Barclay v. Briscoe
47 A.3d 560, 2012 WL 2401512, 427 Md. 270 (2012)
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Rule of Law:
An employer is not liable for injuries to a third party caused by an employee driving home from work, even if the employee is fatigued from an unusually long shift, because the commute is outside the scope of employment and no special relationship exists that would create a direct duty for the employer to protect the public.
Facts:
- Christopher Richardson was a longshoreman employed by Ports America Baltimore, Inc. (Ports) to operate machinery at the Port of Baltimore.
- To get a vessel back on schedule, Ports agreed to have longshoremen work around the clock.
- Under the collective bargaining agreement, longshoremen could work as many consecutive shifts as they desired.
- Richardson accepted a shift and worked continuously for twenty-two hours, from 8 a.m. on January 16, 2006, until 6 a.m. on January 17, 2006.
- At approximately 7:28 a.m. on January 17, while driving his personal vehicle home from work, Richardson fell asleep at the wheel.
- Richardson's car crossed the center line and struck a vehicle driven by Sergeant Michael Barclay, causing catastrophic injuries to Barclay and killing Richardson.
Procedural Posture:
- Sergeant Michael Barclay and his wife filed a complaint against Ports America Baltimore, Inc. (Ports) and others in the Circuit Court for Carroll County (a trial court).
- Ports filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing it was not liable under theories of respondeat superior or direct negligence.
- The Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Ports.
- The Barclays, as appellants, noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, an intermediate appellate court.
- The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment.
- The Barclays, as Petitioners, were granted a writ of certiorari by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, the state's highest court.
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Issue:
Does an employer owe a duty to the motoring public to prevent an employee from driving home when an extended work schedule has caused the employee to be fatigued, thereby creating a foreseeable risk of harm to others?
Opinions:
Majority - Greene, J.
No, an employer does not owe a duty to the motoring public to prevent a fatigued employee from driving home. Maryland law does not impose vicarious or direct liability on an employer for the torts of a commuting employee under these circumstances. Regarding vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the court applied the 'coming and going rule,' which states that an employee is generally not acting within the scope of employment while traveling to or from work. For liability to attach, an employer must have the right to control the employee's operation of the vehicle. The court found that on-the-job fatigue is not a 'special circumstance' sufficient to create an exception to this rule. The pertinent inquiry is the employer's control over the vehicle's operation, not its control over the conditions (like fatigue) that may have led to the accident. Since Richardson was driving his personal car for his own convenience and was not performing any duties for Ports, he was not acting within the scope of his employment. Regarding direct negligence, the court held that an employer generally has no duty to control a third person’s conduct to prevent harm to another unless a 'special relationship' exists. Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317, such a relationship requires the employee to be on the employer's premises or using the employer's chattel at the time of the tort. Because the accident occurred on a public road in Richardson's personal vehicle, no special relationship existed. The court emphasized that the foreseeability of harm alone does not create a legal duty. Without a special relationship or an affirmative act of control by the employer after the employee became impaired, no duty to the general public arises.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the traditional, narrow scope of employer liability in Maryland for the off-duty torts of employees. By strictly adhering to the 'coming and going rule' and the Restatement's definition of a 'special relationship,' the court rejected attempts to expand employer duty based on work-induced fatigue. This ruling solidifies the principle that foreseeability of harm is insufficient to create a new legal duty and places the responsibility for safe commuting squarely on the employee. The case serves as a strong precedent against imposing a new, broad duty on employers to monitor and manage employee fatigue in relation to their commutes, distinguishing Maryland law from jurisdictions that have been more willing to find liability in similar situations.
