Barbour v. Merrill
48 F.3d. 1270, 31 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 403, 310 U.S. App. D.C. 419 (1995)
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Rule of Law:
In an employment discrimination case under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a plaintiff provides sufficient evidence for a jury to infer intentional discrimination by establishing a prima facie case and introducing evidence that discredits the employer's proffered non-discriminatory reasons for its action.
Facts:
- In January 1989, Medlantic Management Corporation began a search for a Director of Corporate Materials Management, supervised by Vice President Mark Merrill.
- Martin Barbour, an African-American man with an MBA and extensive relevant experience from a 25-year military career, applied for the position while working at a hospital within the Medlantic system.
- The initial job description required an MBA or equivalent experience, but did not require private-sector experience.
- Barbour was one of four finalists who advanced to a second round of interviews.
- Medlantic offered the position to Craig Shoup, a white candidate, who declined the offer.
- Instead of offering the position to Barbour, Merrill started a new search using an executive search firm, telling Barbour he was not qualified because he lacked private-sector experience.
- Merrill asked the search firm to consider Barbour again, but the firm did not rank him among the top candidates, citing his lack of private-sector experience.
- Medlantic ultimately hired Terry Rich, a white candidate recommended by the search firm.
Procedural Posture:
- Martin Barbour sued Medlantic Management Corporation and Mark Merrill in U.S. District Court, alleging unlawful employment discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
- Barbour amended his complaint to add defendant Gregory Walling, alleging conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
- The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Walling on the conspiracy claim.
- The § 1981 claim against Medlantic and Merrill was tried before a jury for damages and the court for equitable relief.
- The jury found for Barbour, awarding $2,500 in compensatory damages and $25,000 in punitive damages.
- The defendants filed a post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law, which the district court denied.
- The district court awarded Barbour approximately $84,000 in back pay but denied his requests for front pay and prejudgment interest.
- Medlantic and Merrill (appellants) appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, and Barbour (cross-appellant) filed a cross-appeal.
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Issue:
Does a plaintiff in a racial discrimination case under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provide sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find intentional discrimination by establishing a prima facie case and introducing evidence that discredits the employer's proffered non-discriminatory reasons for the hiring decision?
Opinions:
Majority - Tatel, J.
Yes. A plaintiff provides sufficient evidence for a jury to find intentional discrimination by establishing a prima facie case and discrediting the employer's stated reasons. Following the Supreme Court's ruling in St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, a factfinder's rejection of an employer's proffered non-discriminatory reasons is sufficient to permit, although not compel, a finding of intentional discrimination. Barbour established a prima facie case by showing he was a qualified racial minority who applied for an available position, was rejected, and the employer continued to seek applicants. A reasonable jury could find that Medlantic's stated reason for not hiring him—a lack of private-sector experience—was pretextual, as this was not an original requirement and he had already advanced to the final round of the first search. This disbelief of the employer's reason, combined with the prima facie case, allowed the jury to infer that the true reason for the decision was racial discrimination. Similarly, the evidence that established an intentional civil rights violation was sufficient to permit the jury's award of punitive damages.
Concurring - Williams, J.
While the evidence of discrimination seems 'thin to the point of virtual invisibility,' such an intensely fact-bound issue is unsuitable for en banc review. The holding in St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks that a jury 'may' find discrimination upon disbelieving an employer's proffered reason should not be interpreted as giving the factfinder complete freedom to find discrimination in every such case. Rather, it means that in some cases this combination of evidence will be adequate to sustain a finding, while in others it will not, subject to normal appellate review. Because the panel opinion adopts this latter, correct interpretation, the case does not warrant en banc review.
Analysis:
This case solidifies the application of the Supreme Court's 'pretext-plus' framework from St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks within the D.C. Circuit. It clarifies that a plaintiff in an employment discrimination suit does not need direct 'smoking gun' evidence of discriminatory animus to survive a motion for judgment as a matter of law. By establishing a prima facie case and successfully attacking the credibility of the employer's explanation, the plaintiff creates a permissible inference of discrimination for the jury to consider. This precedent makes it more difficult for employers to win cases on summary judgment or JMOL merely by articulating a plausible, non-discriminatory reason for their actions.
