Barb v. Wallace
412 A.2d 1314, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (West) 999, 45 Md. App. 271 (1980)
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Rule of Law:
A seller's oral statements regarding a good's quality and its suitability for a buyer's stated purpose can create genuine issues of material fact as to the existence of an express warranty and an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, making the case generally unsuitable for resolution by summary judgment.
Facts:
- George William Barb, age sixteen, purchased a used gasoline engine for five dollars from Robert Wallace.
- Barb informed Wallace that he intended to use the engine in a go-cart.
- Wallace told Barb that he had been using the engine for farm uses and that it 'ran real good.'
- Wallace also affirmed that the engine would work for a go-cart because the shaft was positioned on the side of the engine.
- Relying on Wallace's statements, Barb declined to start the engine before completing the purchase.
- Approximately twenty minutes after arriving home, Barb attempted to start the engine.
- The engine started and then immediately exploded, causing severe injuries to Barb's head.
Procedural Posture:
- George Barb and his father sued Robert Wallace in the Circuit Court for Allegany County, a state trial court.
- The trial court sustained Wallace's demurrer to the original declaration.
- The Barbs filed an amended declaration alleging tort, breach of warranties, and recovery of medical expenses.
- Wallace filed a motion for summary judgment.
- The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Wallace on all counts.
- The Barbs, as appellants, appealed the summary judgment on the warranty and medical expense counts to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, an intermediate appellate court.
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Issue:
Does a seller's oral affirmation that a used engine 'ran real good' and was suitable for the buyer's stated purpose create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the existence of express and implied warranties, thereby making summary judgment for the seller inappropriate?
Opinions:
Majority - Couch, J.
Yes. The seller's statements create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the existence of both express and implied warranties, making summary judgment for the seller inappropriate. The court reasoned that a seller's affirmations of fact about a good's quality and suitability can constitute warranties, and determining whether such warranties exist is typically a question of fact for a jury. For the express warranty claim, Wallace's statement that the engine 'ran real good' is susceptible to more than one permissible inference: it could be a mere statement of past experience, or it could be an affirmation of the engine's present quality and condition. Because a reasonable inference supports the existence of a warranty, the choice between inferences must be made by a trier of fact. For the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, Wallace knew Barb's intended use (a go-cart). The key disputed element is whether Barb, who was taking a mechanics course, relied on Wallace's skill and judgment. The court found this created a factual dispute that should not be resolved on summary judgment, as Barb may have relied on Wallace's knowledge of this specific engine regardless of his own general knowledge.
Analysis:
This decision underscores the principle that the existence of oral warranties is primarily a question of fact, making it difficult to resolve such claims through summary judgment. It reinforces that even a non-merchant seller can create an implied warranty of fitness under the UCC if the specific circumstances, such as the buyer's reliance on the seller's particular knowledge, support it. The case serves as a precedent for sending warranty disputes based on oral representations to the jury, limiting a trial court's ability to dismiss them as a matter of law.
