Banks v. Dretke
540 U.S. 668 (2004)
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Rule of Law:
When prosecutors suppress material evidence favorable to an accused, such as the fact that a key witness is a paid informant, and mislead the defense by representing that all discoverable material has been disclosed, the defendant has established the requisite 'cause' and 'prejudice' to excuse a procedural default and pursue a Brady claim in a federal habeas proceeding.
Facts:
- In April 1980, police found the body of 16-year-old Richard Whitehead, who had been shot three times.
- Investigation led police to Delma Banks, Jr., who was seen with Whitehead on the night of the murder.
- Robert Farr, a confidential informant, was paid $200 by Deputy Sheriff Willie Huff to help locate Banks's gun.
- Farr induced Banks to travel with him to Dallas by telling Banks he needed a gun to commit robberies.
- Following Banks's arrest, police recovered the murder weapon from Charles Cook, who stated Banks had left it with him.
- At trial, Cook testified that Banks confessed to the murder and falsely claimed he had not discussed his testimony with anyone, despite having been intensively coached by prosecutors.
- At both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial, Farr falsely testified that he was not a paid informant, had not been promised anything by police, and had not informed police about the Dallas trip.
- During the penalty phase, Farr's testimony that Banks planned to commit future robberies and would "take care of" any trouble was the centerpiece of the prosecution's argument for Banks's future dangerousness.
Procedural Posture:
- Delma Banks, Jr., was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in a Texas state trial court.
- The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the state's highest criminal court, affirmed the conviction and sentence on direct appeal.
- Banks's first two state postconviction motions were denied.
- Banks filed a third state postconviction motion alleging, among other things, a Brady violation concerning witness Robert Farr. This motion was denied by the state courts.
- Banks filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.
- Following an evidentiary hearing, a Magistrate Judge recommended granting habeas relief as to the death sentence based on the Farr Brady claim and trial counsel's ineffectiveness.
- The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge's recommendation but denied Banks's request for a certificate of appealability on a separate Brady claim concerning witness Charles Cook.
- On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the grant of relief, holding the Farr Brady claim was procedurally barred, and affirmed the denial of the certificate of appealability for the Cook claim.
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Issue:
Does the State's suppression of evidence that a key penalty-phase witness was a paid police informant, coupled with the State's misrepresentations that it had disclosed all exculpatory evidence, constitute cause and prejudice sufficient to excuse the petitioner's procedural default and warrant federal habeas relief from his death sentence under Brady v. Maryland?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Ginsburg
Yes. The State's suppression of evidence and its misrepresentations constitute cause and prejudice, warranting federal habeas relief. A petitioner shows 'cause' for failing to develop facts in state court when the State suppresses the relevant evidence. Here, Banks established cause under the three-part test from Strickler v. Greene: 1) the prosecution withheld evidence of Farr's informant status; 2) Banks reasonably relied on the prosecution's pretrial representation that it would disclose all Brady material; and 3) the State confirmed this reliance by denying Farr was an informant in state habeas proceedings. The State's misconduct was compounded by its allowing Farr to perjure himself on the stand. The suppressed evidence was 'prejudicial' because it was material to the death sentence. Farr's testimony was the linchpin of the State's penalty-phase case for future dangerousness, and evidence of his informant status and role in setting Banks up would have severely undermined his credibility, creating a reasonable probability of a different result.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Justice Thomas
No. While concurring that a certificate of appealability should have issued on the Cook claim, the suppressed evidence regarding Farr's informant status was not prejudicial. To demonstrate prejudice under Kyles v. Whitley, Banks must show the evidence puts the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict. The jury knew Banks had committed a random and wanton murder, had violently pistol-whipped a relative, and, by his own admission, was willing to supply a 'death weapon' for use in armed robberies. Given this substantial evidence of future dangerousness, there is no reasonable probability that knowing Farr was paid $200 would have caused the jury to alter its finding on the special issue. The brutality of the crime itself, combined with Banks's admitted willingness to abet other violent crimes, was sufficient for the jury to impose the death penalty.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the 'cause' prong of the 'cause and prejudice' standard for overcoming procedural default in federal habeas corpus cases involving Brady violations. It establishes that a defendant is not required to 'scavenge for hints of undisclosed Brady material' when the prosecution has affirmatively represented that all such material has been disclosed. The decision reinforces the high ethical and constitutional duties of prosecutors, holding that their concealment and misrepresentation create the external impediment necessary to excuse a defendant's failure to develop facts in state court. It strongly rejects a 'prosecutor may hide, defendant must seek' standard, thereby strengthening defendants' ability to litigate meritorious Brady claims discovered late in the process due to state misconduct.
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