Bailey v. Bly
1967 Ill. App. LEXIS 1277, 231 N.E.2d 8, 87 Ill.App.2d 259 (1967)
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Rule of Law:
For strict liability to be imposed under the Illinois dog statute, the dog must be an active agent in causing the injury; liability does not attach when the dog is merely a passive, inert force that a person trips over.
Facts:
- Jerold Bly owned a dog named Lady and lived next door to his parents, Cleo and Vola Bly.
- Jerold's aunt, Ruth Bailey, was visiting the home of Cleo and Vola Bly.
- As Bailey was leaving the house, she carried a suitcase with clothing draped over it, which may have obscured her view.
- The dog, Lady, was lying in the doorway.
- Bailey commanded Lady to move, and the dog moved from the doorway to the top step of the porch and lay down again.
- Assuming the dog had moved completely off the porch, Bailey did not see Lady lying on the top step.
- Bailey walked toward the steps, tripped over the dog, and fell to the pavement, suffering personal injuries.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiff Ruth Bailey sued Jerold Bly (the owner) and Cleo and Vola Bly (as alleged harborers) in the Circuit Court of Sangamon County under the state's dog liability statute.
- Both the defendants and the plaintiff filed motions for summary judgment.
- The trial court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment, finding the statute did not apply and that Cleo and Vola Bly were not keepers of the dog.
- Judgment was entered in favor of all defendants.
- The plaintiff, Ruth Bailey, appealed the trial court's judgment to the appellate court.
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Issue:
Does a dog that is passively lying in a person's path 'injure' that person within the meaning of the Illinois dog statute, thereby imposing strict liability on its owner, if the person trips over it?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Presiding Justice Craven
No. A dog does not 'injure' a person under the statute when it is merely a passive force involved in an accident. The court held that the statute requires some overt act or active behavior on the part of the dog that causes the injury. The court distinguished this case from precedent like McEvoy v. Brown, where a dog actively ran between a person's legs. Here, the dog was an 'inert or passive force,' and its involvement was not related to its nature as a dog. The legislature did not intend to impose absolute liability as a 'pure penalty for dog ownership' where the dog's own behavior did not cause the harm.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrows the application of the Illinois dog statute, which imposes strict liability. The court establishes a crucial distinction between injuries caused by a dog's active behavior versus its passive presence. By requiring an 'overt act' by the dog, the ruling prevents the statute from being applied to situations where a dog is merely a static condition or obstacle, similar to a piece of furniture. This precedent forces future courts to scrutinize the dog's specific conduct to determine if it was an active cause of the injury, rather than simply being present at the scene.
