Barking Hound Village, LLC v. Monyak
2016 WL 3144352, 787 S.E.2d 191, 299 Ga. 144 (2016)
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Rule of Law:
In Georgia, the measure of damages for the negligent injury or death of a pet includes the animal's fair market value at the time of loss, plus interest, and any reasonable medical and other expenses incurred in treating the animal, without the total being capped by the animal's market value.
Facts:
- Robert and Elizabeth Monyak owned an 8.5-year-old dachshund mix named Lola and a 13-year-old Labrador mix named Callie.
- Callie was prescribed an anti-inflammatory medication for arthritis.
- In 2012, the Monyaks boarded both dogs for ten days at a kennel owned by Barking Hound Village, LLC (BHV) and managed by William Furman.
- The Monyaks provided Callie's medication to kennel staff with instructions for its administration to Callie only.
- While boarded, Lola was allegedly administered toxic doses of the medication prescribed for the much larger dog, Callie.
- Three days after being picked up from the kennel, Lola was diagnosed with acute renal failure.
- Over the next nine months, the Monyaks provided Lola with extensive veterinary care, including kidney dialysis, costing over $67,000.
- Despite the treatment, Lola died in March 2013.
Procedural Posture:
- Robert and Elizabeth Monyak sued Barking Hound Village, LLC and William Furman in a Georgia trial court, alleging negligence and other claims.
- The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing damages were capped at the dog's fair market value.
- The trial court denied summary judgment on the negligence claim, holding that the Monyaks could present evidence of the dog's 'actual value' to them, including both economic and non-economic factors.
- The defendants (appellants) were granted an interlocutory appeal to the Georgia Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals held that the proper measure of damages was the 'actual value of the dog to its owners,' which could include veterinary expenses but not damages for sentimental or intrinsic value.
- The Supreme Court of Georgia granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' decision regarding the proper measure of damages.
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Issue:
Does the proper measure of damages for the negligent death of a pet dog include both its fair market value and the reasonable veterinary expenses incurred in attempting to save it, even if those expenses exceed the dog's market value?
Opinions:
Majority - Thompson, Chief Justice
Yes. The proper measure of damages recoverable by the owners of an animal negligently killed by another includes both the animal’s fair market value at the time of the loss plus interest, and, in addition, any medical and other expenses reasonably incurred in treating the animal. The court based its reasoning on long-standing Georgia precedent, specifically Atlanta Cotton-Seed Oil Mills v. Coffey (1887) and Telfair County v. Webb (1904), which established a special rule for damages in cases involving animals. These cases allow for the recovery of reasonable treatment expenses as a separate component of damages, not capped by the animal's fair market value. The court reasoned that this rule is more humane, as it does not create an incentive for an owner to neglect a suffering animal. The court explicitly rejected allowing damages for sentimental value, stating the 'unique human-animal bond, while cherished, is beyond legal measure.' However, it held that evidence of a pet's attributes (e.g., breed, age, training) is admissible to help determine its fair market value and the reasonableness of veterinary costs.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies a bifurcated damages rule for the negligent killing of animals in Georgia, distinguishing them from other forms of personal property. By allowing recovery of reasonable veterinary expenses in addition to fair market value, the court provides a path for pet owners to recoup significant costs, even for animals with little to no market value, such as rescues or older pets. This ruling strikes a balance, acknowledging the special role of pets by encouraging humane treatment without opening the door to non-economic damages for emotional distress or sentimental value, thereby maintaining a traditional tort law framework. The case provides a clear precedent that will guide future litigation involving veterinary malpractice and negligent injury to pets, ensuring that treatment costs are a recoverable element of damages, subject to a reasonableness standard.
