Ballard v. United States
1946 U.S. LEXIS 1658, 329 U.S. 187, 67 S. Ct. 261 (1946)
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Rule of Law:
The purposeful and systematic exclusion of women from federal grand and petit jury panels in a state where they are eligible for jury service violates the statutory scheme established by Congress, which requires that juries be chosen from a fair cross-section of the community.
Facts:
- Petitioners, a mother and her son, were leaders and promoters of the 'I Am' movement.
- The movement was presented as a religious organization.
- Petitioners used the United States mails to solicit funds and support for the movement.
- The government alleged that the movement was a fraudulent scheme and that petitioners were using the mails to defraud people.
Procedural Posture:
- Petitioners were indicted for mail fraud and conspiracy in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California.
- Petitioners filed a motion to quash the indictment and a challenge to the petit jury array, arguing women were systematically excluded; the trial court denied the motions.
- Following a trial, petitioners were convicted.
- Petitioners (as appellants) appealed to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed the conviction on other grounds.
- The United States (as petitioner) successfully sought a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court, which reversed the Circuit Court of Appeals and remanded the case back to it for consideration of petitioners' other claims.
- On remand, the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the original District Court conviction.
- Petitioners (as petitioners) successfully sought a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Circuit Court's affirmance of their conviction.
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Issue:
Does the systematic and intentional exclusion of women, who are eligible for jury service under state law, from federal grand and petit jury panels violate the congressionally mandated scheme for federal jury selection?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Douglas
Yes. The purposeful and systematic exclusion of women from the jury panel was a departure from the scheme of jury selection which Congress adopted. The federal statutes governing juror qualifications are designed to make the jury a 'cross-section of the community.' While federal law looks to state law to determine who is qualified to be a juror, the method of selecting from that qualified pool is a matter of federal law. The two sexes are not fungible, and excluding one deprives the jury of a 'flavor, a distinct quality,' making it less representative of the community. This error is not harmless and does not require a showing of specific prejudice; the injury is to the jury system itself, the law as an institution, and the democratic ideal. Because the grand jury that issued the indictment was also improperly constituted, the indictment must be dismissed.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Burton
No. The exclusion of women did not violate the statutory scheme because federal law defers to state law on juror qualifications. At the time, California law made women eligible for jury service but treated the provision as directory, not mandatory, and state courts commonly empaneled all-male juries. The federal district court was therefore within its discretion to conform its practice to that of the state. Congress itself requires the exclusion of women from federal juries in states where they are ineligible for state service, indicating no fundamental right is infringed by their absence. The exclusion of women is not comparable to the exclusion of an economic class, as in Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., and does not warrant retroactively disapproving an established practice that has since been corrected.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Jackson
The concurring opinions do not directly answer the issue, arguing instead that the Court should not have reached the jury selection question at all. Justice Jackson, concurring in the result only, argued that the petitioners had abandoned their objection to the jury's composition in prior appeals. He would have dismissed the indictment on the substantive grounds that the Court's prior ruling—prohibiting inquiry into the truth of religious beliefs—left no statutory basis for a mail fraud conviction. Justice Frankfurter similarly argued the jury point was waived and that the Court was irresponsibly avoiding the central First Amendment issue, as the government could simply re-indict the petitioners before a properly constituted grand jury.
Analysis:
This case solidifies the 'fair cross-section' requirement for federal jury selection, extending the principle beyond racial groups to include women. By exercising its supervisory power over federal courts, the Supreme Court established a national standard for inclusiveness that could be more demanding than local state practices. The decision signals that the representativeness of the jury is a foundational component of the federal judicial process, and a violation of this principle is a structural error that harms the entire system, not just the individual defendant. This precedent paved the way for future challenges to jury selection practices that systematically exclude any significant and distinct community group.
