Ballew v. Aiello
1967 Mo. App. LEXIS 553, 422 S.W.2d 396 (1967)
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Rule of Law:
An act cannot be considered negligent if it is not the conscious act of a person's volition. Actions performed in a state of mental confusion upon being suddenly roused from sleep lack the requisite volition to establish liability for negligence.
Facts:
- Gerald M. Gilmore was a passenger in a car driven by Michael Aiello and was dozing in the front passenger seat after a large meal.
- Aiello drove the vehicle's right wheels off the blacktop pavement and onto the rough shoulder of the road.
- The vehicle began bouncing on the rough shoulder, and another passenger shouted in alarm.
- The commotion suddenly roused Gilmore from sleep.
- Upon waking, Gilmore saw what he perceived to be a large rock, about 12 to 15 inches big, on the shoulder directly in the car's path.
- Immediately and instinctively, Gilmore grabbed the steering wheel with both hands and gave it a sharp jerk to the left.
- Gilmore's action caused the Aiello vehicle to swerve back onto the pavement and into the opposing lane of traffic.
- The Aiello vehicle then collided with an oncoming car in which Ruth Ballew was a passenger, causing her injuries.
Procedural Posture:
- Ruth Ballew sued driver Michael Aiello and passenger Gerald M. Gilmore in a Missouri trial court for personal injuries.
- The case was tried before a jury.
- At the close of all evidence, Gilmore's motion for a directed verdict was overruled by the trial court.
- The jury found for Ballew and the court entered a judgment of $1,000 against both defendants.
- Defendant Gilmore, as the sole appellant, appealed the judgment to the Springfield Court of Appeals, an intermediate appellate court in Missouri.
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Issue:
Does a passenger's instinctive physical act of grabbing and jerking a steering wheel, performed while in a state of mental confusion upon being suddenly roused from sleep, constitute a volitional act required to establish liability for negligence?
Opinions:
Majority - Stone, J.
No. A passenger's instinctive physical act, performed while in a state of mental confusion upon waking, does not constitute the volitional act required to establish liability for negligence. To create liability, an act must be a conscious exercise of a person's will. The court reasons that the law does not hold individuals responsible for actions taken without volition, such as when they are suddenly stricken by a loss of consciousness or are involuntarily asleep. Citing precedent from Stokes v. Carlson, the court extends this principle to the 'state of mental confusion occurring on waking from sound slumber,' where the 'mind and will' are 'in abeyance.' Gilmore's action was not a conscious choice but an instantaneous, involuntary reaction to a perceived peril upon being awakened. Because the evidence affirmatively established a lack of volitional action, Gilmore cannot be held liable for negligence as a matter of law.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the foundational tort principle that negligence requires a voluntary act (volition). The court's holding clarifies and extends the 'no volition' defense, typically applied to drivers who fall asleep or suffer sudden medical emergencies, to passengers whose actions are purely reflexive upon waking. It establishes that the key inquiry is the actor's state of consciousness and ability to make a choice, not their role in the vehicle. This precedent is significant for future cases involving defendants who cause harm through sudden, involuntary physical reactions, providing a strong basis to argue that such reflexive conduct lacks the necessary element of volition for a negligence claim.
