Barnes v. Geiger
446 N.E.2d 78, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 365, 1983 Mass. App. LEXIS 1227 (1983)
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Rule of Law:
In Massachusetts, a tortfeasor is generally not liable for physical injury resulting from emotional distress to a person who mistakenly believes a close family member is the victim of an accident, as such distress is not reasonably foreseeable; nor is recovery available under the rescue doctrine unless the rescuer engages in a specific act of intervention beyond merely going to the scene.
Facts:
- Frances M. Barnes observed a car strike a pedestrian, tossing him sixty feet in the air, from or near her home.
- The accident occurred near an area where Mrs. Barnes's thirteen-year-old son and ten-year-old daughter had gone ice skating.
- Convinced the accident victim was her son, Mrs. Barnes ran to the scene of the accident, intending to rescue the injured.
- The stricken party, who later died, was an unrelated fifteen-year-old boy named Michael LeFebvre, not Mrs. Barnes's child.
- The day after the accident, Mrs. Barnes died of a cerebral vascular hemorrhage.
- The cerebral vascular hemorrhage was allegedly triggered by elevated blood pressure caused by witnessing and going to the scene of the accident.
- Robert Geiger, Jr. was the driver of the car that struck Michael LeFebvre.
Procedural Posture:
- Albert W. Barnes, Sr., as administrator of the estate of Frances M. Barnes and as her husband, brought an action in the trial court to recover damages for the death and conscious suffering of Mrs. Barnes, for loss of consortium, and for consequential damages.
- Robert Geiger, Jr., the primary defendant, successfully moved for summary judgment in the trial court (Mass. R.Civ.P. 56) based on undisputed facts from the complaint, counsel representations, and briefs.
- Judgment was entered accordingly by the trial court for Geiger.
- The complaint against other defendants was dismissed by the trial court for failing to state a claim for which relief could be granted (Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)).
- Plaintiff appealed the judgments to the Appeals Court of Massachusetts.
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Issue:
Does Massachusetts law permit recovery for physical injury induced by mental distress when a person mistakenly believes that the victim of an observed accident is her child, or under a rescue theory when she runs to the scene but does not engage in a specific act of intervention?
Opinions:
Majority - Kass, J.
No, Massachusetts law does not permit recovery for physical injury induced by mental distress when a person mistakenly believes an accident victim is her child, nor under a rescue theory when she merely runs to the scene without actively intervening. The court reasoned that psychic trauma and resulting physical injury to a person who mistakenly believes a close family member is the victim of an observed accident is beyond what is reasonably foreseeable. While Dziokonski v. Babineau allowed recovery for emotional shock to immediate family members of actual victims, extending this to mistaken identity would unreasonably expand the class of persons to whom a tortfeasor may be liable, as such anxiety is often transitory and ephemeral. The court views this as a pragmatic judgment balancing an injured party's interest against limiting the legal consequences of a negligent act. Regarding the rescue theory, the court held that while negligence creating peril invites rescue, the doctrine requires some specific act of intervention beyond merely running to the scene out of curiosity or generalized intent to help. Mrs. Barnes did not intervene in any fashion, and her purpose was deemed more investigatory than a specific mission of assistance. Expanding the rescue doctrine to those with an 'undefined intent to rescue' would effectively undo the Dziokonski limitation of requiring a close familial relationship for psychic trauma claims.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the boundaries of liability for negligently inflicted emotional distress and the application of the rescue doctrine in Massachusetts. By limiting emotional distress claims to situations where the perceived victim is genuinely a close family member, and the distress is not based on a mistake, the court prevents an 'unreasonable expansion' of tortfeasor liability. Furthermore, it narrows the rescue doctrine, requiring an actual 'act of intervention' and a 'specific mission of assistance' rather than mere presence or a general intent to help, thereby providing a clear standard for future 'rescuer' claims. The decision reflects a pragmatic approach to tort law, balancing victim compensation with the need for manageable limits on foreseeability and liability.
