Barber v. Gonzales
98 L. Ed. 2d 1009, 1954 U.S. LEXIS 1898, 74 S. Ct. 822 (1954)
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Rule of Law:
For the purposes of deportation statutes, the term 'entry' is a technical term of art meaning an arrival from a foreign port or place. A person arriving in the continental United States from a U.S. territory or possession, such as the Philippines prior to its independence, has not made an 'entry' and is therefore not subject to deportation for crimes committed 'after entry'.
Facts:
- The respondent, Gonzales, was born in the Philippine Islands in 1913, at which time it was a territory of the United States, making him a U.S. national.
- In 1930, Gonzales came from the Philippine Islands to the continental United States.
- The Philippine Independence Act of 1934 reclassified citizens of the Philippine Islands as aliens for U.S. immigration purposes.
- In 1941, Gonzales was convicted in California of assault with a deadly weapon and sentenced to imprisonment for one year.
- In 1950, Gonzales was convicted in Washington of second-degree burglary and received an indeterminate sentence with a minimum term of two years.
Procedural Posture:
- In 1951, after an administrative hearing, Gonzales was ordered deported to the Philippine Islands under the Immigration Act of 1917.
- After being taken into custody, Gonzales filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California.
- The District Court, a federal trial court, dismissed the petition.
- Gonzales, as appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, an intermediate federal appellate court.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's judgment and ordered Gonzales's release.
- The government, represented by the District Director of Immigration (Barber), petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does a person born as a United States national in the Philippine Islands who came to the continental United States prior to the Philippine Independence Act of 1934 make an 'entry' within the meaning of § 19(a) of the Immigration Act of 1917, thereby making him deportable for crimes committed after his arrival?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Chief Justice Warren
No. A person coming from the Philippines to the continental U.S. before the Philippine Independence Act did not make an 'entry' under the Immigration Act of 1917. The term 'entry' in this statute is a technical word that has been judicially construed to mean an arrival from a 'foreign port or place.' When Gonzales arrived in 1930, he was a U.S. national moving from one U.S. insular possession to the mainland, not arriving from a foreign country. Since the deportation statute applies only to aliens who commit crimes 'after entry,' and Gonzales never made such an entry, he cannot be deported under that provision. The Court emphasized that deportation statutes, which can inflict the 'equivalent of banishment or exile,' must be strictly construed, and technical words must be given their usual technical meaning absent clear congressional intent to the contrary.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Minton
Yes. Gonzales's arrival should be considered an 'entry' subjecting him to deportation. The word 'entry' should be given its ordinary, common-sense meaning of coming into the country, rather than a strained, special construction. The majority's strict interpretation improperly favors a convicted alien criminal over the interests of the United States in protecting its citizens. It is not sound public policy to construe statutes in a way that forces the nation to retain alien criminals. The precedent in United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith supports giving 'entry' its ordinary meaning, and the cases relied upon by the majority are distinguishable.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the legal definition of 'entry' in immigration law as a term of art requiring arrival from a foreign nation, not merely a physical crossing into the United States. It demonstrates the judicial principle that deportation statutes, due to their severe consequences, are to be strictly construed against the government. The case limits the government's ability to retroactively apply changes in a territory's status (like Philippine independence) to deport individuals who originally arrived as U.S. nationals. This ruling established a clear precedent that influenced how similar cases involving individuals from U.S. territories were handled and was later codified by Congress.
