Barnum v. Williams
1972 Ore. LEXIS 344, 504 P.2d 122, 264 Or. 71 (1972)
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Rule of Law:
The violation of a motor vehicle statute does not constitute negligence per se but instead creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence. The party who violated the statute may overcome this presumption by producing evidence that they were acting as a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances.
Facts:
- On a rainy day, Plaintiff was driving a motorcycle uphill on Vista Avenue in Portland, rounding a sharp curve to his left.
- Defendant was driving her car downhill on the same street, approaching the curve from the opposite direction.
- Vista Avenue was divided by a yellow line, with Defendant's lane being significantly narrower than Plaintiff's lane.
- Defendant observed Plaintiff riding on the center line and leaning into the turn.
- Apprehensive of a collision, Defendant applied her brakes.
- Upon braking, Defendant's car slid across the center line and into Plaintiff's lane.
- Defendant's car then collided with Plaintiff's motorcycle in Plaintiff's lane of travel.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiff sued Defendant in a state trial court for personal injuries sustained in a motor vehicle collision.
- The case was tried before a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of the Defendant.
- Plaintiff, the appellant, appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court of Oregon.
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Issue:
Is a party who violates a motor vehicle statute necessarily negligent as a matter of law (negligence per se)?
Opinions:
Majority - Denecke, J.
No. A violation of a motor vehicle statute is not necessarily negligence as a matter of law; it creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence that can be overcome by evidence that the violator was acting as a reasonably prudent person. The court found that its historical adherence to the strict negligence per se doctrine was inconsistent with the tort law principle that liability should be based on fault. The court had previously carved out exceptions for sudden emergencies, but found it illogical to limit the excuse of reasonable conduct only to emergency situations. The court concluded that a unified standard, where a statutory violation creates a presumption of negligence that the violator must rebut by showing their conduct was reasonable under all the circumstances, provides a more rational and just framework.
Dissenting - McAllister, J.
Yes. The violation of a motor vehicle operational statute should be treated as negligence per se, with the only recognized excuse being the existence of a sudden emergency. The dissent argues that the majority is incorrectly departing from a long line of precedent that established a strict negligence per se rule for operational statutes, allowing an excuse only when an actor was confronted with a sudden peril and acted reasonably in response. The majority's new 'rebuttable presumption' standard is an unwarranted and confusing change to established law. The trial court's instruction, which allowed the jury to excuse the defendant's statutory violation without finding a sudden emergency, was an error.
Analysis:
This decision significantly softens the negligence per se doctrine in Oregon for motor vehicle statutes, shifting it from a rule of automatic liability to a rule of presumed liability. It replaces the rigid, category-based 'sudden emergency' exception with a more flexible, overarching standard of 'reasonableness under the circumstances.' This change grants juries more latitude to evaluate the entire context of a driver's actions rather than finding them automatically negligent for a technical violation of a traffic law. Consequently, future litigation will focus more on whether the violator can produce sufficient evidence of reasonableness to overcome the presumption of negligence.
