's knowing consent, then his employer, the defendant, cannot be held liable either.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a significant distinction between criminal liability and civil liability concerning a minor's capacity to consent to sexual intercourse. While the law renders a minor's consent legally ineffective for the purpose of a criminal prosecution for statutory rape, this court holds that the same consent, if knowingly given, acts as a complete bar to a civil suit for damages. This ruling prioritizes the public policy of preventing a minor from being 'rewarded' for willing participation over the policy of protecting minors from sexual exploitation through civil remedies. It creates a precedent where an act can be a serious crime yet not give rise to a tort claim, significantly impacting how statutory violations are treated in civil litigation.
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