Barrera v. Hondo Creek Cattle Co.
132 S.W.3d 544, 2004 WL 396603 (2004)
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Rule of Law:
The Texas Agricultural Code's statute of repose (Tex. Agric. Code Ann. § 251.004(a)) bars nuisance actions against agricultural operations if they have been lawfully operating for one year or more, and the conditions complained of have existed substantially unchanged since the established date of operation; this statute is constitutional and does not constitute an uncompensated taking.
Facts:
- Hondo Creek Cattle Company (HCCC) operates a cattle feedlot on over 500 acres of land near Edroy, Texas.
- HCCC purchased the feedlot from Lykes Brothers in 1995; Lykes Brothers had operated a feedlot on the premises for decades.
- Approximately sixty plaintiffs, including Augustina Barrera, live in and around Edroy, Texas.
- The plaintiffs experienced flies, dust, and smell from the HCCC feedlot on their property.
- The conditions complained of, including flies, dust, and smell, allegedly created by HCCC and its predecessor, had existed substantially unchanged since the 1960s.
- During the year prior to the lawsuit, the feedlot maintained approximately 6,000 cattle.
- More than a year before the lawsuit was filed, the dust from the feedlot had already caused plaintiffs to complain.
Procedural Posture:
- On October 22, 1997, approximately sixty plaintiffs, including Augustina Barrera, filed a nuisance suit against Hondo Creek Cattle Company (HCCC) in the trial court.
- At trial, a smaller group of plaintiffs proceeded without a jury as a bellwether group.
- HCCC asserted a one-year statute of repose from the agricultural code as an affirmative defense.
- On May 17, 2001, the trial court entered a take-nothing judgment against these bellwether plaintiffs and severed their case from the other plaintiffs.
- The trial court also ruled against HCCC on the issue of attorney’s fees.
- On June 29, 2001, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law.
- Both appellants (Augustina Barrera, et al.) and appellee (HCCC) filed notices of appeal to the Texas Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi.
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Issue:
Does the Texas Agricultural Code's statute of repose (Tex. Agric. Code Ann. § 251.004(a)) constitutionally bar a nuisance claim against an agricultural operation if the operation has been lawfully active for over a year and the conditions creating the alleged nuisance have remained substantially unchanged?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice YÁÑEZ
Yes, the Texas Agricultural Code's statute of repose constitutionally bars the nuisance claim. The court affirmed the trial court's findings, supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence, that HCCC's feedlot is an agricultural operation, that HCCC had lawfully operated for over one year prior to the suit, and that the conditions complained of (flies, dust, and smell) existed substantially unchanged since the 1960s. The appellate court found that the appellants either waived their challenges to these findings due to insufficient argument or citations, or that the evidence supported the trial court's determinations. Specifically, the court clarified that the 'substantially unchanged' element refers to the conditions creating the nuisance, not merely changes in the feedlot's operation. The court also rejected the appellants' constitutional challenge, holding that the statute did not constitute an uncompensated 'taking' because the appellants failed to establish the required elements of an intentional government act accomplished for a public purpose that damaged or took private property. Therefore, the statute of repose applied and barred the plaintiffs' claims.
Analysis:
This case significantly strengthens the legal protections for agricultural operations in Texas under its 'right to farm' statute, clarifying the application of the statute of repose to nuisance claims. It defines the 'substantially unchanged' criterion as pertaining to the nuisance conditions themselves, rather than operational modifications, which can be a critical distinction in future cases. Furthermore, the decision establishes a high threshold for property owners challenging such statutes on constitutional 'takings' grounds, requiring clear evidence of government involvement in damaging or taking private property.
