Bard v. Jahnke
848 N.E.2d 463, 6 N.Y.3d 592 (2006)
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Rule of Law:
In New York, the owner of a domestic animal is liable for harm caused by the animal only if the owner knows or should have known of that animal's vicious propensities. There is no separate common-law negligence cause of action for harm caused by a domestic animal.
Facts:
- Reinhardt Jahnke owned and operated Hemlock Valley Farms, a dairy farm.
- Jahnke's son hired a carpenter, John Timer, to repair cow mattresses in a section of a barn known as the 'low cow district'.
- Timer asked another carpenter, Larry Bard, to assist him with the repair work.
- On September 27, 2001, Bard was working on his knees in the barn when a hornless dairy bull named Fred, which roamed freely in that section for breeding purposes, attacked him.
- Prior to attacking Bard, the bull had never threatened or injured any human or animal.
- Bard suffered significant injuries, including fractured ribs and a lacerated liver.
- Jahnke was not aware that either Timer or Bard would be working at the farm on that particular day.
Procedural Posture:
- Larry Bard and his wife sued Reinhardt Jahnke and John Timer in the New York Supreme Court (the trial court) for strict liability and negligence.
- The defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants, dismissing the case.
- Bard, as plaintiff-appellant, appealed the dismissal to the Appellate Division (an intermediate appellate court).
- The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's dismissal, but on the grounds that liability requires knowledge of a vicious propensity, which was not present.
- Bard, as plaintiff-appellant, was granted leave to appeal the decision regarding Jahnke to the New York Court of Appeals (the state's highest court).
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Issue:
Does New York law impose liability on the owner of a domestic animal for injuries it causes based on a theory of ordinary negligence, or is liability determined exclusively by the strict liability rule requiring proof that the owner knew or should have known of the animal's vicious propensities?
Opinions:
Majority - Read, J.
No, liability is determined exclusively by the strict liability rule requiring proof of vicious propensities. When harm is caused by a domestic animal, its owner's liability is determined solely by application of the rule that the owner must know or should have known of that animal's vicious propensities to be held liable. The court reaffirmed its precedent from Collier v. Zambito, holding that once an owner has such knowledge, they face strict liability. The court rejected the argument to adopt the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 518, which would allow for a separate cause of action for negligence. The court reasoned that accepting a negligence claim based on the general characteristics of a breed (e.g., that breeding bulls are inherently dangerous) would improperly dilute the traditional vicious propensity rule. The court explicitly declined to hold that particular breeds or kinds of domestic animals are dangerous as a class, thus requiring plaintiffs to prove the owner had knowledge of the specific animal's dangerous nature.
Dissenting - R.S. Smith, J.
Yes, New York law should impose liability based on a theory of ordinary negligence in addition to the strict liability rule. The majority's decision rejects the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 518, which is followed by the overwhelming majority of other states and allows for a negligence claim even when an owner does not know of an animal's specific dangerous tendencies. The dissent argues that a jury could have found the farm owner negligent for failing to warn workers of the bull's presence in an area where they would be working. The dissent criticizes the majority's rule as archaic, unfair, and inconsistent with general principles of tort law that hold individuals liable for negligent management of other potential dangers, such as automobiles.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the 'vicious propensity' rule as the exclusive remedy in New York for injuries caused by domestic animals. By explicitly rejecting the ordinary negligence standard proposed by the Restatement, the court established a high bar for plaintiffs and provided significant protection to animal owners. The ruling prevents plaintiffs from arguing that an owner should be liable simply because they own an animal from a breed or class that is known to have dangerous tendencies. This bright-line rule simplifies liability analysis but may preclude recovery for deserving plaintiffs injured by an owner's carelessness that does not relate to a known vicious propensity.
