Baker v. State of Vermont
744 A.2d 864 (1999)
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Rule of Law:
Under the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution, the state is constitutionally required to extend to same-sex couples the common benefits and protections that flow from marriage under state law. The legislature retains the authority to decide whether to achieve this through inclusion in the marriage statutes themselves or through a parallel legal system such as a domestic partnership or civil union.
Facts:
- Plaintiffs consisted of three same-sex couples: Stan Baker and Peter Harrigan; Lois Farnham and Holly Puterbaugh; and Nina Beck and Stacy Jolles.
- Each couple had been in a committed, long-term relationship for periods ranging from four to twenty-five years.
- Two of the plaintiff couples, Farnham/Puterbaugh and Beck/Jolles, were raising children together.
- Each couple applied for a marriage license from their respective town clerk in Vermont.
- Each couple was refused a marriage license on the grounds that they were ineligible under Vermont's marriage laws, which were understood to apply only to opposite-sex couples.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiffs (three same-sex couples) sued the State of Vermont and three municipalities in the Vermont Superior Court, a state trial court.
- Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the defendants' refusal to issue them marriage licenses violated state statutes and the Vermont Constitution.
- The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
- The trial court granted the defendants' motions, ruling that the marriage statutes did not permit same-sex marriage and that this exclusion did not violate the Vermont Constitution.
- The plaintiffs appealed the trial court's dismissal of their case to the Vermont Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does the State of Vermont's exclusion of same-sex couples from the benefits and protections of civil marriage violate the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution?
Opinions:
Majority - Amestoy, C.J.
Yes, the State's exclusion of same-sex couples from the benefits and protections of civil marriage violates the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution. The State is constitutionally required to extend to same-sex couples the common benefits and protections that flow from marriage under Vermont law. The court first determined that the plain meaning of Vermont's existing marriage statutes contemplated marriage as a union between a man and a woman. It then turned to the constitutional question under the Vermont Constitution's Common Benefits Clause (Article 7), analyzing it independently from the federal Equal Protection Clause. The court established a unified standard of review, asking whether the exclusion of a part of the community from a public benefit bears a 'reasonable and just relation to the governmental purpose.' The State’s primary justification for the exclusion—furthering the link between procreation and child-rearing—was found to be unreasonable. The law was significantly underinclusive, as it granted marriage benefits to many opposite-sex couples who cannot or do not procreate, and it illogically excluded same-sex couples who do raise children, often with the state's legal approval through adoption. The court concluded that none of the state's asserted interests provided a reasonable and just basis for the exclusion. As a remedy, the court directed the Legislature to enact legislation to provide these benefits, either by including same-sex couples within the marriage statutes or by creating a parallel legal status, and suspended its judgment to allow time for legislative action.
Concurring - Dooley, J.
Yes, the exclusion violates the Vermont Constitution, but the majority's reasoning is flawed. This is a civil rights case that should have been analyzed under the Court's established, multi-tiered framework for equal protection claims, not under the majority's new, single-standard balancing test. This new test is an activist standard that inappropriately equates civil rights discrimination with economic regulation and will lead to unpredictable judicial review of legislative acts. The proper approach would have been to recognize lesbians and gay men as a suspect classification under Article 7, which would trigger strict scrutiny. Under that more exacting standard, the State's justifications would clearly fail. While the result is correct, the majority's rationale abandons established jurisprudence and creates an unmoored, overly discretionary standard for future cases.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Johnson, J.
Yes, the exclusion is unconstitutional, but the majority's remedy is an abdication of judicial duty. The proper analysis is that the marriage statutes create an unlawful sex-based classification, as an individual's right to marry is denied solely based on the sex of their chosen partner. This classification fails even a rational basis review because the state’s justifications are based on outdated and impermissible sex-role stereotypes. While concurring in the constitutional holding, the dissent is from the remedy. The Court has a constitutional duty to provide prompt and complete relief for a civil rights violation. Instead of suspending its judgment and deferring to the Legislature, the Court should have immediately enjoined the State from denying marriage licenses to the plaintiffs. This judicial deference to the political process is inappropriate in a civil rights context and leaves the plaintiffs without a certain remedy.
Analysis:
This landmark case was the first time a state's highest court ruled that the state constitution required equal benefits for same-sex couples. It led directly to the Vermont Legislature creating the legal status of 'civil unions,' the first of its kind in the United States, which provided a parallel legal structure to marriage. The decision established a new, more holistic standard of review for equality claims under the Vermont Constitution, departing from the tiered-scrutiny model used in federal jurisprudence. The court's unique remedy of deferring to the legislature on implementation set a significant precedent for how courts might address judicially mandated remedies for complex and politically sensitive social issues.
