Barnard v. Adams
13 L.Ed. 417, 10 How. 270, 51 U.S. 270 (1851)
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Rule of Law:
The intentional stranding of a vessel by its master to save the cargo and crew from a greater, imminent peril constitutes a voluntary sacrifice that qualifies for general average contribution. This is true even if the vessel's eventual loss was otherwise inevitable.
Facts:
- The ship Brutus, carrying cargo for Charles Barnard and others, was anchored in the outer roads at Buenos Ayres when a dangerous gale began.
- During the storm, the ship's anchor cables parted, and the vessel began drifting uncontrollably broadside toward dangerous shallows where it faced certain wreck.
- To avoid being wrecked on the shallows, the first mate, who was in command, slipped the remaining chains and got the vessel before the wind.
- The mate intentionally decided 'to run the ship ashore for the preservation of the cargo and the lives of the crew.'
- After steering upriver to find a suitable location, the mate perceived another imminent peril of wrecking on rocks off a point called St. Isidro.
- To avoid the rocks, the mate changed course and deliberately ran the vessel onto a level, sandy beach.
- The ship was severely damaged and ultimately sold as a total loss because the cost of refloating it was too high.
- The crew and the entire cargo were saved and eventually transported to New York on another vessel.
Procedural Posture:
- Joseph Adams and others, owners of the ship Brutus, sued Charles Barnard and others, the cargo owners, in the U.S. Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York.
- The plaintiffs sought to recover a general average contribution for the loss of the Brutus.
- At trial, the court instructed the jury that if the acting master intentionally ran the vessel ashore for the better security of the property and persons involved, it constituted a voluntary sacrifice.
- The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, Adams et al.
- The defendants, Barnard et al., appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does the intentional stranding of a vessel, which is already in a position of imminent and seemingly inevitable peril from a storm, constitute a voluntary sacrifice entitling the shipowner to a general average contribution from the owners of the saved cargo?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Grier
Yes. The intentional stranding of a vessel to save the cargo and crew from an imminent and otherwise inevitable greater peril is a voluntary sacrifice that qualifies for general average contribution. The law of general average is founded in equity, requiring that a loss incurred for the benefit of all shall be made good by the contribution of all. For general average to apply, there must be a common, imminent danger; a voluntary sacrifice of a portion of the venture to save the rest; and success in that effort. The argument that contribution is not due if the sacrificed property was 'inevitably' going to be lost anyway misunderstands the doctrine; the master is justified in making a sacrifice precisely because he is forced to choose between losing the whole and losing a part. The right to contribution depends not on an intent to destroy the property, but on the fact that it was selected to suffer the peril in place of the whole venture. Here, the master voluntarily chose to run the ship aground on a safer beach to avoid the certain destruction of both ship and cargo on rocks or shallows, making the ship the 'victim' for the benefit of the cargo.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Daniel
No. The stranding of the vessel was not a voluntary sacrifice but rather an act of submission to an uncontrollable and inevitable force, and therefore does not qualify for general average contribution. A true sacrifice must be an action purposely undertaken through the will and agency of man, not merely an act of suffering or endurance of a 'vis major' (superior force). The evidence shows the vessel was in a hopeless and desperate situation, inevitably drifting to shore. The mate did not elect to run the ship ashore; he was forced to. His action was merely 'steering her to a less dangerous place for stranding, when she was inevitably drifting to the shore.' This was not a choice to sacrifice the ship for the cargo, but an attempt to mitigate an unavoidable disaster for the benefit of the entire venture, including the ship itself. It is paradoxical to say one 'elects' a peril from which one is actively fleeing.
Analysis:
This decision firmly established in American maritime law that a voluntary stranding qualifies for general average, even when the vessel is in a 'doomed' condition. It clarifies that a 'sacrifice' does not require an intent to destroy, but rather a conscious choice to expose one part of the venture to peril to save the rest. By rejecting the argument that the 'inevitability' of loss negates the claim, the Court distinguished American law from the more restrictive English position at the time. This precedent encourages shipmasters in crisis to make the optimal decision for the common adventure without fear that choosing the 'least bad option' will prevent a claim for contribution, thus promoting the preservation of life and property at sea.
