Barnhill v. Davis
300 N.W.2d 104, 1981 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 840 (1981)
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Rule of Law:
A bystander may recover for severe emotional distress caused by witnessing the negligent infliction of harm on a closely related person, even if the bystander was not in physical danger, provided the distress is serious and meets specific foreseeability and genuineness criteria.
Facts:
- On June 12, 1978, Robert C. Barnhill was driving his car in West Des Moines, followed by his mother, Grace Maring, who was driving her own car.
- Barnhill stopped at an intersection, proceeded safely through it, and then pulled over to the side, about three car lengths away, to wait for his mother.
- When Grace Maring attempted to drive through the same intersection, her car was struck on the driver's side by a car driven by Rose Marie Davis and owned by James A. Davis.
- As a result of the accident, Maring suffered slight bruises, including a bruised rib cage and mild muscle strain, but a subsequent examination approximately six weeks later found no evidence of physical injury from the accident.
- Robert Barnhill claims that he has suffered emotional distress because of his fear for his mother’s safety, and contends this distress has caused him pain in his back and legs, dizziness, and difficulty in sleeping.
Procedural Posture:
- Robert C. Barnhill filed a petition in trial court, claiming damages for emotional distress, while Grace Maring also claimed damages but later voluntarily dismissed her portion with prejudice.
- Defendants Rose Marie Davis and James A. Davis moved to dismiss Barnhill's petition for failure to state a claim, which the trial court denied.
- Defendants subsequently moved for summary judgment, arguing that a bystander, not involved in an accident, cannot recover as a matter of law for emotional distress from harm to a third person caused by a defendant's negligence.
- The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismissing Barnhill's petition.
- Barnhill appealed the grant of summary judgment, and the Davises cross-appealed the denial of their motion to dismiss, bringing the case before the Iowa Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does a bystander, who was not in any physical danger, have a legal right to recover for emotional distress and its physical consequences resulting from witnessing the negligent infliction of harm upon a closely related third person?
Opinions:
Majority - McGiverin, Justice
Yes, a bystander who is not in physical danger may recover for emotional distress and its consequences resulting from fear for the safety of another person caused by a defendant's negligence, under certain circumstances. The court rejects the traditional 'impact rule' and the 'zone of physical danger' test as too harsh and artificial, determining that it is foreseeable for a bystander to suffer emotional distress even if not personally endangered. Instead, the court adopts a foreseeability test, drawing significantly from Dillon v. Legg, which requires courts to consider (1) the bystander's proximity to the accident, (2) direct sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, and (3) a close relationship between the bystander and the victim. To further ensure the genuineness and seriousness of claims, the court adds two additional requirements: (4) a reasonable person in the bystander's position would believe, and the bystander did believe, that the direct victim would be seriously injured or killed, and (5) the emotional distress to the bystander must be serious, ordinarily accompanied by physical manifestations. Applying these elements to Barnhill's case, the court finds that he met the initial foreseeability criteria and minimally generated a genuine issue of material fact regarding his belief of serious injury and the physical manifestations of his distress.
Dissenting - Allbee, Justice
No, a bystander who is not in physical danger should not be able to recover for emotional distress from witnessing the negligent infliction of harm on another person. Justice Allbee expresses strong disapproval of the majority's decision, calling the concept 'beguiling' and unwilling to join in 'opening this 'Pandora’s box.'' He argues against the cause of action by highlighting its complexity, administrative difficulties, and potential problems, including the remoteness of emotional distress from the negligent act, the fictional duty of one person to prevent another from being frightened, the difficulty in foreseeing who may be distressed, the nearly limitless possibilities for liability, and the significant potential for fraudulent, collusive, and nuisance claims. Justice Allbee references substantial authority and prior dissents, such as in Dillon v. Legg, to underscore these concerns.
Analysis:
This case significantly expands tort liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress in Iowa, moving beyond the restrictive 'zone of physical danger' rule. By adopting a modified version of the Dillon v. Legg factors, the court broadens the scope of potential plaintiffs to include non-endangered bystanders, aligning Iowa with a growing number of jurisdictions. The establishment of specific requirements for proximity, direct observation, close relationship, belief of serious injury, and serious emotional distress (with physical manifestations) is crucial for addressing the 'flood of litigation' concerns raised by the dissent. This framework provides clear guidelines for future courts to assess the genuineness and foreseeability of such claims, balancing expanded recovery with necessary limitations.
