Bailey Ex Rel. Bailey v. Morris
323 N.W.2d 785, 1982 Minn. LEXIS 1752 (1982)
Rule of Law:
Under Minnesota's strict liability dog bite statute (Minn.Stat. § 347.22), which imposes liability on owners when a dog injures someone 'without provocation,' an unintentional act by the injured person can constitute provocation, and whether such an act occurred is a question of fact for the jury.
Facts:
- Barbara Bailey, a minor, sustained a cut on her forehead after being bitten by a dog belonging to the Morrises, her neighbors.
- The Morrises owned two dogs, each of which had recently given birth to a litter of puppies.
- The Morrises were aware that neighborhood children, including Barbara, were attracted to the puppies.
- On March 6, 1977, several children, including Barbara, came to the Morris home and asked to see the puppies, which were kept in the basement.
- Mrs. Morris warned the children before they went downstairs that 'mother dogs are very nervous and you have to be careful with them when they are with their puppies.'
- According to the Morris children, the dog, Tokar, was growling when Barbara approached her.
- Despite the warnings and the dog's growling, Barbara reached out to pet Tokar.
- Tokar bit Barbara, resulting in a 4½ centimeter cut on her forehead, which required stitches and subsequent cosmetic surgery.
Procedural Posture:
- Barbara Bailey sued Mr. and Mrs. Morris in a trial court on a theory of strict liability under Minn.Stat. § 347.22.
- Bailey moved for a directed verdict on the issue of liability, which the trial court denied.
- The trial court submitted the issue of provocation to the jury via a special interrogatory.
- The jury found that the dog bit Barbara because it was provoked.
- The trial court entered judgment based on the jury's verdict in favor of the Morrises.
- Barbara Bailey, as the appellant, appealed the trial court's judgment.
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Issue:
Does an unintentional act, such as a child attempting to pet a growling dog despite warnings, constitute 'provocation' under Minnesota's strict liability dog bite statute, thereby relieving the dog owner of liability?
Opinions:
Majority - Otis, Justice
Yes, an unintentional act, such as a child attempting to pet a growling dog despite warnings, can constitute 'provocation' under Minnesota's strict liability dog bite statute, and whether such an act occurred is a question of fact for the jury. The Minnesota dog bite statute, Minn.Stat. § 347.22, imposes liability on a dog owner when the dog attacks 'without provocation.' The court has previously established that provocation is an issue of fact properly submitted to the jury, citing Mondry v. Maloney. While an earlier common law case, Fake v. Addicks, suggested provocation must be voluntary and invite injury, the current statute's interpretation can encompass unintentional acts, a position supported by other jurisdictions. The jury in this case could reasonably believe that Barbara, by approaching a growling dog and attempting to pet it despite explicit warnings about the mother dog's nervousness, engaged in a provocative act. This situation is distinguished from an inadvertent act like tripping on a dog. The court clarified that the inquiry into provocation under the statute is distinct from a defense of comparative negligence, which is not available in strict liability actions. Although the wording of the special interrogatory to the jury was not ideal, it was not so prejudicial as to warrant reversal, as the evidence presented focused solely on Barbara's actions as the source of provocation.
Dissenting - Todd, Justice
No, the act of a minor child attempting to pet a dog should not, as a matter of law, be considered a provocative act under the statute, and submitting this issue to the jury in a strict liability case was improper. Justice Todd argues that the trial court's instructions and the majority's opinion contradict the precedent set in Seim v. Garavalia, decided after this trial, which comprehensively analyzed the dog bite statute and concluded that submitting a minor plaintiff's negligence to the jury is improper due to the statute's imposition of absolute liability. Seim upheld a directed verdict on statutory liability even when petting a dog was involved. By focusing on the minor's act as 'provocation,' the majority is effectively reintroducing the concept of the minor's negligence into a strict liability claim, which Seim sought to prevent. Therefore, Justice Todd would hold, as a matter of law, that a minor child's attempt to pet a dog does not constitute a provocative act under the statute, and would reverse the trial court's decision, remanding for a new trial on all issues, including damages.
Dissenting - Wahl, Justice
Justice Wahl agrees with Justice Todd's dissent, concurring with the position that the child's act of petting the dog in this case was no more provocative than the act considered in Seim v. Garavalia.
Analysis:
This case is significant for clarifying the scope of 'provocation' under Minnesota's strict liability dog bite statute, distinguishing it from general comparative negligence principles. It reinforces that provocation is a question of fact for the jury, but expands the definition to include unintentional acts, particularly when the injured party had warnings or notice of the dog's disposition. This ruling potentially shifts some burden to plaintiffs, even minors, to demonstrate that their actions did not induce the attack, thereby creating a more nuanced application of strict liability in dog bite cases. Future cases will likely rely on this decision to argue that specific actions, even if seemingly innocuous or unintentional, could constitute a statutory defense against strict liability claims.
