Bartlett v. Strickland
2009 U.S. LEXIS 1842, 173 L. Ed. 2d 173, 556 U.S. 1 (2009)
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Rule of Law:
To state a vote dilution claim under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, a minority group must demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a numerical majority (more than 50%) of the voting-age population in a single-member district.
Facts:
- The North Carolina Constitution contains a 'Whole County Provision' that prohibits the state's General Assembly from dividing counties when drawing legislative districts.
- Following the 2000 census, the General Assembly undertook redistricting for the State House of Representatives.
- In its 2003 redistricting plan, the General Assembly split Pender County to draw the boundaries for House District 18.
- The African-American voting-age population in the resulting District 18 was 39.36%.
- Had the General Assembly complied with the Whole County Provision and not split Pender County, the African-American voting-age population in District 18 would have been 35.33%.
- The General Assembly's stated purpose for splitting the county was to create a 'crossover district,' which they believed was required by § 2 of the Voting Rights Act to give African-American voters an opportunity to elect their preferred candidate with support from white voters.
Procedural Posture:
- Pender County and its Board of Commissioners sued the Governor of North Carolina and other state officials in a North Carolina state trial court.
- Plaintiffs alleged that the state's 2003 redistricting plan violated the 'Whole County Provision' of the North Carolina Constitution.
- The state-official defendants argued that § 2 of the federal Voting Rights Act required them to split Pender County, thereby preempting the state constitutional provision.
- The trial court ruled for the state officials, finding that § 2 required the creation of the crossover district.
- Three of the Pender County Commissioners, as appellants, appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of North Carolina, with the state officials as appellees.
- The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed, holding that § 2 requires a minority group to constitute a numerical majority of the voting population to compel the creation of a district.
- The state officials successfully petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does § 2 of the Voting Rights Act require state officials to draw an election district where a racial minority group is less than 50% of the voting-age population but could elect its candidate of choice with support from crossover majority voters?
Opinions:
Plurality - Justice Kennedy
No. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act does not require the creation of 'crossover' or 'coalitional' districts where a minority group comprises less than 50% of the population. The first of the three threshold requirements established in Thornburg v. Gingles requires a minority group to demonstrate it is sufficiently large to constitute a numerical majority in a potential district. This majority-minority rule provides a clear, objective, and administrable standard for courts and legislatures, unlike a standard for crossover districts that would require speculative, race-based predictions about voting behavior. Interpreting § 2 to mandate crossover districts would raise serious constitutional concerns under the Equal Protection Clause by unnecessarily infusing race into virtually every redistricting decision.
Concurring in the judgment - Justice Thomas
While concurring in the judgment to affirm, this opinion adheres to the view that the text of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act does not authorize any vote dilution claims whatsoever. The Gingles framework is a 'disastrous misadventure in judicial policymaking' with no basis in the statute's text, which should only apply to state enactments that limit citizens' access to the ballot, not the drawing of district lines.
Dissenting - Justice Souter
Yes. A district where a cohesive minority population is large enough to elect its chosen candidate with a reliable number of crossover voters should qualify as a minority-opportunity district under § 2. The plurality's rigid 50% rule is contrary to the functional approach of the statute, which focuses on a minority group's actual 'opportunity... to elect representatives of their choice.' This ruling will have the perverse effect of forcing states to pack minority voters into majority-minority districts, discouraging the cross-racial coalitions the Voting Rights Act was meant to foster and heightening the role of race in districting.
Dissenting - Justice Ginsburg
Joining Justice Souter's dissent, this opinion argues the plurality's interpretation severely undermines the purpose of the Voting Rights Act and calls on Congress to clarify the statute to correct the Court's reading.
Dissenting - Justice Breyer
Joining Justice Souter's dissent, this opinion argues that the plurality's 50% rule fails even on its own terms as a simple administrative gateway. A more functional, mathematical rule, such as requiring the minority population to be twice the size of the necessary crossover vote, would better reflect voting realities and more effectively separate meritorious claims from non-meritorious ones.
Analysis:
This decision resolves a long-standing question by establishing a bright-line, 50% rule for the first prong of the Gingles test for vote dilution claims. By rejecting the concept of mandatory crossover districts, the Court provided clear guidance to legislatures and lower courts, potentially reducing § 2 litigation. However, the ruling also limits the statute's applicability in areas where racial polarization is declining, as it prevents minority groups that can successfully form coalitions from using § 2 to challenge districting plans. This creates a dichotomy where states are permitted, but not required, to create crossover districts, which may disincentivize the drawing of integrated districts in favor of more racially segregated 'safe' districts.
