Baker v. Nelson
1971 Minn. LEXIS 1032, 191 N.W.2d 185, 291 Minn. 310 (1971)
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Rule of Law:
A state law defining marriage as a union between persons of the opposite sex does not violate the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, nor any other provision of the U.S. Constitution.
Facts:
- Richard John Baker and James Michael McConnell, two adult males, applied for a marriage license in Hennepin County, Minnesota.
- Gerald R. Nelson, the clerk of the district court, refused to issue them a license.
- Nelson's sole reason for the denial was that Baker and McConnell were of the same sex.
- It was undisputed that there were no other statutory impediments that would prevent either Baker or McConnell from entering into a heterosexual marriage.
Procedural Posture:
- Petitioners Richard John Baker and James Michael McConnell sought an alternative writ of mandamus from the Hennepin County District Court (trial court) to compel respondent Gerald R. Nelson to issue them a marriage license.
- The trial court quashed the writ of mandamus and specifically directed that a marriage license not be issued to the petitioners.
- Petitioners (as appellants) appealed the trial court's orders to the Supreme Court of Minnesota.
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Issue:
Does Minnesota's statutory prohibition of same-sex marriage violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution?
Opinions:
Majority - Peterson, J.
No, Minnesota's statutory prohibition of same-sex marriage does not violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. First, the court concluded that state marriage statutes, using terms like 'husband and wife' and 'bride and groom,' implicitly define marriage as a union between persons of the opposite sex. Second, the court held this definition is not unconstitutional. It reasoned that the right to marry a person of the same sex is not a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause, distinguishing precedents like Griswold v. Connecticut which protected privacy within the existing marital relationship, not a right to redefine it. The court characterized marriage as a historic institution for procreation and child-rearing. Regarding equal protection, the court found no irrational or invidious discrimination, stating that a classification based on the 'fundamental difference in sex' is distinct from the unconstitutional racial classifications struck down in Loving v. Virginia.
Analysis:
This decision was a foundational early ruling that upheld state prohibitions on same-sex marriage against federal constitutional challenges. It established the legal rationale that marriage's traditional definition, tied to procreation and opposite-sex couples, was a legitimate state interest that did not invidiously discriminate. The U.S. Supreme Court's dismissal of the subsequent appeal 'for want of a substantial federal question' gave this ruling significant precedential weight, influencing courts nationwide for decades to deny marriage rights to same-sex couples until the legal landscape was fundamentally altered by cases like Obergefell v. Hodges in 2015.
