Barker v. Wingo
407 U.S. 514 (1972)
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Rule of Law:
Whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial has been violated is determined by a flexible balancing test considering four factors: the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of the right, and the prejudice to the defendant.
Facts:
- In July 1958, an elderly couple was murdered in Kentucky, and Willie Barker and Silas Manning were indicted for the crime.
- The Commonwealth believed its case against Barker was weak and depended on Manning's testimony, which it could not secure until Manning was convicted.
- To secure Manning's testimony, the Commonwealth obtained a series of 16 continuances of Barker's trial over more than four years while it prosecuted Manning through six separate trials.
- Following his indictment, Barker was incarcerated for 10 months and then was released on bond, remaining free in the community for the rest of the pretrial period.
- Barker and his counsel did not object to the first 11 continuances, from October 1958 until a motion to dismiss was filed in February 1962.
- After Manning was finally convicted in late 1962, further delays in Barker's trial were caused by the illness of the ex-sheriff, who was the chief investigating officer.
- Barker's trial finally commenced on October 9, 1963, more than five years after he was indicted.
Procedural Posture:
- Barker was tried and convicted of murder in the Christian County Circuit Court, a Kentucky state trial court.
- Barker, as appellant, appealed his conviction to the Kentucky Court of Appeals, which, as appellee, affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- Barker filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, which was denied.
- Barker, as appellant, appealed the denial of his habeas petition to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which affirmed the District Court's decision against him.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted Barker's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does a delay of over five years between indictment and trial violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial when the delay was largely attributable to the prosecution's strategic decision to first try a co-defendant, and the defendant did not object to the delay for the first three and a half years?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Powell
No. The delay between Barker's indictment and trial did not violate his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The Court rejected rigid approaches, such as a fixed time limit or a strict 'demand-waiver' rule, in favor of an ad hoc balancing test. This test weighs four factors: (1) length of delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of his right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant. Here, the over five-year delay was presumptively prejudicial and triggered the inquiry. The reason for the delay—the prosecution's need to convict an accomplice first—was not inherently improper but still resulted in an extraordinary delay. However, the other two factors weighed heavily against Barker. He did not assert his right for over three years, strongly suggesting he was gambling on his accomplice's acquittal and did not actually want a speedy trial. Finally, Barker failed to demonstrate significant prejudice; there was no claim of lost witnesses or impaired defense, and while he suffered anxiety and a 10-month incarceration, this was not sufficient to overcome his failure to assert his right.
Concurring - Justice White
Agreed with the majority's conclusion that Barker's rights were not violated. This opinion emphasizes that the speedy trial right protects against the personal prejudices of pretrial delay, such as disruption of employment, public obloquy, and anxiety, wholly aside from prejudice to the defense on the merits. A defendant who desires a speedy trial should have it within a reasonable time, and countervailing state interests like crowded dockets are insufficient justifications for delay. The deciding factor in this case was Barker's clear acquiescence to the major delays. Had Barker not so clearly acquiesced, the result would have been otherwise, as the personal prejudice inherent in any long delay is a major evil the Sixth Amendment protects against.
Analysis:
Barker v. Wingo is the foundational case for modern Sixth Amendment speedy trial jurisprudence. It rejected rigid, bright-line rules and instead established a flexible, four-factor balancing test that courts must apply on a case-by-case basis. This grants judges significant discretion but also creates uncertainty for both the prosecution and defense. Critically, the decision shifts some responsibility to the defendant to assert the right, making the defendant's actions (or inaction) a powerful factor in the analysis, thereby influencing defense strategy in all subsequent cases involving trial delays.
