Barrett v. Lucky Seven Saloon, Inc.
96 P.3d 386 (2004)
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Rule of Law:
The standard of care for a commercial vendor's civil liability for injuries to a third party caused by an intoxicated patron is established by RCW 66.44.200(1), which prohibits the sale of alcohol to any person 'apparently under the influence of liquor.' A violation of this statute constitutes evidence of negligence.
Facts:
- On October 11, 1995, Ned Maher went to the Lucky Seven Saloon after work.
- At the Lucky Seven, Maher purchased at least three pitchers of beer and consumed at least two of them over approximately three hours.
- Maher left the tavern at about 4:30 P.M. and began driving home.
- While driving, Maher fell asleep, causing his vehicle to cross the centerline.
- Maher's vehicle collided with a car driven by Jeffrey A. Barrett, causing Barrett profound and permanent injuries.
- Approximately two hours after the collision, Maher's blood alcohol content was measured at .13 percent.
- Maher later pleaded guilty to vehicular assault while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
Procedural Posture:
- Jeffrey Barrett and his guardian sued Lucky Seven Saloon, Inc. in a state trial court for negligence.
- The trial court granted a motion in limine filed by Lucky Seven, ruling that the 'obviously intoxicated' standard, rather than the statutory 'apparently under the influence' standard, would apply to determine civil liability.
- Following a trial, the jury, instructed on the 'obviously intoxicated' standard, returned a verdict for the defendant, Lucky Seven Saloon.
- Barrett, as the appellant, appealed the judgment to the Washington Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- Barrett, as the petitioner, successfully petitioned the Supreme Court of Washington for review on the sole issue of which liability standard applies.
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Issue:
Does RCW 66.44.200(1), which forbids the selling of alcohol 'to any person apparently under the influence of liquor,' establish a standard for a seller's civil liability for damages caused to a third party by an intoxicated driver?
Opinions:
Majority - Owens, J.
Yes. RCW 66.44.200(1) establishes the standard for a seller's civil liability for damages caused to a third party by an intoxicated driver. The court first determined that the statutory standard 'apparently under the influence' is meaningfully different from, and a lower threshold than, the common law standard of 'obviously intoxicated.' The court then applied the four-part test from the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286 to decide whether the criminal statute sets the standard of care for civil negligence. The court found that: (1) the plaintiff, as a member of the public, is within the class of persons the statute was enacted to protect; (2) the statute aims to protect the interest invaded, which is personal health and safety; (3) the statute protects against the kind of harm that occurred, a catastrophic car accident; and (4) the statute protects against the particular hazard from which the harm resulted, 'alcohol-induced driver error.' Because all four elements were met, the statutory standard applies, and the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on it was prejudicial error requiring a new trial.
Dissenting - Sanders, J.
No. The standard of civil liability should remain service to an 'obviously intoxicated' patron. The dissent first argues that Barrett waived the issue by failing to properly object to the jury instructions at trial as required by CR 51(f). Substantively, the dissent contends that the majority's decision abandons decades of established common law precedent since the repeal of Washington's Dramshop Act, which consistently held 'obviously intoxicated' as the standard of civil liability. The decision creates an illogical dual standard of care, where a tavern's liability depends on the patron's subsequent conduct (e.g., drunk driving vs. assault). Furthermore, the legislature's long-standing failure to amend the statute in the face of consistent judicial application of the 'obviously intoxicated' standard implies legislative acquiescence. The dissent emphasizes that personal responsibility for drinking and driving should rest primarily with the intoxicated patron, not the commercial vendor.
Concurring in part/dissenting in part - Bridge, J.
No. While concurring with the majority that the issue was adequately preserved for appeal, Justice Bridge agrees with the analysis and conclusion of the dissenting opinion on the substantive legal question.
Concurring in the dissent - Madsen, J.
No. A new trial should not be granted because the petitioners failed to establish that they were prejudiced by the jury instructions. To show prejudice, they had the burden of demonstrating a meaningful, legally significant difference between the 'obviously intoxicated' standard and the 'apparently under the influence' standard. Because the petitioners failed to provide a persuasive argument or authority showing such a difference, they did not demonstrate that the trial court's refusal to give their proposed instruction constituted reversible error.
Analysis:
This decision replaces the judicially created common law standard of 'obviously intoxicated' with the more plaintiff-friendly statutory standard of 'apparently under the influence' for commercial vendor liability in third-party drunk driving cases. It significantly lowers the threshold for establishing a breach of duty, making it easier for plaintiffs to bring negligence claims against taverns and bars. The ruling solidifies the court's use of the Restatement § 286 test to import standards of care from criminal statutes into civil negligence law, even where a common law standard already exists. However, as the dissent highlights, it may create doctrinal inconsistency by establishing a different standard of care for harms caused by drunk driving versus other harms caused by intoxicated patrons, such as assault.
